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OCT 28 1953

Vol. LXXIV, 4

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM
WHOLE No. 296

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

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OCTOBER, 1953

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

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The American Journal of Philology is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 50 cents, Canadian postage 25 cents, extra); single numbers, \$2.00 each.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell, The Johns Hopkins University; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 3, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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ISONOMIA.

I.

That *Isonomia* preceded *Demokratia* as the common name for popular government is reasonably clear from the Debate on Constitutions in Herodotus, III, 80 ff.¹ The form of government here named *Isonomia* is "the rule of the masses"² in contrast to both tyranny and oligarchy; it is identified in the most positive way by the characteristic devices of the democratic constitution: election by lot, the audit of public officials, the power of the assembly to discuss and decide all questions of public policy.³ The omission of the word, *Demokratia*, in this context can hardly be accidental. For the debate goes on for several paragraphs, and if Herodotus, or his source,⁴ had known the word at this time, we would expect some use of it⁵ such as we

¹ The same conclusion from this text is reached by J. A. O. Larsen, "Cleisthenes and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens," in *Essays in Political Theory, presented to G. H. Sabine* (Ithaca, 1948), pp. 1 ff. My great debt to this paper will be evident from the sequel, though I cannot agree with it in every detail. See also Debrunner, "Demokratia," in *Festschrift für E. Tièche* (Bern, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

² III, 80, 6, *πλήθος ἄρχον* [= *δῆμος κρατέων*]; cf. 81, 1, *ἐς τὸ πλῆθος . . . φέρειν τὸ κράτος*.

³ III, 80, 6.

⁴ I concede the possibility that Herodotus was drawing on an earlier source (cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 4), but attach no particular importance to it. If true, this would obviously strengthen my argument as to the early currency of *Isonomia* as a name for democracy.

⁵ And not only in the speeches, but also in the narrative sequel at III, 83, 1, where *Isonomia* has no ornamental function but simply serves

find in later portions of the *History* of Herodotus.⁶ The only ground on which this argument could be overruled would be some evidence that *Demokratia* was already in common use by the time of Herodotus' Debate on Constitutions or that of his source. This Ehrenberg thinks he can supply from the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus.⁷ His splendid analysis of this neglected source of democratic ideology certainly establishes the fact that the *idea* expressed by *Demokratia* was perfectly clear to Aeschylus and his audience; it is exactly rendered in such phrases as "the people who rule the state" (τὸ δάμιον τὸ πτόλιν κρατύνει) and "the people's ruling hand" (δήμον κρατοῦσα χεῖρ) which, as Ehrenberg illuminatingly puts it, can mean nothing else but "ὁ δῆμος κρατῶν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, that is to say, that the show of hands is the expression of the people's rule, of *Demokratia*."⁸

as the writer's name for the form of government espoused by Otanes. I might add that I believe (with Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*) that *demos* may mean the democratic form of government, and (with J. E. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus*) that instances of this sense occur in this debate. Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 6, n. 16) argues that at 81, 3; 82, 1; 82, 5 *demos* means "the people as the ruling body" and, therefore, cannot mean this form of government. That this disjunction is inadmissible seems to me clear from the use of κατάλυσσις τοῦ δήμου as equivalent to κατάλυσσις τῆς δημοκρατίας in official texts. ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου occurs in the Bouleutic Oath (*ap. Demosth.*, XXIV, 144), introduced "five years after this [the Cleisthenean] order" (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 2), probably in 501/0 (von Fritz and Kapp, *ad loc.*, in their translation with notes of this work [New York, 1950]). *Per contra*, the law ("of Solon," but obviously liberally re-drafted) enacted in 410 reads ἐάν τις τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταλύῃ (*ap. Andoc.*, I, 96). I suggest that in this Debate Herodotus is in the position of the drafters of the early democratic legislation, who had to use the concrete *demos* for the idea which would be more formally expressed by *Demokratia*, once the latter became current. Herodotus generally uses μοναρχίῃ (or τυραννίς) as the name of monarchy; but at least once (82, 1) he makes the concrete μούναρχος express the abstract idea, paralleling the usage of *demos* for *Demokratia*.

⁶ δημοκρατέσθαι, δημοκρατίας at VI, 43, 3; δημοκρατίην at VI, 131, 1. For the earlier date of the "Persian History" see especially J. E. Powell, *The History of Herodotus* (Cambridge, 1939).

⁷ "Origins of Democracy," *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 515 ff. (I shall refer hereafter to this paper by the abbreviation "OD"). My debt to all of Ehrenberg's work is very great and no less so at the very points where, as will appear, I have disagreed with him; the ideas expressed throughout this paper have been sharpened by his careful and imaginative analysis of the evidence.

⁸ OD, p. 522.

But it is one thing to have a phrase for an idea, quite another to have a word which compresses the whole phrase into a single, abstract noun that stands as the proper name of democracy; the evidence which is quite enough to establish the former could hardly justify Ehrenberg's inference that "it is almost certain" that the word, *Demokratia*, was "not unknown" to Aeschylus at this time.

Now the words *isonomous*, *Isonomia* occur respectively in two well-known texts, both earlier than the Debate in Herodotus or its source: the Song of Harmodius⁹ and Alcmaeon, fragment 4.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the political meaning of the word which is so gloriously plain in Herodotus is by no means explicit in these texts, and must be reconstructed. Here we surely may proceed by extrapolation from Herodotus, for it is extremely unlikely that a word which proclaims democracy so belligerently in Herodotus could be telling a radically different story a few years, or, at the most, decades earlier. What then shall we make of Ehrenberg's view that in both of these early texts *Isonomia* is an "aristocratic conception," and means the "equality of noblemen, as contrasted with lack of equality expressed in the rule of one man"?¹¹

The gravest objection to this view is stated by Ehrenberg himself when he remarks that "it remains [on his theory] something of a puzzle how the aristocratic *Isonomia* could so quickly become the watchword of democracy."¹² Only definite evidence to the

⁹ "Scolia anonyma," nos. 10 and 13 in Diehl, II, pp. 184 ff.

¹⁰ Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th edition, Berlin, 1951-52). All subsequent citations of pre-Socratic fragments refer to this work.

¹¹ *Aspects of the Ancient World* (Oxford, 1946), p. 89. See also his article, *Isonomia*, in *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, cols. 293 ff.

¹² OD, *loc. cit.* The solution he offers for this "puzzle" is that Cleisthenes used to his own radically different purpose "the ideas and the slogans which had dominated the actual liberation" (p. 534). This surely begs the real problem. If *Isonomia* had meant only a year or two before "equality of noblemen" it would be fantastically inept to express the spirit of a new order whose immediate enemies were precisely those who did believe in "equality of noblemen," and whose basic innovations were designed to break the power of the nobles. No amount of cleverness in the art of pouring new wine into old vessels could overcome this flagrant contradiction. To explain the difficulty Ehrenberg would have to argue that Cleisthenes was trying to conciliate the

contrary could overrule its antecedent improbability. But an examination of the texts yields no such evidence whatever.

Consider the first quatrain in our surviving text of the Song of Harmodius:

In a myrtle bough I'll carry my sword,
Like Harmodius and Aristogeiton,
When they slew the tyrant,
And made Athens *isonomous*.

What could be the meaning of *isonomous* here? Let us canvass all the possibilities. Is it being used as

(i) a neutral term which simply means liberation from tyrannic rule, without any positive specification of the sort of government that followed; or

(ii) a term which does describe the ensuing régime, but thinks of it only as the reinstatement of the pre-Peistratid constitution; or finally

(iii) a term which celebrates the new Cleisthenean order?

Now (i) is so unlikely that no one has sponsored it, to my knowledge. A word so rich in meaning could hardly be just a colorless variant for ἐλευθέρους.^{12a} But if this were its actual sense here, it would offer no positive ground for taking this to be "equality of noblemen," since on this hypothesis it means no more than liberation from tyranny. (ii) I think no less unlikely,¹³ for we have not a scrap of evidence that the pre-Peisi-

nobles, which Ehrenberg rightly denies; and if, *per impossibile*, this had been his real aim, he would have reverted to the Solonian *Eunomia*, which, however inadequate to express the spirit of his own constitution, would still be immeasurably closer to it than "equality of noblemen."

^{12a} Larsen (*op. cit.*, pp. 6-10) stresses the opposition to tyranny both in this and other contexts; but I do not understand him to mean that either in the skolion or any other important text *Isonomia* is merely the contradictory of tyranny.

¹³ *Contra*, F. Jacoby, whose view I shall consider directly. Ehrenberg's own view would have to come under this heading, for it assumes that the *skolion* was composed "in the years after 514" when "there was no difference of aims between the Alcmaeonids and the other nobles" (OD, p. 531). Now 514 will not do as the *terminus post quem*; the *skolion* envisages the liberation of Athens as an accomplished fact, and could only have been composed after the expulsion of Hippias at 510, thus forcing Ehrenberg to narrow its dating to the years between 510 and 508. But is there any reason to think of those years as a

stratid order was termed *Isonomia*. As Ehrenberg himself has stressed, Solon's own word for the general spirit of his reforms was not *Isonomia*, but *Eunomia*; ¹⁴ one would therefore expect that only a radical departure from the Solonian constitution would prompt the use of the new word. But even if we suppose that (ii) is right, "equality of noblemen" would still be utterly inept as a description of the pre-Peistratid *status quo*. The Solonian order, where civic rights were apportioned in accordance with income in brutal disregard of birth, could scarcely be thought of as "equality of noblemen"; still less could the modification which followed the deposing of Damasias, where the eupatrids were limited by law to five archonships, three and two others being reserved for non-eupatrid land-owners and artisans respectively. ¹⁵

(iii) is by all odds the most likely hypothesis. The use of *Isonomia*, trivial on the first hypothesis, unaccountable on the second, is not only accountable but profoundly significant as the expression of the spirit of the Cleisthenean reforms, whose combined effect had been, in Aristotle's phrase, to "give the state to the masses." ¹⁶ The only serious objection I can think of to this view would issue from Jacoby's assumption that the *skolion* expresses an anti-Cleisthenean sentiment. But this assumption

political honeymoon between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, with "no difference of aims" between them other than opposition to tyranny? As Ehrenberg himself remarks (p. 540) Cleisthenes must have had a political programme and made it "widely known" before the second intervention by Cleomenes, else the popular party would not have recalled him and turned to him as its natural leader when it defeated Cleomenes and ousted Isagoras. Is it reasonable to think of so radical a programme as a last-minute concoction, rather than the final expression of a long-standing opposition between the general orientation of Cleisthenes and Isagoras, the friend of Sparta? Even apart from this objection, Ehrenberg's case ties him down to an excessively narrow dating of the *skolion*, for which I cannot conceive any argument other than that this date, and this alone, could support the sense of "equality of noblemen" for *isonomous*, which, of course, is arguing in a circle. The reference of the *skolion* to Hipparchus as "the tyrant" argues for a later date than the years immediately following the time when Hippias was the real tyrant and the decisive struggle had to be fought against him.

¹⁴ OD, pp. 534-5; cf. *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 84-5.

¹⁵ Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 13, 2.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, 20, 1. For Cleisthenes as the real founder of Athenian democracy see both Larsen, *op. cit.*, and Ehrenberg in OD.

strikes me as wholly gratuitous.¹⁷ The *skolion's* statement that Harmodius and Aristogeiton "made Athens *isonomous*" surely cannot be pressed to mean "they, and not the Alcmaeonids, made Athens *isonomous*." This is a drinking-song, not a codicil in a legal document, nor the verdict of a historian.¹⁸ I can see no reason at all why the partisans of Cleisthenes should not glorify the tyrannicides in just these words (and also sponsor their heroization) without prejudicing in the least the Alcmaeonid services in "making Athens *isonomous*."¹⁹ Nor need we

¹⁷ I say this with profound respect for the greatest living master of Greek historiography. But after going through the lengthy and vigorous exposition of his view (*Atthis* [Oxford, 1949], pp. 158 ff. and notes, especially notes 52-54 at pp. 339-40), I find only two definite arguments for the view that the *skolion* is anti-Alcmaeonid: that it ascribes the ending of the Peisistratid tyranny (i) not to the Alcmaeonids but to Harmodius and Aristogeiton who (ii) "belonged to one of the great clans . . . , with which Cleisthenes fell out immediately after the expulsion of Hippias" (p. 339, n. 53). (i) I proceed to discuss directly in the text above and in the following note. In the case of (ii) no evidence is offered to support the "falling out" of Cleisthenes with the Gephyraioi; Herodotus, V, 72, 1 (followed by Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 20, 3) gives 700 (noble) families on the side of Cleisthenes, 300 on that of Isagoras; how does Jacoby know that the Gephyraioi were with the minority led by Isagoras, who had been "a friend of the tyrants" (Arist., *ibid.*, and cf. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, VIII [1939], p. 62)?

¹⁸ Though to those who took it as history—a later generation that had no first-hand knowledge of what had happened—it *could* be misleading, and Herodotus may have had just this *skolion* (along with other vehicles of the legend) in mind when he wrote more than two generations after the event, "in my judgment it was they [the Alcmaeonids], much more than Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who liberated Athens" (VI, 123). Those who had lived through the liberation would not have needed this correction. As for Thucydides, *his* correction of the legend (I, 20, 2; VI, 54 ff.) is greatly exercised over the eclipse of the real tyrant, Hippias. But it does not seem intent on vindicating the Alcmaeonid contribution, which it would surely have been if (as Jacoby holds, pp. 159 ff.) so momentous a historical fact had been suppressed in an "official" version in Hellanicus; had this been the case, Thucydides would surely have given more effort to putting the facts straight than the casual phrase that Hippias was "deposed in the fourth year [after the murder of Hipparchus] by the Spartans and the Alcmaeonid exiles" (VI, 59, 4; cf. VI, 53, 3, where the Alcmaeonids are not mentioned at all, and the Spartans seem to be the only liberators).

¹⁹ Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry* [Oxford, 1936], pp. 413 ff.) seems to me to make the same mistake as Jacoby in his interpretation of the

suppose that this tribute to the tyrannicides was without practical political use. None of the many discussions of this topic has taken account of its possible connection with a fact that we know from Aristotle: that after Isagoras and his friends had been expelled and the new constitution had been promulgated, the kin of the exiled Hippias, Hipparchus, son of Charmus (archon at 496/5), was strong enough in Athens to present a grave threat to the new régime, and that Cleisthenes created the ostracism to get rid of him.²⁰ In such a conflict as this the Alcmaeonids would have every reason to work the story of the tyrannicides for all it was worth, and this may well have been both the time of the heroization and the date of the composition of the *skolion*, whose words are not retrospective in tone, but voice a fighting mood directed against a present enemy.²¹ The

skolion, though his conclusion is the very opposite of Jacoby's: "They [the Alcmaeonids] justified themselves [sc. against the charge of collaborating with Sparta in the struggle against Hippias] by falsifying history. They put it about that the real destroyers of tyranny were not the Spartans, nor even the Alcmaeonids, but a pair of blameless young heroes," etc. (p. 415). I submit that (a) the "not . . . nor" clauses in the last sentence have no support in the text, and (b) even if the *skolion* were meant to "falsify" history, it could not fool the generation that had witnessed the actual events. To meet (b) Bowra would have to date the *skolion* much later than he seems willing to do. Certainly the Alcmaeonids would feel much better about sharing the credit for the liberation with the Athenian tyrannicides than with the Spartan army; the less said about Cleomenes in this connection, the better it would be for them; but this is quite another matter from saying that in this *skolion* they are "falsifying history."

²⁰ *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 3-4, which would be further strengthened if, as Meritt has argued (*op. cit.*, p. 63), Hippias' son, the younger Peisistratus, remained in Athens; an ostrakon bearing his name has been found in the excavations of the Agora, and Meritt is inclined to assign his archonship "to one of the available years between 499 and 497." But see, *contra*, A. W. Gomme, *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 327-8.

²¹ Raubitschek's recent argument (*A. J. A.*, LV [1951], pp. 221 ff.) that the ostracism was instituted by Cleisthenes in the same year (487) in which it was first used to expel Hipparchus, son of Charmus, fits exactly the words of Androtion (frag. 6, Jacoby) and is perfectly consistent with the wording of *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 3-4—the only two texts we have to go by. It fits in with his earlier suggestion that 488 is the *terminus post quem* of the erection of the statue of the tyrannicides by Antenor (*A. J. A.*, XLIV [1940], p. 58, n. 2, with references to earlier sponsors of this date and also to other studies which reject it; to the latter K. Schefold, *Museum Helveticum*, III [1946], pp. 59 ff. should now

people who composed and sang these words were doubtless noblemen; but if these noblemen were Cleisthenean partisans, the last thing they could possibly mean by *Isonomia* under such circumstances is "equality of noblemen." It could not have become the favourite song of the radical democrats,²² unless its *Isonomia* was precisely the slogan of the equalitarian democracy which was founded by Cleisthenes and was realized in ever-increasing measure throughout the fifth century.

Nor does Alcmaeon's fragment offer the slightest aid and comfort to the "aristocratic" conception of *Isonomia*. Ehrenberg²³—and he is not the only one²⁴—calls him "the Pythagorean physician." Now as Heidel has pointed out, in what is by far the best extant refutation of the "Pythagoreanism" of Alcmaeon,²⁵ the only thing worthy of the name of evidence on

be added). If Raubitschek's argument is accepted it would suggest (on the above theory) a dating for the *skolion* which fully accounts for the feature I mentioned above, n. 13 *sub fin.* However, the suggestion I make above is obviously not tied to Raubitschek's theories. An earlier date for the enactment of ostracism—say, the year of Hipparchus' archonship (496), which, since the archonship was still elective (*Ath. Pol.*, 22, 5), must have marked a high tide of his influence—would do almost as well. On no account could I accept Carcopino's view (*Les origines de l'ostracisme* [Paris, 1935], p. 23) that the ostracism was enacted in 507 on the sole ground that "la constitution de Clisthène forme un tout indivisible"; it would surely be more than three years from the expulsion of Hippias before his Athenian kinsman could live down the Peisistratid disgrace and begin to recoup his political fortune.

²² Cf. Aristoph., *Wasps*, 1225.

²³ OD, p. 535. Cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 9, who speaks of Alcmaeon as "a Pythagorean from Croton."

²⁴ Zeller's is typical of the earlier view. He includes Alcmaeon in his chapter on "The Pythagoreans," though his examination of Alcmaeon's doctrine leads only to the conclusion that Alcmaeon was "considerably influenced by the Pythagorean philosophy, without having actually adopted it in its totality," *History of Greek Philosophy*, I (Eng. tr., London, 1881), p. 562. Recent writers are more guarded: K. Freeman, *Companion to the Pre-Socratics* (Oxford, 1946), p. 135: "Alcmaeon may or may not have been a Pythagorean."

²⁵ "The Pythagoreans and Greek Mathematics," *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 1 ff. But Heidel weakened his case unnecessarily by swallowing Burnet's assumption (*Early Greek Philosophy* [4th edition, 1930], p. 194) that "Alcmaeon dedicated his treatise" to the Pythagoreans, Brotinus, Leon, Bathyllus (τάδε ἔλεξε . . . Βροτίνῳ, etc.). There is really no reason for this view. We have no parallels for dedications in this period. A discourse which takes the form of personal address, as of

which such a characterization could rest is Aristotle's statement²⁶ that he *may* have derived his doctrine of opposites from the Pythagoreans. The only reason offered by Aristotle for this possibility is that "he expressed himself similarly to them." But when we compare Alcmaeon's opposites as listed by Aristotle himself in this passage (and also with those listed by Aetius at B 4), we find that the two pairs which, on any view (including Aristotle's own), are *characteristic* of Pythagoreanism—the *Peras-Apeiron*, Odd-Even contrasts—are conspicuously missing, and are indeed utterly alien to Alcmaeon's thought according to all our other information about it.²⁷ Moreover, the Pythagorean concept of *Harmonia* is as different from Alcmaeon's concept of *Isonomia* (in B 4) as from the general, Ionian, view from which Alcmaeon's is doubtless derived.²⁸ The general view of harmonious order in pre-Socratic cosmology and Hippocratic medicine is that of equality, i. e. the 1/1 ratio.²⁹ But the Pythagorean discoveries of the concordant intervals in music led them to quite different ratios expressive of *Harmonia*: the 2/1, 3/2, 4/3 ratios, each of them pairs of unequal numbers and thus obviously contrary to the pattern of *Isonomia*. At the same time, Pythagoreanism was a deeply dualistic world-view in a sense which is without parallel in Alcmaeon or any other of the *physiologoi* or medical writers.³⁰ The basic Pythagorean opposites, *Peras-Apeiron*, Odd-Even, are designated Good and Evil principles

Empedocles to Pausanias, conveys exhortation or instruction and does not imply agreement with the views previously held by the addressee. In this case Alcmaeon is surely *opposing* the Pythagorean faith, for he starts off by declaring that (only) the gods can attain *σαφήνεια* about τὰ ἀφανέα, the very things which figured prominently in Pythagorean theology and cosmology, and goes on to limit inquiry to things determinable by means of evidential inference, *τεκμαίρεσθαι*, which expresses a very different temper of mind from that which would accept all kinds of mystical doctrines on the strength of the *αὐτὸς ἔφα* of Pythagoras.

²⁶ *Metaph.*, 986 a 26 ff. For the correct reading see Ross, *ad loc.*, and Heidel, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

²⁷ I have made this point and the one immediately following in a different connection in a review of Raven's *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, *Gnomon*, XXV (1953), pp. 29 ff.

²⁸ See Section III, below, pp. 363-5.

²⁹ Cf. my "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 156 ff.

³⁰ Cf. my remarks in *Phil. Quarterly*, II (1952), at pp. 110 ff. and notes.

respectively; whence it would follow that the *normal* pattern of good order which this philosophy would inspire would not be equality of the Good to the Evil principles, but the preponderance of the Good over the Evil. We simply do not know enough about their system to be able to say just how these two ideas—the inequality involved in musical harmonies and that required by the moral dualism of their metaphysics—would be merged in theory and applied to politics.³¹ But what we do know is enough to show the opposition of the general lines of Pythagorean thought to Alcmaeon's pattern of *Isonomia*, so that we have no right, without positive evidence to the contrary, to tar Alcmaeon with the Pythagorean brush. If we had found the Pythagoreans themselves using the term *Isonomia* we *might* concede for it the sense of "equality of noblemen," though we would then have to break our heads over the question whether what little we know, or think we know, of Pythagorean politics is aptly expressed by such a sense.³² Fortunately, we need not agonize over this problem in the present argument. All we have on our hands is a text which in no proper sense is "Pythagorean" either in author-

³¹ The most plausible guess is that it would favour some sort of hierarchic political order, a rule by the "wise" whose understanding of *Peras* confers on them unilateral authority to govern the state. (Cf. E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics* [Baltimore, 1942], pp. 98 ff.) This is not inconsistent with the acceptance of equality in the form of the *talio* in corrective justice (Arist., *E.N.*, 1132 b 21 ff.).

³² For various views see Minar, *op. cit.*; G. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens* (London, 1941), pp. 210 ff.; K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy* (New York, 1940), Ch. 5; A. Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liege, 1922). I agree with Minar that in its origins and throughout the 5th century Pythagoreanism was generally anti-democratic. But I believe he is wrong in thinking of them as proponents of "an aristocracy of the landed nobles" (*op. cit.*, p. 111); as I have remarked elsewhere (*Philos. Review*, LI [1942], p. 423), at the time when Pythagoreanism was a political innovation its "intellectual aristocracy must have appeared as a challenge to the *ancien régime* of hereditary aristocracy." But this does not exclude in the least an eventual Pythagorean alliance with the conservatives against the popular forces, which seems to be implied by the most reliable of all our historical texts on this topic, that of Polyb., II, 39, 1-4: the burning down of the Pythagorean *synhedria* must have been a popular revolt since it led to the "destruction of the leading men of each city." This, in turn, does not preclude a later accommodation to democracy on the part of some Pythagoreans, as of Archytas at Tarentum. On all this see especially, von Fritz, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.

ship or derivation; its true affinities are with Ionian medicine and *physiologia*; and if we are to regard it, as I believe we should, as a generalization from politics, we must look for the political model which inspired it not in the Pythagorean movement, but in the general advance of democracy throughout the Greek world, especially in Ionia where, I believe, the generalization first arose. Further discussion of this latter point must await the third section of this paper.

II.

I do not wish to dwell longer on the historical priority of *Isonomia* as the name of democracy, important as this is in its own context. It is the meaning of the word which I shall seek to ascertain in the remainder of this essay. For while *Demokratia* does no more than describe a fact, *Isonomia* expresses an idea, indeed a whole set of ideas, by which the partisans of democracy *justified* the rule of the people. These ideas were so appealing in themselves, and so appealingly expressed by *Isonomia* that well before the fifth century had run its course the word was being borrowed by the proponents of alternative forms of government. The Thebans in a well-known passage in Thucydides³³ speak of their own political order as *Oligarchia isonomos*. Even Plato in the Seventh Letter speaks ingratiatingly of his own ideal as that of a "just and *isonomos* constitution."³⁴ What values lent such splendor to the word that even rivals and critics of democracy were eager to poach on enemy territory and use for their own purposes a word which continued to take pride of place in the vocabulary of the partisans of democracy?³⁵

Let us begin with the second word in the compound. Does it mean 'distribution' (deriving *-νομία* from *νέμειν*, 'to distribute') or 'law' (taking *-νομία* as a derivative of *νόμος* with the

³³ III, 62, 3; to be discussed in Section III, below.

³⁴ *Ep.* 7, 326D; and cf. *Menex.*, 239A; and see below, n. 78. Plato's willingness to appropriate the word in the Seventh Letter is all the more remarkable in view of the scorn he had heaped on *isonomikos*, *Isonomia* many years earlier (*Rep.*, 561E, 563B) in his wholesale attack on democratic ideas and institutions.

³⁵ *Ἰσονομία πολιτική* is the *ὄνομα εὐπρεπές par excellence* among the democratic leaders, Thuc., III, 82, 8. *Isonomia* has a similar, though less striking, function in Isocr., *Areop.*, 20; also Aesch., I, 5 with n. 70, below.

sense of 'law')? Ehrenberg has argued for the former,³⁶ and his arguments suffice to show that among the many associations of *Isonomia* in fifth and fourth century usage, that of ἴσα νέμειν would be one, and, at times, might even be the dominant sense in the speaker's mind.³⁷ Now 'equal distribution' fits perfectly the deeply rooted notion of the democratic state as a common pool of rights and privileges equally shared by all its citizens.³⁸ Nevertheless, I do not believe this is the primary meaning of *Isonomia* as generally understood—i. e. the one which most people would take as the literal sense of the word, rather than one of its implications and allusions. Its proper meaning, I believe, is definitely *not* equality of distribution but equality of law; and this for the following reason.

In the parallel compounds, ἀνομία, εὐνομία, ἀντρονομία the derivation of -νομία from νέμειν is either impossible or unlikely. It is flatly impossible in the case of ἀνομία which, as Heinimann has reminded us,³⁹ already occurs in adjectival form in Hesiod (*Th.*, 307). The Titan, Typhon, is "terrible, outrageous (ὀβριστήν), and lawless (ἄνομον)." In ἄνομος here -νόμος could only refer to

³⁶ In his *R.-E.* article, cited above, n. 11. He seems to surrender the view in *Aspects of the Ancient World*, p. 75. Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 5, n. 13) remarks that *Nomos* "is derived from a root meaning to 'distribute or divide,' but the question is whether it is formed directly from some noun with this primary meaning or from the latter noun *Nomos* meaning 'law,'" and refers to Ehrenberg's *R.-E.* article. I hope that my discussion will be a decisive answer to this question. The earlier view had favoured the derivation from *nemein*: R. Hirzel, *Themis* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 243 ff., widely followed as, e. g., by G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*, I (3rd ed., Munich, 1920), p. 418.

³⁷ At col. 293 of his *R.-E.* article he collects the passages in which ἴσα νέμειν occurs, some of them in direct association with the idea of democracy, and also ἴσων τυγχάνειν or ἴσα ἔχειν (the direct result of ἴσα νέμειν).

³⁸ See e. g. statements to this effect by the opponents or critics of democracy: ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 1, 2; Plato, *Rep.*, 557A; Arist., *Pol.*, 1275a 22-23 with b 6, *et passim*, and by pro-democratic sources: Lys., XXV, 3; Demosth., XXI, 67; XXIV, 59; and LI, 11. Most striking is the expression employed by Herodotus (III, 80, 2 and III, 142, 3) for the institution of *Isonomia*: that of making power "common" (ἐς μέσον καταθεῖναι or τιθεῖναι), the same expression which is used by Aristophanes in the *Ecclesiazusae* (602) for the communizing of property.

³⁹ *Nomos und Physis* (*Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, Heft 1 [Basel, 1945]), p. 64, to whose discussion of *Nomos* in archaic thought, pp. 61 ff., I am greatly indebted.

law, though, to be sure, the law in question here would not be positive, written law. Ehrenberg has rightly stressed the point that νόμος did not acquire the sense of positive law before the sixth century.⁴⁰ The earliest sense of the word is that which survives in the ἄγραφος νόμος of the classical period; it is that of custom, usage, employed, of course, not merely as a descriptive term, but also (and always so in moral contexts) as a vehicle of the strongest normative import, to denote that divinely sanctioned order whose observance is of the essence of justice.⁴¹ The

⁴⁰ *Aspects of the Ancient World*, p. 75. His own statement of the point goes too far: "It is beyond doubt that νόμος did not gain the meaning of 'law' before the end of the sixth century." (For a similar view as now "generally recognized," see Heinimann, *op. cit.*, p. 72.) By 'law' here Ehrenberg understands the "unity of traditional and enacted standards" (p. 91); and, since νόμος always had the sense of 'traditional' standards, the question is whether it was not stretched to include positive enactment till the end of the 6th century. Such a late date seems to me inadmissible, since as soon as written law was introduced, i.e., by the end of the 7th century, the general sense of *Dike* would include the observance of written, along with that of unwritten, law, and *Nomos*, as the rule whose observance constitutes *Dike*, would be correspondingly enlarged. This is exactly what happened to *Thesmos*: originally 'traditional usage' (*Od.*, XXIII, 296, λέκτροιο παλαιῦ θεσμόν), it is used as the name of Draco's law (*I. G.*, I², 61) and by Solon, frag. 24, 18, Diehl, for his own written enactments. Theognis, 54, saying of the new masters of Megara that they formerly "knew neither *dikas* nor νόμους" (echoing *Od.*, IX, 215 [so Heinimann, p. 62, n. 13], with the significant substitution of νόμους for θέμιστας), is surely using *Nomos* in just this enlarged sense; the laws which these new men did not know, since "they ranged like deer outside the *Polis*," are the laws of the *Polis* which by this time (middle of 6th century) would certainly include written laws. The disputed text of Solon, frag. 24, 16, Diehl (νόμον of Diehl's first edition *vs.* ὁμοῦ of the second, favoured by Ehrenberg and many others) cannot, of course, be used as an argument against my view. On my view νόμον would be possible, and would make a better reading, since κράτει νόμον . . . ἔρεξα matches beautifully βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας (both clauses presenting the junction of similar opposites, κράτος / βία, and νόμος / δίκη), and the idea of νόμος / δίκη in these lines would match that of θεσμός / δίκη in the next two verses.

⁴¹ In this respect *Nomos* is strictly parallel to *Dike* and *Themis*: all three may denote no more than a uniformity of human life without any particular moral connotation; e.g., *Od.*, XXIV, 255, the δίκη γερόντων is to rest after a bath; *Od.*, XIV, 130, weeping and lamentation is θέμις γυναικός when her husband has perished far from home; Alcman, frag. 93, Diehl, ὀρνίχων νόμῳ, which probably means "the ways of birds" (cf. Heinimann, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5), and Herodotus, VIII, 89, 1. ἐν χειρῶν

(substantival) opposite to *ἀνομος* in the epic is *εὐνομία*, as we see from the earliest instance of this latter compound at *Od.*, XVII, 487: "the gods in the guise of strangers . . . visit the cities, observing the ὕβρις and the εὐνομίῃ of men." *Eunomie* cannot mean here "good distribution"; for what the gods are looking for in this context is not whether there is good distribution, but proper observance of the sacred *Nomos* of respect for strangers.⁴² Finally, in *Autonomia* we encounter a distinctly later term,⁴³ which may be even later than *Isonomia*; and here we see all over again how strongly *-νομία* in a compound would carry the sense of 'law,' though here, of course, with a strong accent on positive legislation which was entirely absent in *Anomos* and *Eunomia*. It is unlikely, to say the least, that those who used *Autonomia*, in contrast to despotism, to denote "(being ruled by) one's own law" would normally employ the parallel *Isonomia* in any sense other than that of "(being ruled by) equal law."

If "equality of law" is then the literal sense of *Isonomia*, it poses immediately the question whether it means merely (i) 'equality before the law' or (ii) 'equality maintained through law.' The first is not only compatible with the literal sense of the word, but is even the most natural rendering of it. Nevertheless, it is clear on historical grounds, and it is now generally agreed, that this is *not* the full meaning of *Isonomia*.⁴⁴ For *unequal* laws, i. e. laws which sanction the unequal distribution of political rights and privileges to different social classes, *might* be upheld quite 'equally,' i. e. impartially. This is precisely the

νόμος, which means "in hand-to-hand fighting" (cf. J. L. Myres, *Political Ideas of the Greeks* [1927], p. 248, who observes that here the word comes "very near to Aeschylus' use of the verb for 'wielding' a shield or other implement"). Beyond this morally neutral sense, all three words have, of course, the specifically moral sense of "right usage." Hesiod's employment of *ἀνομος* in conjunction with ὕβριστης at *Th.*, 307 may be compared with a corresponding expression in the *Odyssey* in terms of *Dike* and *Themis*: the Cyclopes are ὕβρισταί . . . οὐδὲ δίκαιοι (IX, 175) and (106) ἀθέμιστοι.

⁴² I believe this would agree with Ehrenberg's present view, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 75-6.

⁴³ The first occurrence of *αὐτόνομος* is in Herodotus (*L. S. J.*, s. v.); cf. also Hippocr., π. ἀ. ὕ. τ., 16.

⁴⁴ See Ehrenberg's excellent remarks on this point in his *R.-E.* article, cols. 295 ff.

central conception of the Solonian reforms. Solon's "equal"⁴⁵ laws for the noble and the base" define sharply graded political privilege; they restrict the magistracies to the members of the upper income classes.⁴⁶ But the seriousness of the intent of their impartial application is witnessed by the admission of every citizen to the courts before which ordinary suits could be tried and the magistrates themselves could be called to account under the law.⁴⁷ It is instructive that these reforms which go so far in the direction of judicial equality should not have been termed *Isonomia* in either Solon's poems, whose ideal is *Eunomia* (frag. 3, Diehl), or any of our later sources.

No less instructive is the case of Sparta. Dedicated to the conception of the "lordship of the law" (*δεσπότης νόμος*),⁴⁸ exemplary throughout the Greek world for its stern fidelity to law, its watchword was *Eunomia*,⁴⁹ not *Isonomia*, and this for the good reason that its members, though social "peers" (*ὅμοιοι*), were not political equals; the hereditary status of kings and nobles entitled them to constitutional privileges denied to their fellow citizens.⁵⁰ That *Isonomia* was not applied to the

⁴⁵ The word is *ὅμοιος* (frag. 24, 18, Diehl), but this may well carry the sense of equality; see my "Equality and Justice" (cited above, n. 29), n. 51. The sense of the "equality" of these laws is illuminated by "straight . . . justice" in the following line, the opposite of the "crooked" justice (cf. frag. 3, 37, Diehl) of the corrupt aristocracy, i. e., undeviating, impartial justice.

⁴⁶ See on this my "Solonian Justice," *C. P.*, XLI (1946), pp. 79-80.

⁴⁷ Arist., *Pol.*, 1274 a 3, "he constituted the jury-courts from all the citizens," including the thetes (*Ath. Pol.*, 7, 3). We can assume that it would be through appeals to a popular court (*ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἔφεσις*, *Ath. Pol.*, 9, 1) that the people would exercise the power "to call magistrates to account" (*Pol.*, 1274 a 17; cf. 1281 b 34). The only limit to the full judicial equality here granted the people would be the continuing jurisdiction of the Areopagus over cases of homicide (the statement that the jury-courts "had the decision in all matters both public and private," *Ath. Pol.*, 9, 1 must be read with this qualification) and its power to "guard the laws," "supervise the constitution," and "call offenders to account" (*Ath. Pol.*, 8, 4).

⁴⁸ Herodotus, VII, 104, 4.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 77 ff., and the *C. Q.* papers by Andrews and Wade-Gery to which he refers at p. 81, n. 1. *Eunomia* is also the term which Pindar (*I.*, 5, 22) applies to the aristocratic order of Aegina.

⁵⁰ The case of the kings is too obvious to call for documentation; for the exclusive eligibility of the nobles to the *Gerousia* see G. Gilbert,

aristocratic régime of Sparta by its most ardent sympathizers⁵¹ is powerful witness to the fact that what the word asserts is not merely that the laws should be equally upheld, but that they should be equal in the wholly different sense of defining the equal share of all the citizens in the control of the state. This is the sense it carries in Herodotus who uses it to denote the "communizing" of political power, its transference into the hands of the masses;⁵² and this is abundantly borne out by later uses of *Isonomia* to express the peculiar ethos of the equalitarian state.⁵³

But if *this* is the right sense of the word, why should it not mean 'equal distribution'? Because 'equal distribution' says too much, as 'equality before the law' says too little. For what is conceived as equally distributed in *Isonomia* is restricted to *Nomos*, i. e. to the political domain. Long before the term *Isonomia* had been coined there had been a perfectly good word for "equal distribution": *Isomoiria*; the adjective *isomoros* already occurs in Homer (*Il.*, XV, 209). When the embattled peasantry of Attica rebelled against eupatrid oppression they did ask for *Isomoiria*,⁵⁴ and their demands included redivision

Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (Eng. tr., London, 1895), p. 48, n. 2.

⁵¹ The one instance which might be adduced as evidence against this statement, Isocr. *Panath.*, 178, actually confirms it. Here Isocrates says that the Spartans established *Isonomia* and *Demokratia* among themselves; naturally, if we are going to turn the Spartans into democrats (cf. also *Areop.*, 61), we may credit them, by the same token, with *Isonomia*. *Isonomous* may, or may not, be the right reading in Ephorus, *ap. Strabo*, VIII, 5, 4 (= frag. 18 Müller, frag. 117 Jacoby). If it is, it refers not to the classical Spartan constitution, but to an earlier period in which the Spartans were on a footing of equality with the *perioikoi*. But I think Jacoby is right in adopting the alternative reading of *isotimous*.

⁵² See n. 38, above.

⁵³ Cf. especially Thuc., VI, 38, 5; Plato, *Rep.*, 561E, 563B. In all this I do not mean, of course, that to the democrats themselves *Eunomia* and *Isonomia* would be mutually exclusive terms; they would certainly think of the good observance of their "equal" constitution as *euno-meisthai* (so e.g. Aeschines, I, 5). One could hardly claim *Isonomia* to the exclusion of *Eunomia*, though *Eunomia* could be, and was claimed, by those who would have no truck with *Isonomia*, e.g. by Plato in the *Republic* (425A *et passim*) where *Isonomia* occurs only as a term of abuse (n. 34, above).

⁵⁴ So much I hope will be conceded from Solon's refusal to grant "to

of the land as well as redistribution of political rights and privileges. We know what happened to their demands. They got under Solon a share, though nothing like an equal share, of political power. On the score of economic equality they got nothing at all, beyond cancellation of debts secured on the debtor's person and the emancipation of those who had fallen into slavery through debt.⁵⁵ In the subsequent development of Athenian democracy the separation of the two demands became formally complete. The demand for political equality, first voiced by only the poorest sections of the *demos*, became the first article of the democratic creed and was progressively implemented in waves of far-reaching reforms which swept away one by one all constitutional guarantees of political privilege for the upper classes.⁵⁶

The demand for equality in the land was quickly dropped from the responsible democratic platform. It was only under the tyrant, Peisistratus,⁵⁷ never again under Cleisthenes, or Pericles, or Cleon, or any other democratic leader that the landless were

the base *Isomoiria* of the rich fatherland with the good" in frag. 23, Diehl. The people's demand for redivision of the land is amply attested in our sources (*Ath. Pol.*, 11, 2; *Plut., Sol.*, 13, 3 and 16, 1), as well as the general claim to equality (*Plut., Sol.*, 14, 2); the slogan *Isomoiria* would be the natural vehicle for the demand for redivision of the land (*Ath. Pol.*, 11, 2; *Plut., Sol.*, 13, 3 and 16, 1) backed by the general claim to equality (*τὸ ἰσον*, *Plut., Sol.*, 14, 2). I believe it is misleading to suggest (Ehrenberg in his *R.-E.* article, col. 298) that the demand for equality played no part in the earlier struggles of the people against the aristocracy, and came to the fore only later in the struggle against tyranny. In this instance the demand was for *τὸ ἰσον* and *ἰσομοίρια* as well as for *Dike*.

⁵⁵ For the interpretation of the economic aspects of Solon's reforms see my "Solonian Justice" (cited above, n. 45), pp. 73 ff. They consist mainly in the legal provision which made all debts secured on the debtor's person unenforceable by law, as well as (probably) the use of state funds to ransom Athenian citizens already sold as slaves in foreign lands. The latter would involve, of course, a certain amount of indirect redistribution of property; but that is as far as Solon went.

⁵⁶ The Cleisthenean constitution, 508 B. C., and the subsequent reforms listed at *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 1-2; the reforms of Ephialtes, 462; admission of Zeugitai to eligibility for appointment by lot to archonship, 457; pay for jury-service and for Councillors, *ca.* 450; pay for attendance at the Assembly, soon after 403.

⁵⁷ Though this is only a conjecture; see my "Solonian Justice," p. 79.

given Attic land by the state.⁵⁸ In Athens such a demand became a lost cause, the desperate hope of the wholly dispossessed,⁵⁹ who never once had the chance to get sponsorship for it from even the most extreme of demagogues. We can see now precisely why *Isomoiria* could never serve as the watchword of the democratic state; it was too deeply compromised with redivision of the land.⁶⁰ The banner which was to fly from the democratic mast-head had to proclaim the equal share of all the citizens in the laws yet also to pledge the state to maintain by these same laws the established inequalities of property.⁶¹ What slogan would fit this purpose better than *Isonomia*?

⁵⁸ The Athenian empire *did* give land to the landless (some 10,000 Athenians may have left Athens as cleruchs between 509 and 430, A. W. Gomme, "Cleruchy," in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* [1949]), but only at the price of expatriation. That a good many of the cleruchs came from the poorer classes is what we would expect; and we know from *I. G.*, I², 45 (B) that at least in some cases the cleruchy was reserved exclusively to the *zeugitai* and the *thetes*.

⁵⁹ Aristotle speaks as though redivision of the land was a regular feature of democratic revolutions in Greece (*Ath. Pol.*, 40, 3) and cites "redivision of estates" as one cause of oligarchic revolutions at *Pol.*, 1305 a 5; cf. also the undertaking not to countenance "cancellation of private debts or redivision of the land or the houses of Athenians" in the heliastic oath *ap. Demosth.*, XXIV (*Ag. Timocr.*), 149. From these facts alone we could infer that the hope of redivision of the land remained alive in the poorest strata of Athenian society; and this is confirmed by the vogue of utopian communistic schemes such as that of the *Ekclesiazusae*, though this also tells us that such demands were not a serious threat to the propertied classes, else they could not be joked about so good-naturedly on the public stage. We can also learn something from the proposals of conservatives like Isocrates (*Peace*, 24; *To Phil.*, 120; *Areop.*, 35) and Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1320 a 36 ff.) for settling the destitute on small plots of land.

⁶⁰ It can hardly be an accident that *Isomoiria*, so natural a vehicle for the democratic concept of the state as an equalitarian community, is never used for this purpose in any surviving fifth or fourth century historical or political source. Its application to democracy at *Thuc.*, VI, 39, 1 does not refer to the equal share of each and every citizen in the state but to the equal shares of the three "parts" of the state (the rich, the wise, and the masses). In legal contexts the word is used of equality of shares in an estate (*Demosth.*, XLVIII, 19; *Is.*, I, II, and XXXV), which shows how strongly the word retains its connection with allotment of property, as in *Il.*, XV, 209 and 704-5, and Solon, frag. 23, Diehl.

⁶¹ Cf. the heliastic oath (n. 59, above), and the declaration of the *archon eponymus* on his induction "that everyone will have and hold

If this interpretation is correct, *Isonomia* is the record of a defeat for the poorest section of the *demos*. It signalizes that paradox of Greek democratic society: the astonishing fact that the man who, as citizen, shares the kingly dignity, the sovereign power of the *demos*, may yet as a private individual labor under the indignity of utter destitution.⁶² Everyone must have felt the discrepancy, though it was only the conservatives who dragged this skeleton out of the democratic closet. No impartial estimate of the democratic state can close its eyes to the consequences of this contradiction in terms of moral degradation, political corruption, and ceaseless class conflict, to which Plato with merciless logic directs our attention.⁶³ Yet it would be an even graver distortion of history to overdraw, as Plato does, this negative side of the picture. If the landless did not get land, they got in *Isonomia* more than the common people had yet won for themselves anywhere else since the dawn of history. Hitherto material progress had normally been coeval with the concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of kings and nobles. *Isonomia* refused to countenance either the ancient monopoly of law in the hands of a hereditary aristocracy or the claims to political privilege of the new plutocracy whose social power rivalled that of the old nobility. It promised the poorest citizen an equal right in the law-making, law-administering, law-enforcing power of the state. It expressed the spirit

to the end of his term of office whatever (property) he possessed at the beginning of his office" *Ath. Pol.*, 56, 2. The most likely date of the introduction of both pledges is the time of the Solonian reforms; Bonner and Smith, *Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, I (Chicago, 1930), p. 62, assume that the declaration of the *archon eponymus* is "at least as early as 683-82," but without positive evidence. The need for such a pledge would be felt most acutely after widespread agitation for redistribution of property which, so far as we know, did not arise until the end of this century.

⁶² I am not ignoring the fact that the poor could and did use their political power to extract all kinds of economic tribute from the state at the expense of their wealthier fellow-citizens and/or the "allies." A very considerable redistribution of property was achieved indirectly by these means; but in the last analysis they were only palliatives, never cures, for the chronic malady of poverty. The man who depended on the heliastic *triobolon* for his daily food and that of his family (Aristoph., *Wasps*, 300 ff.) was in a very poor position to maintain self-respecting independence *vis-à-vis* the rich.

⁶³ *Rep.*, 421E ff.; *Laws*, 715B and 832B, C.

of a constitution, hitherto undreamed of in civilized society, which declared that the poor man's share in law and political office was equal to that of the noble and the rich.⁶⁴ This was implied in *Isonomia*, and one can see why a word which said so much should pass from a description of a special feature of democracy into a name for the whole constitution. The same thing happened in the case of *Isegoria* and *Isokratia*,⁶⁵ but with nothing like the success of *Isonomia*. Equal law, equal liberty of speech, equal power in government—each of these seizes on features so essential to democracy that none of them could exist without the others, none could be realized without the support of the whole constitution, so that any of them singly could serve to designate the whole. It is an impressive witness to the importance which the members of the democratic *Polis* attached to its equal law that *Isonomia* should be their favorite ideological slogan, pre-eminent over even *Isegoria* and *Isokratia*.

III.

But there is something more in *Isonomia* than the sense that we have so far explored. This is a subtler, more elusive meaning, and it is hard to state it without overstating it. Yet the attempt must be made, for to omit it would be to ignore a part of its meaning which was not only a vital part of democratic ideology but accounts in large measure for the appeal of *Isonomia* to more conservative shades of political opinion. I can best suggest what this is by calling attention to the fact that the junction of equality and law may be read not only in the sense of law as the guarantee of equality, but also in the converse sense of equality as the guarantee of law. In the former sense, which has occupied our attention in the preceding section, law appears as the means to the end of political equality; in the latter, law, or the rule of law, is the end, political equality is the means to

⁶⁴ Eur., *Suppl.*, 404-37.

⁶⁵ Herodotus, V, 78 and V, 92, a, 1 respectively. In none of the other 5th and 4th century instances known to me (Eupolis, 291; ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 1, 12; Xen., *Cyr.*, I, 3, 10; Demosth., XXI, 124) does *Isegoria* seem to stand as a generalized expression for democracy, though the importance attached to the idea which it expresses is, of course, enormous (see, e.g., Eur., *Suppl.*, 435-41). Nor do I know of any such usage of *Isokratia* outside of Herodotus.

this end. To take the word in this latter sense is to assert that its conformity to law will be ensured by its equalitarian distribution of political power. It is my contention that to a thoughtful democrat *Isonomia* would convey both of these senses, though one or the other might predominate in different contexts, and that the latter sense will account, as the former alone would not, for the reluctant admiration which even opponents of democracy could feel for *Isonomia*.

Long before Aristotle produced his classical formulation of the Rule of Law,⁶⁶ it had been the conviction of the democrats that their constitution, and theirs alone, measured up to this ideal.⁶⁷ Thus, to take comparatively late expressions of this conviction, Demosthenes identifies democracy with government by law in explicit contrast to both monarchy and oligarchy;⁶⁸ Aeschines remarks that "tyrannies and oligarchies are governed by the tempers of their lords, democratic states by the established laws."⁶⁹ On what grounds would they justify this conviction? What is there about their state which makes democrats assert so confidently that it alone is governed by law? The question unfortunately remains unanswered in the orators, probably because the answer seemed too obvious to themselves and their audience to call for statement and discussion. It seems to be taken for granted in Aeschines' cursory contrast between "the oligarchs and those who are governed by an unequal consti-

⁶⁶ *Pol.*, 1286 a 8 ff., 1287 a 19 ff.

⁶⁷ The assessment of the historical accuracy of this claim is not my business in this paper; all that matters strictly to my argument is that the conviction was actually held by the democrats themselves, which one would hardly suspect from Aristotle's identification of "extreme democracy" with "mass-rule" *against* the "rule of law" (*Pol.*, 1292 a 5 ff.). If I may venture an unsupported opinion, it is that, in spite of a margin of ever-present lawlessness, radical democracy did substantially conform to the rule of law both in constitutional design (e.g., the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*) and in the bulk of its day-to-day practice. I do think, however, that the Attic orators were wrong in blanketing oligarchy as a whole with the charge of lawlessness; there is no good reason to doubt that an enlightened oligarchy, like that of Thebes, would substantially conform in its way to the ideal of the rule of law. The Attic orators could only make their point stick by picking out lawless oligarchies, of which there were doubtless plenty.

⁶⁸ VI (2 *Phil.*), 25 for the first, XXIV (*Ag. Timocr.*), 75-6 for the second.

⁶⁹ I (*Ag. Timarch.*), 4.

tution" and the Athenians, "who have the equal and law-abiding constitution,"⁷⁰ without any responsible encounter with the question why an "equal constitution" should be in fact more "law-abiding" than an "unequal" one.⁷¹ For an account of the nexus between equality and the rule of law we must go back to a time when habit had not yet turned a profound idea into a shallow dogma.

Otanes' main argument for *Isonomia* in the Debate on Constitutions is that this will be a law-abiding state, free from the lawlessness of tyranny. But he does not rest his case with asserting and documenting the tyrant's *hybris*. He adds an *explanation* of the causes of the tyrant's flouting of the holy restraints of *Dike* which is our first Western record of a revolutionary advance in man's understanding of the problem of government. The traditional explanation of the perversion of justice by its official guardians had been couched in terms of purely personal morality. Hesiod's bitter invectives against the bribe-eating kings had been premised on the assumption that their crooked judgements were caused by their personal "foolishness" and "evil mind."⁷² There is never a hint in all his complaints that their offenses against *Dike* might be due to the essential injustice of the institutions which made them the irresponsible dispensers of law and judgement. Even Solon, who, unlike Hesiod, is most emphatically a political reformer, has no clear perception of the fact that unequal political privilege is *per se* the source of the *Dysnomia* of the eupatrids. He blames their political vices on their personal immorality: "they know

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 5. As Ehrenberg has remarked, ἴσην καὶ ἰσνομίαν here is doubtless a periphrasis for *Isonomia*.

⁷¹ Aeschines' reasoning, such as it is, is that "in a democracy the persons of the citizens and the constitution are safeguarded by the laws, while those of tyrants and oligarchs (are safeguarded) by suspicion and armed force," i. e., that democratic law does the job which coercive force does in undemocratic states. Taken at face value this is nonsense, since, on the one hand, law is no monopoly of democracy and, on the other, democratic law has also coercive sanctions. What Aeschines doubtless means to say is that in democracy law has the added sanction of voluntary compliance and is, to that extent, a better safeguard of the person and the constitution. This is a valuable insight so far as it goes, but it ignores the vital question why coercive power should also be used more law-abidingly in the "equal" constitutions.

⁷² *Op.*, 38-41, 260-64.

not how to restrain themselves from excess, nor to order their pleasures in peacableness of life.”⁷³ Indeed even Plato, who understood as well as anyone ever did the interdependence of personal and social virtue, was to remain under the spell of the moralistic over-simplification of the problem of social justice. He holds that a man whose personal wisdom and virtue meet the high standards of philosophic perfection, *should* be entrusted with absolute, irresponsible power, and that his personal integrity, armed with sufficient resources of persuasion and compulsion, could and would establish the perfectly just state.⁷⁴

The exponent of democracy in Herodotus strikes out along a radically different path when he traces the vices of tyranny to the vicious scheme of unequal power of which the tyrant's personal character is itself the inevitable victim. The tyrant's *hybris*, says Otanes, is the result not of the envy which is common to all men,⁷⁵ but of the special privilege of his position. “Even the best of men,” he asserts, placed in the tyrant's seat of irresponsible power, “would be changed from his wonted mind.” When he defends the rule of the people under the rubric of *Isonomia*, Otanes does not idealize the people's virtue. He does not claim that the people's rule will be good because the people are just and wise. He says only that their rule will be responsible and equal, assuming that it will be saved by this very fact from the *hybris* which not even the best of monarchs can avoid. He believes that the power of any man in office, when counterpoised against the equal power of his fellows to bring him to judgement under the law, will be held under constraint of equality within the just limits of lawful rule.

It is this sense of *Isonomia*—that of an equalitarian distribution of political power, assuring responsible and, therefore, law-abiding government—which best explains the use of *Oligarchia isonomos* by the Theban spokesmen in Thuc., III, 62. The point at issue in this discussion is whether the city of Thebes can be held responsible for the act of its government when it be-

⁷³ Frag. 3, 9-10, Diehl; cf. 4, 3-5, Diehl. The charge of *ἄδικος νόος*, frag. 3, 7, is repeated from Hesiod, *Op.*, 260.

⁷⁴ This is the view of the *Republic* and the *Politicus*. It is not withdrawn in the *Laws*, where Plato merely gives up the hope that such a man can be found (691C, D; 713C); see especially 876C, D.

⁷⁵ Being inherent in man's nature: *φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ*, III, 80, 3.

trayed the Greek cause at the time of the Persian invasion. The Theban's argument to the contrary is premised on a distinction between two types of government, which we may call isonomic and non-isonomic respectively. The contemporary constitution of Thebes is brought under the first head by attaching specifically the term *isonomos* to their brand of oligarchy; while their mention of democracy *tout court* under the same head assumes that its title to *Isonomia* is so obvious that it does not call for special mention. On the other side, there is tyranny and the earlier government of Thebes, where "a *Dynasteia* of a few men held power." The difference between the two types consists in the fact that the first, and only the first, is (i) a government of law, (ii) a responsible government, whose decisions are those of "the whole of a state having the power to govern itself (*ἐξόμπασα πόλις αὐτοκράτωρ*)."⁷⁶ What accounts for the difference is not spelled out: but it is clearly implied in the statement that when the earlier *Dynasteia* led Thebes to the Persian alliance, it did so by "forcibly coercing the masses (*κατέχοντες ἰσχύι τὸ πλῆθος*)."⁷⁷ It is the unequal power of the rulers of a non-isonomic state that accounts for their ability to act without restraint of law and force their own arbitrary will upon the governed, pushing them into a course of action for which they cannot be held responsible, since they lacked the power to accept or reject it for themselves. Clearly this cannot happen in democracy where power belongs to the people, and officials do not decide the policies of the state but administer the policies which the people decide.⁷⁸ By grafting the democratic slogan of *Isonomia* on their own constitution the Theban speakers claim that neither can this happen in their own contemporary state and for the same reason as in democracy. And they can make this claim in good faith because, as we know from independent sources, their constitution was a genuinely equalitarian one within the limits of its restricted franchise.⁷⁹ Though oligarchic, because it excluded over half of native Thebans from full-fledged citizenship, it

⁷⁶ Exactly the same construction is put on *Isonomia* by Thucydides at IV, 78, 2-3: Brasidas passed through Thessaly; but, since the Thessalian masses were always friendly to Athens, "if *Isonomia*, rather than *Dynasteia*, had been the local Thessalian usage, Brasidas would not have passed."

⁷⁷ The evidence is best collected and discussed in H. Swoboda, "Studien zur Verfassung Boiotiens," *Klio*, X (1910), pp. 315 ff.

could nonetheless be justly termed an *Oligarchia isonomos*, because it gave every member of the enfranchised civic body an equal share in the government, with no special privilege for the nobility; it entrusted the sovereign decisions of the state to *Boulai*, in which each hoplite-citizen took his place by regular rotation. Thus here, too, as in Otanes' speech in Herodotus, *Isonomia* designates a political order in which the rule of law and responsible government are maintained by the equal distribution of political power.⁷⁸

But what lay back of Otanes' speech? So profound an apprehension of the corrupting effects of irresponsible power on the character of those who hold it and of the equal diffusion of power as the remedy for injustice, expressed so confidently yet unpretentiously by this exponent of *Isonomia*, suggests a long antecedent development. How far back this development extends we can judge from the fact that by the middle of the sixth century the implied idea had been projected from politics to cosmology; and nothing gives us a better sense of the force with which this political insight struck the minds of its discoverers than the fact that it provided the pattern on which the first Western concept of nature as a domain of inherent, unexceptionable order was designed.⁷⁹ The word, *Isonomia*, does not occur, of course, in the fragments of Anaximander, the

⁷⁸ I forego an extensive analysis of the Platonic use of *Isonomos* (n. 34, above). Briefly, in *Ep.*, 7, 326D the contrast is between the "just and *isonomos politeia*" and the arbitrary rule (*δυναστεύοντας*) which he imputes to "tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies"; he is turning the table on the democrats by saying, in effect, that their own slogan is too good for them, as for their tyrannic and oligarchic rivals. By *Isonomia* he clearly understands a rule of stable law (cf. 326C, *ἡρεμῆσαι κατὰ νόμους*); though what he would do with the first half of the compound is hard to say, unless he would reinterpret it in accordance with his concept of "proportional" equality (*Laws*, 744C, 757A ff.; cf. *Rep.*, 558C), which is, of course, the denial of democratic ("arithmetical") equality. The use of *Isonomia* at *Menex.*, 239A is less instructive for our purpose. The same semantic legerdemain which transforms that which is "called" democracy into "aristocracy with the good opinion of the mass" reduces *Isonomia* to (i) *Isogonia* and (ii) government by those preeminent in "repute of virtue and wisdom" (239A and cf. 238D); (i) and (ii) are the qualifications which would make *Isonomia* acceptable to Plato, if Athens could measure up to them.

⁷⁹ For the reconstruction of Anaximander's cosmology which I assume in this discussion see the paper cited above (n. 29), pp. 168 ff.

founder of this concept of nature; we cannot say that he used the word or knew it. His famous fragment (B 1) speaks not of law but "justice" (*δίκη*) and "reparation" (*τίσις*). But what matters here is that in his system the guarantee of this "just" order, where "injustice" is unfailingly redressed, is not the preponderant power of some higher, law-ordaining, law-enforcing agency, but the equal power of the basic constituents of nature to hold each other in check. The former idea would have been naturally suggested to his mind by the traditional, Hesiodic conception of divine justice. Hesiod's poems had impressed on the Greek imagination the conviction that Zeus is the guardian of justice, his wisdom and might its only sure support; if there is law and order on Olympus above, in the Tartarus below, and in the human *polis* upon the earth, it is because Zeus has fought and subdued every rebellious power, and is now able to crush, according to his own designs and in his own good time, any one who flouts the ordinances of his sovereign will.⁸⁰ Anaximander, who thinks of his *Apeiron* as divine, and endows it with the traditional attributes of divinity, immortality and agelessness, would have every reason to transfer to it a guardianship of justice patterned on that of Hesiod's Zeus. His alternative solution of the problem has the force of a deliberate rejection of this traditional conception. He chooses to think of nature as a self-regulative equilibrium, a system whose "justice" is preserved by the internal equipoise of its components, not by the intervention of any higher, external power.⁸¹ His solution of the problem of cosmic justice is modelled on a notion of political

⁸⁰ The goddess, *Dike*, of course, is very much concerned with human justice and does some punishing of injustice on her own account (*Op.*, 223); but she is the "daughter" of Zeus and anyhow she, like all the other gods, has received her "honour" or office from Zeus (*Th.*, 74, 885); whatever power she has is derived from Zeus and ultimately dependent on his supreme force (*Op.*, 259 ff.). Similarly for "Oath who gives most woe to mortal men if anyone wilfully swears a false oath" (*Th.*, 231), for "Zeus' thrice ten thousand" guardians of "judgments and deeds of wrong" (*Op.*, 253-5), and the Fates who "pursue the transgressions of men and of gods" (*Th.*, 220). In some passages (*Op.*, 2-8, 267-9) Zeus is directly the watcher and rewarder of human justice. Cf. F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca, 1949), pp. 47 ff., 64 ff., 83 ff., 90 ff.

⁸¹ For the "government" of the created world by the *Apeiron* in accordance with this pattern see *op. cit.* (at n. 29), pp. 172-3.

justice which is utterly different from either the aristocratic justice of Hesiod's *polis* or the monarchic justice of Hesiod's pantheon: the notion which answers substantially to *Isonomia*, for it assumes that the only reliable preservative of justice in a community is the equal distribution of power among its members.

Just such a notion is designated by *Isonomia* in Alcmaeon's fragment. The equalitarian order which is normative for Anaximander's universe is now applied to the *kosmos* of health within the human organism. For Alcmaeon, as for the "Hippocratic" medicine of Ionia and the Sicilian medicine of the Empedoclean school,⁸² the normal constitution of the organism is the *krasis* of equal "powers"; the "monarchic" preponderance of any power is a diseased condition, destructive of the organism. Such a medical use of *Isonomia* is certainly patterned on a democratic concept of the political order, though it is by no means necessary to assume that Alcmaeon so used it *because* he was himself a partisan of democracy. Once we have got rid of his "Pythagoreanism" we must admit that of his political persuasion we know exactly nothing.⁸³ This leaves us with several possibilities: He may have been himself an admirer of the régime which his namesakes, the Alcmaeonids, had recently established at Athens. That a rationalistic physician of Croton might have just such sympathies is perfectly possible, even (as is not unlikely) if he himself were a member of the ruling "thousand"; liberal aristocrats there must have been everywhere throughout Greece; and in the case of Croton we have one

⁸² For the Hippocratics see *op. cit.* (at n. 29), pp. 156-8. For Empedocles see e.g. his theory that vision is best when the dark-light opposites (water-fire) are in equilibrium, "for the best tempered and most excellent [state of the organism with respect to vision] is the one which consists of both in equal proportions"; also his view that "all those in whom the mixture [of the four elements] is equal or nearly so . . . are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions" (Theophr., *De Sens.*, 9 and 11 = Emp., A 86; translations after Burnet).

⁸³ The only information supplied us by our sources on this point is purely negative: no political activity or opinion is ever imputed to him. This may be significant, since political attitudes or legislative functions are imputed to nearly all the major philosophical figures of the sixth and fifth centuries: Anaximander, Heracleitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles. Had he played a political rôle of any prominence we would expect some trace of it, especially in the lives of Pythagoras which claim Alcmaeon as a "Pythagorean."

tradition which informs us that the proposal to democratize the constitution was sponsored by some members of the "thousand."⁸⁴ Alternatively, he may have used *Isonomia*, the term which Cleisthenean democracy (at the latest) had popularized in Greek speech, as simply the most appropriate metaphor for his equalitarian conception of healthful order. Finally, it is not impossible that the same metaphor had been already applied to Anaximander's concept of nature; if so, Alcmaeon could have borrowed both the word and the concept of order which it expressed, with or without the wish to underwrite its political connotations.⁸⁵ I do not see how we can decide among these possibilities, or that we need to; though in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that a man who gave *Isonomia* so prominent a place in his medical thought would not be unfriendly to its political import. The one possibility which, I believe, should be ruled out is that *Isonomia* was a generalization from the political structure of contemporary Croton.⁸⁶ As aristocracies go, this was not an

⁸⁴ Iambl., *V. P.*, 257, with the generally accepted emendation of *χρόνων* (which makes no sense at all) to *χίλων*. I see no reason to doubt that this part of the account comes from Timaeus, though the names "Hippasus, Diodorus, Theages" may not be due to him but to Apollonius (von Fritz, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 ff.). I should be more inclined to date this episode somewhat later than 509 (as does Minar, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.), perhaps by a few years (T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* [Oxford, 1948], p. 366, n. 9) or decades (von Fritz, p. 87), but in any case doubtless within Alcmaeon's lifetime. I see no reason to doubt the statement of the source (*loc. cit.*) that Pythagorean speakers opposed the proposal.

⁸⁵ I consider this the least likely of the three possibilities, since (i) we have no evidence that Anaximander used *Isonomia* (though what we know of his philosophical vocabulary is so meager, that neither can we say that he did not) and (ii) Alcmaeon's interests were medical and physiological, not cosmological (though this too is not a conclusive objection, since the analogy of physical macrocosm and human microcosm was so vivid in Greek thought that had a physician found *Isonomia* in a cosmology, he *could* have transferred it to medicine without any sort of commitment to its cosmological validity).

⁸⁶ As seems to be assumed by both Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 9) and Ehrenberg (OD, p. 535), taking Alcmaeon's *Isonomia* to mean a "balanced state." What kind of "balanced state" would Croton be, if it disfranchised the overwhelming proportion of the *demos* (n. 87, below)? But if "balanced state" were in Alcmaeon's mind, then, as Ehrenberg himself remarks (*loc. cit.*), he would have spoken of it as *Eunomia*, not *Isonomia*.

excessively narrow one; but it was certainly a far more restricted one than, say, the oligarchy established at Thebes after the Persian wars, barring from so much as attendance at the Assembly all but the privileged "thousand," who, on any estimate, must have been a tiny fraction of the native population.⁸⁷ Such a constitution, whose marked inequalities were the butt of sharp attacks by democratic forces, could scarcely be named by the word whose hallmark was Equality.

Larsen has rightly stressed that in this fragment, as indeed in all of the major contexts in which the word occurs, *Isonomia* appears in sharpest opposition to the one-man rule of tyranny. But it would be an error to infer from this⁸⁸ that *Isonomia* is, therefore, simply the rejection of the extreme inequality of tyranny and could be used by aristocrats no less than by the champions of democracy. Such an inference, as I have urged above, cannot be supported by a single item of positive evidence. But my objection can be grounded on far larger historical grounds, by recalling the role of equality in the political struggles of the Greek world. The demand for equality was first raised against those who held, by hereditary right, the monopoly of government long before tyranny reared its head in Greece. In their struggle against the nobility, the people saw that, without an equal share in the law, they could not be safe from legal oppression. But it was only in the later encounter with tyranny that the people discovered how vain is the promise of equality unless grounded in the rule of law and, conversely, that only the attainment of equality can secure the rule of law. Time and

⁸⁷ Dunbabin (*op. cit.*, p. 365) does not seem to think the figure of half a million excessive for the population of sixth-century Sybaris. If Croton were only half its size—and a state which destroyed Sybaris and established a hegemony over several of its neighbours between 510 and 480 (Dunbabin, p. 368) could not be a small one—the restriction of political rights to a thousand would mean the disfranchisement of well over 90 per cent of the native Crotoniats.

⁸⁸ As Larsen, of course, does not, except in his treatment of Alcmaeon's fragment (*loc. cit.*). This is the only part of his paper to which I have grave objections. Its revision along the lines suggested here would be wholly in accord with his general thesis and make his argument completely coherent. Ehrenberg's view of *Isonomia* as the watchword of the Cleisthenean reforms would be similarly strengthened and simplified by surrendering the notion that it had been an "aristocratic" slogan only a couple of years earlier.

again a tyrant must have won popular support by promising the people to break by force the legal power of the nobles. When they accepted his gift, the people found through bitter experience that the hope of equality under the tyrant's lawless rule was illusory, and that the only way this hope could be realized was to make government responsible to the governed by extending the equal share of all the citizens in the control of the state.

It was this lesson from past experience and goal for future endeavour that was crystallized in the slogan of *Isonomia*. It was not an aristocratic idea, for though the nobles at times made common cause with the people against the tyrant, their goal was not an advance to the equality of *Isonomia* but a retreat to traditional inequalities sanctioned by *Eunomia*. Oligarchies could use the term *Isonomia*, but only by borrowing it from democracy and only by approximating as best they could the democratic pattern. In the degree in which a liberal oligarchy, such as that of Thebes, suppressed the political privileges of its noble clans and attained a measure of responsible government by granting an equal share in government to its fully enfranchised civic body, it too could speak of its constitution as *Oligarchia isonomos*. Democracy had travelled much further along this road when this "fairest of names" had become the proud title of its own constitution. When in due course this was displaced as a proper name by the more prosaic and more precise *Demokratia*, *Isonomia* still remained the favorite slogan of democracy, for it alone expressed its greatest achievement, its pursuit of the goal of political equality to the farthest limits envisaged by the Greek mind, and this not in defiance, but in support, of the rule of law.⁸⁹

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⁸⁹ I wish to make grateful acknowledgment of a Fellowship granted me by the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation which has enabled me to undertake this and other studies in Greek political ideas. A debt of another sort I owe my colleague, Friedrich Solmsen, who read an earlier draft of this paper and made a number of valuable criticisms and suggestions.

THE DECLENSION OF LATIN COMPOUND ADJECTIVES.

The strong predilection of Latin adjectives for *i*-stem inflection, infrequent in the adjectives of most IE languages, shows itself: 1) in the extension of original *u*-stems by means of *-i*- (e. g. *suavis*, Gk. ἡδύς, Skt. *svādús*); 2) in such occasional correspondences as *similis*, Gk. ὁμαλός; *humilis*, χαμαλός; 3) in the intrusion of *i*-stem inflection into adjectives originally having stems ending in consonants, especially the present participle and, to a much slighter extent, the comparative; 4) in the frequent transfer to the third declension in compounds whose second members are *o*-stem or *ā*-stem nouns: e. g. *barba* : *imberbis*; *remus* : *biremis*.¹ It is with this last phenomenon that the present paper is concerned.

The material is based on an examination of compounds having as first member a prepositional prefix or the negative *in-* or a numeral stem or the stem of a declinable adjective, and having as second member a recognizable noun-stem ordinarily following the first or second declension. The collection was made with the help of Gradenwitz² and the indices of a sufficiently wide range of authors to give an adequate general picture of the usage in the Republic and early Empire: Plautus, Terence, Cicero's orations, letters, and philosophical works; the *Corpus Caesareanum*, Sallust, Nepos, Lucretius, Catullus, Vergil, the *Appendix Vergiliana*, Horace, Propertius, Ovid, Vitruvius, Petronius, Seneca's tragedies, Lucan, Statius, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Apuleius. The compounds will be found to be of two types: 1) there is no change in the stem-final beyond the fact that the adjective uses *o*-stem endings as masculine and neuter and *ā*-stem endings as feminine, regardless of the stem-final of the noun entering into composition (e. g. *modus* : *commodus*, *-a*, *-um*; *via* : *invius*, *-a*, *-um*); this type, which is the standard formation in Sanskrit and Greek,³ will be called in this paper Type A; 2) the com-

¹ Of the numerous and mostly very brief references to this feature of Latin word-formation I here cite only Leumann-Hofmann, pp. 233-4.

² Otto Gradenwitz, *Laterculi vocum latinorum* (Leipzig, 1904).

³ In Greek with feminine usually like masculine, the forms being familiarly known as "adjectives of two terminations."

pound adjective is an *i*-stem, as in the examples shown in the first paragraph; this formation will be known as Type B. As a result of analogical influences working in both directions there was some fluctuation, and it is safe to assume that there was some debate among Roman grammarians as to which of two rival forms was "correct"; also there are many manuscript variants,⁴ and in giving figures a small margin of error must be allowed. Consequently I have generally not used statistics to support my main arguments, unless they weigh very heavily in favor of one side. Yet the situation is by no means one of hopeless disorder, and after the material has been presented it will be possible to make certain generalizations which may have some value in connection with the development of literary style.

In the following lists, taken from the texts cited above, the compounds are arranged in the alphabetical order of their second member, the significant part for our purposes:⁵

TYPE A.

1. The prior member is a preposition or inseparable prefix (not including negative *in*-): *ex-animus*, *pro-clivus*, *se-curus*, *se-dulus*,⁶ *sub-dolus*, *pro-fanus*, *ef-frenus*, *pro-fundus*, *sub-iugus*, *de-lirus*, *com-modus* (*ac*-, *in*-, *per-commodus*), *e-nervus*, *prae-posterus*, *ab-sonus*, *con-sonus*, *dis-sonus*, *alti-sonus*, etc., *con-terminus*, *ad-uncus*, *ob-uncus*, *red-uncus*, *sub-vesperus*, *a-vius*, *de-vius*, *ob-vius*, *per-vius*, *im-per-vius*, *prae-vius*.

2. The prior member is the negative *in*-: *in-animus*, *im-berbus*, *in-ermus*, *in-frenus*, *in-glorius*, *in-numerus*, *in-terminus*, *in-vius*.

⁴ Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*³, II (Berlin, 1892), pp. 149-70, give a very detailed treatment of these variants.

⁵ I have excluded the etymologically uncertain *inanis*, *obscoenus*, *obscurus*, *sublimis*, and also *debilis* and *illustris*, for which no corresponding noun exists in Latin; the adverbial forms *omnimodis*, *multimodis*; nouns of the type *duovir*; the proper names *Ahenobarbus*, *Longarenus*, and *Perennia*; forms which rest purely on emendation or which have been removed by emendation from the standard texts; compounds which are in whole or in part Greek, though I have admitted Cicero's *decemscalmus* (*Ad Att.*, XVI, 3, 6) and Horace's *depugis* (*Serm.*, I, 2, 93). In word-counting I have disregarded comparative and superlative forms, because they do not show the distinction between Types A and B.

⁶ I see no reason to question the derivation from *se* + *dolō* 'without guilt,' approved by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet³.

3. The prior member is a numeral stem (including *semi-*, *sesqui-*, *ter-*, *tot-*): *sesqui-alter*,⁷ *oct-angulus*, *sex-angulus*, *tri-angulus*, *viginti-angulus*, *semi-animus*, *un-animus*, *semi-circulus*, *sesqui-digitus*, *sem(i)-ermus*, *quadri-fluvius*, *bi-furcus*, *bi-iugus*, *quadri-iugus*, *ter-iugus*, *tot-iugus*, *tri-iugus*, *se-libra*, *tri-modius*,⁸ *tot-modus*, *uni-modus*, *sesqui-octavus*, *un(i)-oculus*, *decem-scalmus*, *semi-somnus*, *bi-sulcus*, *quadri-sulcus*, *tri-sulcus*, *sesquiertius*, *bi-vius*, *quadri-vius*, *tri-vius* (including *Trivia*, *trivium*).

4. The prior member is the stem of a declinable adjective (in one case the noun-stem *angui-*): *aequ-aevus*, *prim-aevus*, *grand-aevus*, *long-aevus*, *mult(i)-angulus*, *flex-animus*, *magn-animus*, *illuti-barbus*, *albi-capillus*, *angui-comus*, *auri-comus*, *lauri-comus*, *multi-modus*, *omni-modus*, *multi-nodus*, *fer-oculus*, *sicc-oculus*, *levi-somnus*, *multi-vius*.

TYPE B.

1. The prior member is a preposition or inseparable prefix (not including the negative *in-*): *ex-animis*, *re-bellis*, *ac-clivis*, *de-clivis*, *pro-clivis*, *per-pro-clivis*, *per-duellis*, *per-ennis*, *de-famis*, *de-formis*, *trans-formis*, *e-linguis*, *e-lumbis*, *e-nervis*, *e-nodis*, *ab-normis*, *e-normis*, *in-e-normis*, *com-pernis*, *de-pugis*, *in-signis*, *per-in-signis*, *prae-signis*, *de-somnis*, *ex-somnis*, *ex-torris*.

2. The prior member is the negative *in-*: *in-animis*, *im-bellis*, *im-berbis*, *in-ermis*, *in-famis*, *per-in-famis*, *in-formis*, *in-frenis*, *il-limis*, *im-plumis*, *im-punis*, *in-somnis*.

3. The prior member is a numeral stem: *semi-animis*, *un-animis*, *bi-ennis*, *dec-ennis*, *quingu-ennis*, *sex-ennis*, *sept-ennis*, *sem(i)-ermis*, *bi-formis*, *tri-formis*, *decem-iugis*, *quadri-iugis*, *se-iugis*, *tot-iugis*, *quadri-libris*, *tri-libris*, *bi-linguis*, *tri-linguis*, *bi-membris*, *tri-nodis*, *bi-pennis*, *bi-remis*, *quadri-remis*, *quinque-remis*, *tri-remis*, *semi-somnis*, *bi-sulcis*.

4. The prior member is the stem of a declinable adjective (in one case the noun stem *tauri-*): *horri-comis*, *sol-ennis*,⁹ *multi-*

⁷ Cic., *Tim.*, 7, 20; Vitruvius, III, 1, 6, = 'one and a half,' lit. 'having a half as second.' *sesquioctavus* and *sesquiertius* are similar in formation.

⁸ *trimodius* may be regarded as an adjective related in meaning to noun *modius* as *triremis* : *remus*.

⁹ For conjectures on the etymology of this obscure word and its confusion with *-ennis* from *annus* see Ernout-Meillet,³ p. 1118.

formis, omni-formis, pluri-formis, tauri-formis, multi-iugis, aequi-libris.

Most of the compounds of both types are bahuvrīhi;¹⁰ so almost all with negative *in-*, or numeral or adjective stems as prior member; but some of the prepositional compounds are hypostases,¹¹ and a few, such as *rebellis, transformis*, and some of the compounds of *sonus* are probably deverbative back-formations in origin, although in structure they do not differ from other compounds of the kind here treated. The distinction of classes according to origin will receive more attention later, especially when it appears to affect the choice between *o*-stem and *i*-stem inflection. The most striking fact about compounds of Type B is that almost all of them have a long penult: out of thirty¹² stems serving as second member only *-animi-*, *-comi-*, and *-iugi-* fail to conform to this rule, and only a few additional exceptions can be found outside of the texts used in this collection. *bīmus* < **dwi-hīmos*, *trīmus*, *quadrīmus* 'two (three, four) winters old,' *bi-rōtus*, *-a*, are further examples of Type A compounds with short radical syllables. It is also interesting in this connection that among fourth-declension nouns *cornu* makes a series of compounds in *-cornis*, some in common use, and generally avoids the other type (except for *capricornus*), while *gradus* and *manus* generally make forms in *-us*. Conversely we might hope to find that stems with long penult rarely serve as second member of compounds of Type A; that is, rarely fail to change over to *i*-stems. Actually Type A compounds are almost equally divided: twenty¹³ second members have a short penult and eighteen a long penult, but many of the latter are subject to special explanation. In any case it is proper to proceed in confidence that there is some relation between the long penult and the transfer to the *i*-stem class, and to attempt to discover the origin of this relation. It cannot be connected with metrical necessity, for in many of the grammatical cases (nom. sg. masc., acc. masc. and fem., dat.

¹⁰ I use this designation as being probably the one in most common use for the class of compounds otherwise known as "possessive," "mutated," or "exocentric." The history of these terms is discussed by Hirt, *Indogermanische Grammatik*, IV (Heidelberg, 1928), p. 38.

¹¹ For example, *obvius, securus, sedulus*. For this type in general see Leumann-Hofmann, pp. 197, 247, 254.

¹² *-animis*, from *animus* and *anima*, counted as one.

¹³ In *-alter* I count *-te-* as the penult, taking the oblique forms as the basis.

and abl. sg. of all genders, acc. pl. masc. and fem.) Types A and B are fully equivalent in this respect, and even in certain other cases they are to some extent interchangeable metrically. As a matter of fact a majority of the variations such as *inermus* : *inermis* in the hexameter poets occur in cases or in situations where one form is as good as the other. Moreover the existence of traces of a similar relation between stem-class and syllabic length in cognate languages, which will be discussed in the last part of the article, lends support to the belief that the conditions in Latin are quite ancient, but at present it is best to continue the treatment of the compounds in Latin itself.

Among the compounds of Type B with a preposition as first member *abnormis*, *enormis*, *perennis*, and *extorris* show between their members the relation of preposition to object and hence are to be classed as hypostases and not as bahuvrīhis.¹⁴ Yet one at least among them, *extorris*, is very old, if we may judge from the gradation *terra* : *extorris*.¹⁵ *perennis* may be cognate with Umb. *peraknem*, a term of not altogether certain meaning, applied to sacrificial victims.¹⁶ But most of the hypostases, if made from nouns of the first and second declensions, follow Type A: e. g. *sedulus*, *securus*, *profanus*, *delirus*; and their origin is probably to be placed very late within the prehistoric period of Latin, or even within the historic period. The adverbial ablative *sedulo* is far more frequent in Plautus than the other case-forms, and is the only form that occurs in the orations, letters, and philosophical works of Cicero. There are strong grounds for believing that the compounds of *aevum* also are of phrasal origin. These compounds, which belong exclusively to Type A, are *grandaevus* (Lucil. +), *primaevus* (Catul. +), *aequaevus* (Verg. +), *longaevus* (Verg. +), *magnaevus* : *grandaevus* Gloss., *coaevus* (Aug. +). Compounds in which the first member is the stem of a declinable adjective, as distinguished from those made with prepositions, *in-* privative, and numerals, are relatively infrequent in Latin. They stand in a sort of supplementary relation to the ablative and genitive of quality. Thus in Sanskrit and Greek these two constructions are virtually non-existent, while compounds of the type *anyārūpaḥ*, *λενωμένος* are

¹⁴ H. Jacobsohn, *Gl.*, XVI (1928), pp. 56-7, thinks that the hypostases adopted *i*-stem inflection after the analogy of the bahuvrīhis.

¹⁵ Cf. Ernout-Meillet³, p. 1214.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

very frequent, but in Latin the situation is almost reversed.¹⁷ It is curious that the most frequent adjectives of this type are those in *-aevus*, *-animus*, *-oculus*, *-comus*, with a thin scattering of others. Now phrases consisting of adjective and noun are most easily turned into compounds when the noun begins with a vowel, making elision possible,¹⁸ and this may be precisely the manner in which *grandaevus*, etc. arose. Naturally this explanation will not hold for all of the compounds of Type A whose long syllables, according to the view adopted here, should lead us to expect Type B. *ad-*, *ob-*, *reduncus* are probably compounded from the adjective *uncus* (as in *recurvus*) rather than from the noun, and *selibra* 'half-pound' is not an adjective at all but a noun like *libra*. Thus it is possible to explain away some of the compounds which tend to work against the theory: long syllable + *-is* : short syllable + *-us*, and the ratio of short and long syllables in compounds of Type A is not nearly so even as the figures 20 : 18 make it appear. Yet there are some Type A compounds with long syllables where no such explanation is possible. Fluctuation is especially noticeable in the compounds of *arma*, *clivus*, *frēnum*, *furcus*, *somnus*, *sulcus*. From most of these the compounds are too few in number to justify any generalizations, but the distribution of *inermis* and *inermus* in the texts examined in this study seems to confirm the view of Neue-Wagener¹⁹ that the tendency to substitute second-declension forms for third-declension forms in adjectives is a mark of early Latin: for our texts the figures are: Republic: *inermus* 13 : *inermis* 27; Empire: *inermus* 8 : *inermis* 64. The cases of *inermus* in imperial litera-

¹⁷ Cf. Delbrück, *Gdr.*, III, I, pp. 240-2 (instrumental-ablative), 348-9 (genitive). He believes that the development of the genitive of quality followed after the breakdown of the old compounds. Modern Indo-Europeanists might be inclined to lean less heavily on Indo-Iranian and Greek for their reconstruction of the situation in the parent speech and to regard the great development of compounds in these branches as independent developments. On the Latin restraint in the use of compounds in general cf. E. Norden² on *Aen.*, VI, 141 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1916).

¹⁸ Elision is possible if the adjective precedes and stands in the genitive case (2nd decl.) or ablative case (2nd or 3rd decl.). Final *d* in **longōd* or **grandīd* might be an obstacle, but we might assume the elision after loss of *-d* or possibly go back to the time when the instrumental (without *-d*) still had a separate existence.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 150, with reference to *inermus*. Cf. S. L. Fighiera, *La lingua e la grammatica di c. Crispo Sallustio* (Savona, 1896), p. 27.

ture are from Vergil and Tacitus. *sublimis* has so far been ignored in this article because of the uncertainty of its etymology,²⁰ but the fluctuation in its declension does have some relevance to the question of early, classical, and imperial usage, especially in view of the fact that the figures for both types are fairly high. Beside the standard form *sublimis*, of which our texts show around 140 examples, forms from *sublimus*, -a, occur in Enn., fr. 30 (V.); Acc., fr. 563, 576 (Rib.); Sall., *Hist.*, III, fr. 27 (Maurenbrecher); Lucr., I, 340; Apul., *Met.*, III, 2, 15; 23, 2. In Sen., *Med.*, 1026 with Leo's correction *aethere*, adopted by Peiper and Richter, *sublimi* must be ablative and hence an i-stem. Special mention should also be made of the curious forms *sollemmo*, *C. I. L.*, VI, 28117; *triresmos* (acc. pl.), *septeresmom*, *C. I. L.*, I, 195 (Columna Rostrata). Except for *aequiremus*, Chalcid., *Transl.*, 34 (not earlier than third century, A. D.) no other o-stem forms occur beside the very frequent series *biremis*, *triremis*, etc., and the use of second declension forms with the feminine *naveis* arouses suspicion that these compounds were simply made in the Greek manner.

If the intrusion of o-stem inflection into adjectives which normally follow the third declension was a feature of early Latin, one might ask whether there was any strong reaction in favor of Type B at a later period. Two of the most frequent adjectives in question, *inermis* and *sublimis*, did largely succeed in driving their rivals out of use. The few occurrences of *inermus* in Vergil (*Aen.*, X, 425; XII, 131, neither under metrical necessity) and Tacitus (6 examples, all in the *Annals*²¹), and of *sublimus* in Apuleius probably deserve to be classed as archaisms. If my theory about the connection between adherence to Type A or B and the syllabic length of the penult is correct, it is important to examine the cases in which nouns with short penult become second members of compounds of Type B. Here must probably belong *debilis*, which I have so far ignored because of the lack of any Latin noun to which it might be referred; but etymological authorities, including Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet³ are

²⁰ Jacobsohn, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48-61, esp. 58, as *bahuvrīhi* **sub-lim(e)n-i* = 'der, bei dem die Schwelle unten ist.' Walde also from *sub* + *limen*, but as hypostasis. Quite otherwise Ernout-Meillet³, from *sub* + *limus* 'qui monte en ligne oblique.'

²¹ On the progressively poetic and archaizing tendency in Tacitus' style, cf. Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, II (Lund, 1933), pp. 276-8.

nearly unanimous in taking it as a bahuvrīhi compound whose second member is cognate with Skt. *bālam* 'strength.' The ἀπαξ λεγόμενον *illiberis* 'childless,' Tert., *Adv. Marc.*, IV, 34, is a natural enough coinage when the intended meaning is taken into account. Beside the series *auricomus*, etc., of which we have about sixteen compounds, mostly very late, the *i*-stem *bicomis* occurs in Veg., *Mulom.*, I, 56, 36, *Quodsi bicomis fuerit quod vulgus appellat* . . . ; *horricomis* Apul., *Met.*, IV, 19; VII, 11; but *leucomomis* and *erythrocomis*, Plin., *N. H.*, XIII, 113, are simply Greek borrowings. *interminis* occurs in Iul. Valer., *Res Gestae Alex.*, I, 30, against three examples of *interminus* in Apuleius and a fair number of examples of *conterminus* from Ovid on. *monosōlis*, *bisōlis*, of shoes, occur in *C. I. L.*, III, 2, 833: 9, lines 12, 13, 15, 16 (Edict of Diocletian) with no rival forms attested. *remōris*, Paul. Fest., 276 (Müll.), of augural birds which cause delay in the transaction of business, follows the analogy of other deverbatives in *-is*. The fourth declension *gradus*, which has a moderately frequent series of compounds in *-gradus* (in origin perhaps better taken as back-formations from *gradior*) makes *retrogradis*, Apul., *Met.*, IV, 20. Adjectives in *-iugis* are quite frequent: *multiiugis*, Cic., *Att.*, XIV, 9, 1; *biuges*, Verg., *G.*, III, 91, *biugis* (acc. pl.), Aen., XII, 355, and other examples, especially with numeral as first member, beside *subiugus*, *biugus*, *quadriugus*, etc., and the contracted forms *bigae*, *quadrigae*; but a special explanation is possible: the root **iug-*, which produced unthematic verbs in Greek and Sanskrit, also produced unthematic nominal compounds, e. g. ὀζυξ, Lat. *coniunx*, *-iugis*. This type then may be the real basis for *biugis*, etc., especially when we consider that unambiguous *i*-stem forms like the nom. sg. are virtually non-existent. Vergil's acc. pl. *biugis* and the gloss *coniugis* 'consociatus' (Gloss., V, 447, 29) merely show the eventual assimilation of the radical stem to the *i*-inflection which was such a common feature of Latin adjectives. The series *-animus*, *-animis* are so important that one might wonder why they have not been mentioned before. First a few remarks on their distribution. Of *magnanimus* our texts furnish over 60 examples, while *magnanimis* first occurs in Tert., *Pat.*, 12, and *T. L. L.* gives only about a dozen examples. The ratio of *exanimus* to *exanimis* is 25 : 57 in our selection, 39 : 72 in a statistical table in *T. L. L.* Their selection differs from ours in a number of respects, but the lower ratio of *exanimis* in *T. L. L.*

is mainly due to their failure to include Ovid (-us : -is = 0 : 14). *unanimus* : *unanimis* appear in our texts in the ratio of 14 : 0, and very few examples of Type B occur even in late Latin; but *semianimus* : *semianimis* (---) in our texts are in the ratio 6 : 30, with -us in Lucr., Stat., Sen., to which a few examples may be added from texts not in our selection. Of *inanimus* (in-negative) our texts furnish 23 examples from Cic., Tac., and Apul. The last-named author has also 3 examples of *inanimis*, and his 3 examples of -us are in cases where third declension forms would be unsuitable. Other compounds are too rare to be used as a basis for making generalizations,²² but one further fact worth noting is that the dat.-abl. pl. *-*animibus* and neut. pl. *-*animia* are avoided not only in hexameter verse, where their use is impossible, but in the language generally. According to *T. L. L.* there are no such forms from *exanimis*, and I have not succeeded in finding any from any other adjective in -*animis*; they are regularly replaced by forms in -*is*, -*a*. The adjectives now under consideration present a special problem, because of the existence of the two nouns *animus* and *anima* which serve as second members. The following view seems to explain the facts most satisfactorily: *magnanimus* and *unanimus* are compounds of *animus* formed in the regular manner, but the former is rather rare in prose and is probably best regarded as a loan translation of *μεγάθυμος*²³ or some other such Greek adjective. *exanimis* and *semianimis* on the other hand are compounds of *anima*—‘with life gone out’ and ‘half possessing life’—with the preference for *i*-stem inflection probably designed to distinguish them from compounds of *animus*, after the analogy of the numerous *i*-stem compounds made from feminine nouns of the first declension. *inanimus* should also be referred to *anima*, but for some reason did not change to an *i*-stem until very late. The rare and late formations *magnanimis* and *unanimis* may reflect a certain overlapping of meanings between *animus* and *anima*, but more probably are a manifestation of the late Latin

²² Italian literature has *magnanimo*, but *esanime*, *inanime*, *unanime*; *equanime*, *longanime*, *pusillanime* have also *o*-forms in Bellini, *Dizionario della lingua italiana* (Turin, 1861—). The extent to which the Latin conditions are reflected in Romance has some bearing on our problem but would take us too far afield and is complicated by the task of trying to distinguish between literary and popular usage.

²³ Cf. Skutsch, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1914), pp. 207-8.

tendency to generalize Type B in bahuvrīhi compounds, which has been mentioned above. On the other hand *exanimis* and *semianimis* never fully succeeded in displacing their rival forms of Type A, and the persistence of dat.-abl. pl. *-īs* and neut. pl. *-a* even in prose, although it has an obvious rhythmical basis, may have extended far back into the history of the language.

We have now reached the point at which it is fitting to summarize the foregoing and to make some broad generalizations on the history of compounds of Types A and B in the language taken as a whole. I regard the connection between length of penult and type of inflection, represented in the formula: short syllable + *-us*: long syllable + *-īs*, as too strongly supported to admit of reasonable doubt. In order not to interrupt the treatment of the Latin material with a long digression, I have postponed the discussion of similar conditions in certain cognate languages, but they will be found to bear out the validity of the formula to a certain extent. Latin then, for whatever reason (and it is unfortunately less easy to find the reason than to prove the fact), inherited two principal types of compounds where the second member is an *o*-stem or *ā*-stem noun. To a considerable extent the original conditions were protected from effacement by the metrical equivalence of the grammatical terminations in many of the cases most frequently used. Certain adjectives, such as *biennis*, etc., *biformis*, etc., *defamis*, *infamis*, *bilinguis*, *trilinguis*, *insignis*, and the *-remis* series never, or only very rarely, depart from their original type. Since the sporadic examples of change to Type A occur chiefly in early texts, I suspect that they may be partly artificial formations after the analogy of the Greek pattern seen in *τιμή*: *ἄτιμος*, etc., designed for elegance and mostly destined to a short life. Their occurrence in imperial writers like Vergil and Tacitus is a literary archaism. In certain others, however, such as those from *somnus*, *sulcus*, *furcus*, and *clivus*, the rivalry is very close, and it is impossible to say how far back into the prehistory of Latin the adjectives *semisomnus*, etc., extend. *delirus*, *securus*, *profanus*, and quite possibly *grandaevus* developed out of phrases, and never departed from *o/ā*-stem inflection. In later Latin there is evidence of a feeling that adjectives of the type which we call "bahuvrīhi" should be *i*-stems, and this tendency even affected some adjectives with short penults. The remaining

portions of this article are devoted to a treatment of the problem from a comparative viewpoint.²⁴

For Indo-Iranian Wackernagel²⁵ furnishes the following examples: *ardha* : *prátyardhi*-, 'having an equal share': *Rigveda*, X, 1, 5; 26, 5; *rādha* : *krṣṭárādhi*-, 'rich in farm-land': *Atharvaveda*, VIII, 10, 24; several compounds in *-gandhi*- from *gandha*- 'odor,' the only series of this type which survives in classical Sanskrit; Avestan *avi-miθri*- 'having Mithra as enemy, enemy of Mithra,' and *daura-māēši*- 'having few sheep.' From the reverse index in the back of Grassmann's *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda* (Leipzig, 1873) it is possible to add *áyopāṣṭhi* 'having iron barbs' : *apāṣṭá*. Among the four doubtful forms which Wackernagel adds, one or two have a short penult, but all the sure examples have a long penult.

From Armenian Meillet²⁶ assembled fourteen substantives (9 *o*-stems, 1 *a*-stem, 2 *u*-stems, 1 *r*-stem, 1 *n*-stem) which on entering into composition (usually with *an*-privative) become *i*-stems, and he called attention to the resemblance between the conditions in Armenian and in Latin. Since the material is difficult to treat because of the scantiness of sources from which to work and still more because of my own ignorance of the language, I shall limit myself to the mention of a few etyma: *gorc* 'work' (Gk. (f) *ἐργον*: Brugmann, *Gdr.*², I, I, pp. 140, 303, 434, 549; Walde-Pokorny, I, p. 290): *an-gorc. olorm* 'compassion' (Meillet, *M. S. L.*, X [1898], p. 280; W-P, I, p. 184, under the heading *orbho*-): *an-olorm. loys* (*lois*) 'light' (*Gdr.*, I, I, pp. 194, 429, 546, 581; W-P, II, p. 409, under *leuk*-, with *oi* < *eu* or *ou*): *an-loys. šunč* 'breath, spirit' (W-P, I, p. 475, refers to stem *kʷonqio*- after Lidén; Pedersen, *K. Z.*, XXXVIII [1905], p. 198; XXXIX [1906], p. 397, refers to suffixal *nč*): *anšunč*. The *i*-stem character of the compounds is apparent from the oblique forms given in Meillet's list. The four forms here cited seem to have etymologically long root-syllables, but whether there is a consistent relation between this syllabic length and the change to *i*-inflection, as in Latin, is for others to decide.

²⁴ Cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*², II, pp. 112-13. Hirt, *op. cit.*, III, p. 275, IV, p. 41. The Italic dialects furnish the forms Umb. *per-akni*- (= *perennis*?), *sev-akni*- (*sol-ennis*?), which, however, are too few and too uncertain to have any value for the problem as a whole.

²⁵ *Altindische Grammatik*, II (Göttingen, 1905), p. 105.

²⁶ *M. S. L.*, XI (1900), pp. 390-1.

In Greek ἀλκή: ἄναλκς are sometimes cited²⁷ as an example of the change to *i*-stems in composition. As in many other words of its type, the suffix *-i-* has been extended into *-id-*. In fact this extension and the productiveness of the new suffix in making feminine adjectives have largely altered the original conditions, so that Greek offers very little help in the solution of our problem.

The situation in Old and Middle Irish²⁸ is similar in some respects to that in Latin, but the type with declinable adjective as first member (= Latin *aequanimus*) has largely been replaced by a type with adjective as second member (= Latin *animaequus*). Our examples then consist mostly of compounds with prepositions or *so-* (= Skt. *su-*) or *do-* (= Skt. *dus-*, Gk. *δυσ-*) as first member. The change to *i*-stem inflection in composition (indirectly attested through infection of the radical vowel) is frequent; in fact Thurneysen (*loc. cit.*) declares the preservation of the original *o-* or *ā*-stem to be very rare. The following examples, all with etymologically long radical syllables, will serve as illustrations: *ner* 'strength' (< **ner-to-m*, Pedersen,²⁹ II, p. 82; W-P, II, p. 232): *son(a)irt* 'strong.' *format* 'envy' (< **-men-to-*, Pedersen, I, pp. 168, 266; II, pp. 34, 581): *Dí-armait* (man's name, = 'without envy'). *ciáll* 'understanding' (< **q^uei-slā* or **q^ueit-slā*, Brugmann, *Gdr.*², I, p. 773; W-P, I, p. 509): *túachil* 'sly.' The following compounds lend some support to the argument of this paper because of their etymologically short radical syllables and failure to change to *i*-stems: *gal* 'valor': *ecal* 'timid,' nom. pl. masc. *ecil* (: Gk. *χόλος, χολή*, according to Pedersen, II, pp. 25, 521); *sochrud* 'well-formed,' *dochrud* 'ill-formed' (< **q^urtu-*, W-P, I, p. 517, cf. Pedersen, I, p. 43); perhaps also Gaulish-Latin *petorritum* 'four-wheeler' (< **-rt-*, W-P, II, p. 368, under **reth-*). Some of the examples with short radical syllable and *i*-stem, which work against our theory, may reflect the gradual extension of *i*-stems in these compounds beyond their original sphere. The partial transfer of *u*-stem adjectives to the *i*-declension is treated by Pedersen, II, pp. 91, 94, 117, and the growth of the *i*-stems is interestingly

²⁷ Wackernagel, *loc. cit.*; Hirt, *op. cit.*, III, p. 275.

²⁸ R. Thurneysen, *A Grammar of Old Irish* (Dublin, 1946), p. 219. C. J. S. Marstrander, *Skrifter utgit av Videnskapselskapet i Kristiania*, Hist.-Filos. Kl., 1924, pp. 47-8, gives a longer list of examples.

²⁹ *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprachen*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1908-13).

illustrated by the distribution of one particular set of compounds, which may be traced from the glossary in Windisch's *Irische Texte*, I (Leipzig, 1880): *do-*, *so-chruth* (*u*-stem) in Old Irish glosses, but *do-*, *so-chraid* (*i*-stem) in Middle Irish texts preserved in manuscripts of the late eleventh (or early twelfth) to sixteenth centuries. But the Celtic material is not conclusive in the form in which I have treated it here, although a more thorough treatment by a scholar competent in this field might lead to some interesting results.

The bahuvrihi compounds in the early Germanic languages are treated in a rather comprehensive manner by Kluge,³⁰ who distinguishes an "older" type without change in the stem-final of the second member, and a "younger" type with *i*, that is Gmc. *-ja-*, IE *-iō-*. The distribution is in large part a dialectal one, with the first type favored in Gothic and the second in North and West Germanic. Moreover, since the material which Kluge presents does not show any relation between stem-final and length of the penult, it is best not to pursue the matter further.

In Balto-Slavic, as for the most part in Germanic,³¹ *i*-stem adjectives have become indistinguishable from *iō*-stems, and in Lithuanian practically all compound adjectives follow the *iō*-type.³² Slavic on the other hand shows compounds in *-o-* (as in Latin Type A) as well as in *-iō-*, but the examples given by Meillet³³ and Hirt³⁴ give no indication of a distribution along the lines observed in Latin.

We come now to the difficult problem of why the stem-final was to such a large extent determined by the quantity of the penult. The phenomenon is probably very ancient, partly because of the impossibility of explaining it by rhythmical factors within Latin alone and partly because of the suspicion of similar conditions in Indo-Iranian and Celtic, although in these two branches the material is admittedly very scanty.³⁵ Some inter-

³⁰ *Nominale Stammbildungslehre der altgermanischen Dialekte* (Halle, 1926), pp. 88-9.

³¹ *i*-stem (as distinct from *iō*-stem) adjectives have disappeared in Germanic except for some traces in Gothic. Cf. Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

³² Cf. F. T. Wood, *The Accentuation of Nominal Compounds in Lithuanian* (Language Dissertation No. 7 [Baltimore, 1930]), pp. 30-1.

³³ *Le slave commun* (Paris, 1924), pp. 323-4.

³⁴ *Indogermanische Grammatik*, IV, p. 40.

³⁵ The fact that the two types can often be used indifferently in verse

esting correspondences in uncompounded forms may provide an answer to our question. The following etymological pairs show a contrast between long root-syllable with *i*-stem or consonant-stem and short root-syllable with *o*-stem or *ā*-stem: ³⁶

| consonant-stems | <i>i</i> -stems | <i>o</i> -stems | <i>ā</i> -stems |
|--|---|---|--|
| θήρ | Lith. <i>žvėrīs</i> Goth. <i>qēns</i> | <i>ferus</i> | Goth. <i>qinō</i> (<* <i>g^uenā</i>) |
| κλώψ φώρ | OHG <i>scīn-bāri</i> 'scheinbar' <i>iūgis</i> ³⁷ | κλοπός φóρος <i>iūgum</i> ³⁹ <i>dómos domus</i> <i>-vōcus</i> <i>-lēgus</i> <i>mōdus</i> | φορά |
| δῶ ³⁸ <i>vōx, vōcis</i> <i>lēx, lēgis</i> ⁴⁰ | OHG <i>un-māzi</i> | | |

has been noted above. It has been suggested as a tentative conjecture that / + ~ + *us* : ~ + *is* emphasizes the opposition between the simplex and the compound; that is, if I understand correctly, the change of stem came about in the forms with long (and hence accented) penult because here the accent could not serve to mark the opposition between the nouns and the bahuvrihi adjectives derived from them: thus, *rēmus* : *birēmis*, but *mōdus* : *tótmōdus*, with no change of declension because the change of accent marks the opposition. Of course if we adopt this explanation we must assume that the distribution of Types A and B remained fluid, or was different, until after the classical system of accent had gone into effect, because under the older system the initial stress on the first member would have served to mark the opposition to the simplex no matter what was the quantity of the penult. The change in the accentual system was almost but not quite complete in the time of Plautus, according to Kent, *Sounds of Latin*³, p. 66; cf. Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, p. 165. This theory might have one advantage in explaining the early prevalence of *inermus*, etc.: the change of declension would first have become necessary after the change of accent had produced *inērmus* : *árma*, *semisómnus* : *sómnus*. But there is a serious difficulty: if the change operated in those compounds where accent failed to show opposition between noun and compound adjective, then we should expect to meet such contrasts as *númerus* : **innúmeris*, *ángulus* : **triángulis*, *óculus* : **unóculis*, etc.; yet actually nouns of the forms ~ ~ ~, ~ ~ ~ make compounds of Type A as consistently as do those of pyrrhic form.

³⁶ Lengthened grade in the first and second columns contrasts with normal (including *o*-) grade in the third and fourth columns, except that *iūgis* : *iūgum* = normal grade : zero grade. All forms in italic type are Latin unless otherwise designated. The material is collected in part from Buck, *A. J. P.*, XVII (1896), pp. 458-72 *passim*.

We must not ignore the fact that many *i*-stems and consonant-stems have a short penult (e. g., *coniūgem*, *σύζυγα*, beside *i*-stem *iūgis* and *o*-stem *iūgum*) and that conversely many *o*-stems have a long penult. Certainly we could not use statistical method to prove that such a correspondence as, for example, *θήρ* : *ferus* was the original and normal one. Moreover one might object to the above examples as being irrelevant to our argument, since in almost every case they involve an ablaut-relation between the long grade and full grade, while such forms as *rēmus* : *birēmis* involve no ablaut-variation at all. But what is important is the strong probability that the thematic vowel *o/e* was first at home in stems of the types *iugo-* (root in zero grade), *mōdo-* (root in *o*-grade), etc., in other words in stems of the type which make up a fair proportion of the Latin compounds of Type A.⁴¹ The stems with long radical syllable in full grade or lengthened grade then sometimes remained as root-stems, or changed to *i*-stems, especially in Latin, where consonant- and *i*-stems are largely amalgamated, and in Lithuanian (e. g. *žvėris*). It would be tempting but very hazardous to suggest that a rhythmical principle thus arose which had enough vitality to account for such *i*-stems as *imberbis*, *trilinguis*, *defamis*, and even the hybrid *depugis* (cf. *ἄπυγος*). A safer explanation is to emphasize the relative slowness with which thematic inflection spread into various noun- and adjective-classes.⁴² There may also be signifi-

³⁷ *iūgis* 'continuous' **iug-is*. Connection with *iugum*, *iungo*, etc. maintained by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet³.

³⁸ In Hom. *ἡμέτερον δῶ*. Derivation < **dōm* as a sandhi-doublet favored by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet³ under *domus*.

³⁹ *o*-stem in Greek, *u*-stem in Slavic, fluctuation in Latin.

⁴⁰ Because of semantic difficulties this etymology cannot be regarded as certain.

⁴¹ Cf. Hirt, *Griechische Laut- und Formenlehre*² (Heidelberg, 1912), p. 353.

⁴² According to Streitberg's *Dehnstufengesetz* (*I. F.*, III [1894], pp. 305-416, especially 313, 415) forms like *φῶρ* developed from thematic stems, with compensatory lengthening of the root vowel when the final syllable was lost. Our theory is not necessarily in conflict with the *Dehnstufengesetz*, because the long-vowel root-stems in question, whatever their origin, were unthematic and were capable of becoming second members of compounds with unthematic stems or (secondarily) *i*-stems. Streitberg's view seems to imply a rather extensive prehistoric loss of thematic inflection, followed by a gradual gain at the expense of the unthematic type, as seen especially in the history of the Sanskrit and

cance in the fact that many of the nouns making Type B compounds are feminines of the first declension and thus had no *-o/e* in the first place.⁴³ It is masculines and neuters like *arma*, *clivus*, *frenum*, *furcus*, *somnus*, *sulcus* which show the greatest instability and which tend to use second- as well as third-declension forms. The theory which seems to offer the best solution for our problem, then, may be summarized briefly as follows: *o*-stems with short radical syllable constituted the oldest stratum of substantives with *-o/e*- inflection, and they retained this inflection on becoming second members of compounds. Nouns with long radical syllables (lengthened grade, full grade in diphthong *-eu-*, etc., or length by position before consonantal suffix) only later assumed thematic (or *-ā-*) inflection, and their compounds were made without *o/e*, the consonant stem being often extended to an *i*-stem. The abundance of *i*-stem adjectives in general in Indo-Hittite was emphasized by Sturtevant (*Lang.*, X [1934], pp. 266-73) who at the same time called attention to their frequency in Latin as an archaism not shared by most of the other branches. In its treatment of bahuvrīhi compounds Latin stands midway between Indo-Iranian and Greek on the one hand and Celtic on the other: the former generalized the *o*-inflection, the latter the *i*-inflection. If Latin has preserved the two types in what was approximately their original distribution, we have here a further striking archaism of the language.

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Greek verbs; a possibility not in itself inconceivable. But the theory enjoys little favor at the present time; cf., for example, Schwyzler-Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik*, I, pp. 355-6. Moreover the vowel *o/e* is generally regarded as suffixal rather than radical, and its relatively recent extension is affirmed by Meillet, *B. S. L.*, XXXII (1931), p. 203; Benveniste, *Origines de la formation des noms*, p. 172.

⁴³ The doublets *φῆμυς* (K 207 and *Od.*) and *φῆμῃ* (*Od.* +) may have some connection with the correspondence *fama* : *defamis*.

IS PLATO'S SEVENTH EPISTLE SPURIOUS?

So far as we know, the ancients did not doubt the Platonic epistles; and not long ago it might have seemed as if the dispute about their genuineness which started in the 19th century had abated. The majority of scholars in England, France, Italy, Germany had accepted at least the two most important letters, the seventh and eighth—if not more. But a few years ago the dispute flared up again. New doubts were raised, on philological evidence, at first in America, where the letters had never been generally acknowledged, and in Italy. In Germany Gerhard Müller undertook to prove in a paper "Die Philosophie im pseudoplatonischen VII. Brief" (*Archiv für Philosophie*, III, 3 [1949], pp. 251 ff.) that *Letter VII* is the work of an imitator. The proof is not based on stylistic or other philological evidence, but on detailed arguments that the philosophy contained in the *Letter* is absolutely alien to Platonic doctrine. Müller says rightly that to remove the philosophical passage for the sake of saving the *Letter* as an historical document would not be possible because this passage is inseparably linked with the *Letter* as a whole. If, therefore, the philosophical passage is spurious, the complete *Seventh Letter* and, with it, the whole collection of the *Platonic Letters* will fall.

Müller has good philological attainments and great confidence in his cause. He seems already to have convinced many people. The principal reasons for his claim that the philosophy of 340 B ff. is not Platonic are the following:

- (1) The philosophical passage pretends to offer Plato's theory of ideas but wholly contradicts this theory. For it states emphatically that philosophy is inexpressible in words and inaccessible to reason. The genuine Plato, however, only deprecates the written word but never doubts the conclusiveness of reason (*logos*). Furthermore, the philosophy presented in the *Letter* is, lastly, a simple psychological theory clothed in a cloak of secrecy. The view that Plato's philosophy is a mysterious secret doctrine appears only in the *Laws*, in the spurious *Epinomis*, and in the *Letters*.
- (2) The writer's personality is alien to Plato's (*Platonfremd*);

he shows an unbearable arrogance, while Plato's ego is completely hidden behind his work. Furthermore, the character of the writer is that of a militaristic man of action, while Plato never dreamed of trying to realize his political theories. Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* are literary fictions.

- (3) The political theories in the *Letter* are mixed with a panhellenic ideology. This is alien to Plato. It occurs only in the spurious *Menexenus* and in an extended passage (469 B-471 C) of the *Republic* which ought to be thrown out. The passage *Republic* VII, 540 D ff. with the barbaric proposal to "exile" ¹ all persons over 10 years of age must also be removed.
- (4) One cannot quote the *Laws* to explain the philosophical passage. Both the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* have discarded the theory of ideas in favor of a cosmic and astral theology. The *Laws* was written much later than the *Letter* is to be dated if it is genuine. Whatever, therefore, in the *Letter* corresponds to the *Laws* must have been taken from the latter work—a further proof of the spuriousness of the *Letter*.
- (5) The terminology is not Platonic, but based on Aristotelian distinctions. And what Plato calls science is never concerned with objects of nature.
- (6) As a source of history, the *Letter* may have some merit, though what it contains beyond mere fact is novelistic. Dion's character is in no way Platonic but that of an autocrat. One may be sure that the genuine Plato would have told Dion and Dionysius things very different from those told in the *Letter*—things which these autocrats were unable to understand.

I shall now try to examine the validity of Müller's arguments in the order of these six points.²

¹ The text says: ἐκπέψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγροὺς.

² For the interpretation of the *Letter* as a whole see Fr. Novotny, *Platonis Epistulae* (Brno, 1930); J. Harward, *The Platonic Epistles* (Cambridge, 1932); Glenn Morrow, "Studies in the Platonic Epistles," *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XVIII, Nos. 3-4 (1935); R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Seventh and Eighth Letters* (Cambridge, 1945).

1.

The Philosophy in the Seventh Letter

The philosophical passage, beginning 340 B 4, is not a mere summary of the theory of Ideas, it is an exposition of the way in which Plato's philosophy can be communicated to others. It does not say that philosophy is "inexpressible by words and inaccessible to reason," it only says that it cannot be taught and learned 'like other sciences'³ by transmission from teacher to pupil through spoken or written words.

Plato's dialogues—and especially the role of Socrates in the dialogues—are the implicit proof of the truth of this statement: one cannot teach this philosophy as a system of propositions or *logoi*; one can only teach people to philosophize. To philosophize means for Plato a joint endeavor of teacher and pupil⁴ to grasp the truth with the whole power of their souls. Because it demands a persistent intensive study, it asks for a sober and self-controlled life, of which Socrates is an example. From all this it results that Plato himself, a poet as much as a philosopher, represented dramatically men who philosophize, that he wrote dialogues, but never formulated a system of philosophy.

The *Seventh Letter*, the only document whose author speaks in detail of Plato's philosophy in Plato's own name, gives explicitly the reasons implied in the form of this philosophy—that it is laid down in dialogues: one cannot write this thing (*τὸ πᾶγμα*). Therefore Plato himself has never written it nor will he ever write it (341 B 7 ff.). You can learn by heart *logoi* on other sciences that contain facts and theories, but not philosophy which implies the inner comprehension of the truth. Philosophy can be learned only 'by much discussion of the matter itself in a life lived together. Then, suddenly, as if by a leaping spark, a light is kindled in the soul'⁵ and thereafter

³ I am using single quotes for quotations from Plato, double quotes for quotations from other people.

⁴ Cf. J. Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher* (Leipzig, 1928).

⁵ Harward, referring to A. E. Taylor, "The Analysis of the 'Ἐπιστήμη in Plato's Seventh Epistle," *Mind*, N. S. XXI (1912), pp. 347-70, translates "kindled in one soul by another." He justifies his translation in his note 92: "... the fuller description of the process of kindling the light at 344b3-8 makes it clear that the fire comes from the soul of the Master, and that *συνουσία* and *σὺς ἦν* refer, not to the prolonged

nourishes itself' (341 C 6 ff.). Philosophy, therefore, cannot be put into simple words, and still less be written down. Therefore Dionysius' mere attempt to do so is the proof that he had not understood Plato.⁶ All this is not alien to Plato; there is no mystical secret theory in the *Letter*.

The test which is to reveal the difficulty of philosophical endeavor is meant to show two things: whether he who is tested has a genuine zeal for philosophy, and why philosophy cannot be laid down in writing (342 A 7 ff.) 'There are three things by which, of necessity, cognizance must be imparted, the fourth being cognizance itself; as fifth one must place that which is to be known and has true Being. The first is the name, the second the definition, the third the image, the fourth cognizance.' In the following detailed explanation the fifth is not mentioned again because it is not an instrument of cognizance but what cognizance strives to recognize, true Being." Müller speaks incorrectly of "five steps of Being" (p. 254). The five terms are explained by the example of the circle. None of the first three gives us the circle as it is 'itself'; the name may be changed completely; and since the definition (*logos*) is composed of names and of the assertions⁷ made from them, it may be changed also. Being composed of names and of what is asserted of them, it consists, lastly, of articulate sounds (*φωναῖς* 342 C 6); but it is nowhere said in the *Letter* as Müller claims (p. 255), that these sounds must be uttered and that utterance is the distinctive trait of the definition (*logos*). Every dialectical Platonic dialogue where one definition after another is attempted and rejected shows that definitions are never final; and many passages state that empirical images never correspond to mathematical or geometrical concepts.

The fourth instrument of cognizance which had been generally called *episteme*, is now divided into *episteme* proper (knowledge), *nous* (the active mind which achieves knowledge), and

solitary pondering over problems, but to intercourse with a teacher. The mention of *ἐλεγχοί* which proceed by question and answer places this beyond doubt; cf. *Laws* 968c6, where *διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς* is used to describe the education of the members of the Nocturnal Council." See the interpretation of 344 B 3-8 on pp. 389 f. below.

⁶ See Müller's arguments on this subject, pp. 253 ff.

⁷ For this translation of *ῥήματα* see J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, translated by D. J. Allan (Oxford, 1940), p. 126.

doxa alethes (true opinion). That *nous*, *episteme*, *doxa alethes* are first taken together under the general heading '*episteme*' because, in contrast to the other three, they are 'in the souls,'⁸ corresponds with the *Philebus*, where in some places *episteme* is taken together with *doxa* under the head of cognizance in general,⁹ and where in other places *episteme* and *nous* are singled out as the highest of the cognitive faculties. The *Letter* says: the *nous* is 'nearest of these (τούτων 342 D 1)¹⁰ to the fifth.' 'Without getting hold of the four things one can in no other way¹¹ finally become a partaker of the fifth.' An ambiguous meaning of *episteme* (Müller, p. 255) can be found in the *Letter* only in the same sense as in the *Philebus*.

Müller complains (p. 256) of the lack of sense in the statement of the *Letter* (342 E 2) that the 'weakness of the *logoi*' is responsible for the unreliability of the image and the faculties of cognizance. The image, since it is an element of the knowledge of all things, e. g. also of moral concepts, 342 D 4, means a *paradeigma* or representative example. As far as a *paradeigma* must be explained, and as far as opinions and convictions must be imparted to other people, words must be used. The four things, therefore, reveal 'just as much of that which a thing is like (ποῖον) as of that which a thing really is' (τὸ ὄν). What a thing is like (E 3 f.)—that is, what it has in common with other things and what thus shows only qualities of the thing—

* 342 C 4 ff.: τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ἀληθής τε δόξα . . . ὥς δὲ ἐν τούτῳ αὖ πᾶν θετέον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς οὐδ' ἐν σωματίων σχήμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν—ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὃν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν. τούτων. . .

⁹ τέταρτα ἂ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὁρθάς . . . *Phileb.* 66 B 8 f.; τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας 60 D 5. Cf., on the other hand, 59 B 7 ff. and 61 D 10 ff.

¹⁰ To make it clear that τῶν δῆλον . . . τριῶν (see note 8) is a parenthesis, and that τούτων refers to τούτο πᾶν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν I have made a dash after ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, instead of Burnet's comma; this punctuation seems implied in Harward's translation, p. 136. Müller (p. 255 and note 10) refers τούτων to the immediately preceding τριῶν, and, consequently, claims that knowledge and true opinion are here "directed" towards name, definition, image (p. 258), which is "a confusing contradiction to the genuine Platonic philosophy," whereas all four together (cf. 343 D 8 τῶν τεττάρων φύσις) refer to the 'fifth.' From this translation arises Müller's misinterpretation of the *Letter* on pp. 257 ff.

¹¹ I read, on the advice of Professor Friedlander, with MSS A and O λάβη, ἄλλως γέ πως instead of Burnet's λάβη ἁμῶς γέ πως A².

is never exhaustive in regard to its real essence. But because of the weakness of language you can never name, define, imagine, even conceive of anything without comparing it with other things; in other words, the insufficiency of language is apparent in all four instruments of cognizance. The *Letter* continues (343 A 5 ff.) to speak once more, in another order, of the uncertainty of all these instruments. First, the image of the circle which is drawn or turned (for practical purposes) is, when used for the cognizance of the ideal circle of the mathematicians, full of qualities contradicting the concept of this 'real' circle: it always has, e.g., some straightness. The name is completely arbitrary because one could also call straight what is now called circular. The definition too is never conclusive, nor are the opinions and convictions based on these three.

343 B 7 ff.: 'The worst is, as said just before, that of the two alternatives, the Being (τοῦ ὄντος) of a thing and what a thing is like (ποιοῦ),¹² it is not what the thing is like but its Being which the soul strives to grasp, while all the four instruments present, in word and deed,¹³ to the soul what it does not seek, and "by their reliance on sense perception" (Morrow) make it easy to refute what they say and point out.' This does not matter so much in the dealings of every day life where we are not accustomed to seek for the full truth and where it suffices to understand one another through images and examples. But as soon as we try to give an account of the 'fifth' (343 D 2) and to explain it in words and in script or by answering questions, we may be made ridiculous before any crowd of listeners by any eristic. 'For they often do not realize that what is refuted is not the soul of him who writes or speaks' (the true meaning of Being, for which the soul is seeking), 'but each of the four instruments which are bad by nature.'

343 E 1 ff.: The discussion 'goes up and down between the four things,'¹⁴ that is, it examines again and again whether the

¹² See Müller, p. 256 on the "Ungereimtheiten" of the contrast of *τί* and *ποῖον*.

¹³ The writer has in mind, not the simple example of the circle, but discussions *περί τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου . . . καὶ περὶ ποιήματα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα*, for which the same is valid as for the example of the circle (342 D 4 ff.).

¹⁴ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν E 1, referring back to τῶν τεττάρων D 8. I do not agree with Harward (note 107) that there is here "a slight verbal

name is right for that which is in the mind, whether the definition fits the name, whether this or that image or instance or deed corresponds to the definition, whether the opinion based on all three is true. This process of going up and down mutually clears the four instruments of knowledge; it therefore generates 'hardly,' with toil and pain, knowledge of a well constituted thing in a well constituted mind.

344 B 4 ff.: 'When all of them, names and definitions, and also what is seen and its impressions upon the soul,¹⁵ are rubbed hard¹⁶ against one another, in discussions where arguments are argued kindly by those who use¹⁷ questions and answers without jealousy, then right sense, and insight into everything, by straining every human power, flare up.' This is the commentary to the passage 341 C 7¹⁸ on the spark of fire which is lighted in the soul (by the teacher) and then nourishes itself in the soul (of the pupil). It is no "simple psychological I've got it (ich hab's)" or "a mystical flash of the inexpressible in the soul," as Müller (p. 263) claims, who always confuses that

confusion because *ἐπιστήμη*, *νοῦς*, *δόξα ἀληθής*, which "belong to the soul" of the speaker, are included in the 'four things,' from which "the soul" here is differentiated. Though human *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς* are 'in the souls,' they are not identical with the soul itself, because they are defective (343 D 8).

¹⁵ *ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις*: *ὄψεις* can have an objective sense, *αἰσθήσεις* the subjective meaning of sensation. The *Definitiones* 414 C 5 define *αἴσθησις* as *ψυχῆς φορά· νοῦ κίνησις*. *ὄψεις*, sights, would then stand for images, *αἰσθήσεις*, sensations, for the lowest cognitive faculty of the soul by which opinions are formed. In this way the parallelism between the two phrases *ὀνόματά τε καὶ λόγοι* and *ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις*, and the parallelism also between the two passages 343 E 1 *ἢ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν* (= *τῶν τεττάρων*) *διαγωγή* and 344 B 4 *τριβόμενα πρὸς ἀλλήλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα* would be expressed. Müller's translation (p. 258) is somewhat like Harward's but takes *ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις* in a more subjective sense "Anschauungen und (andere) Wahrnehmungen." For him the passage is a confirmation of his translation of 342 D 1 and of his interpretation of *episteme* as referring to "the three." See note 10 above.

¹⁶ *τριβόμενα*. Harward says in his note 110: "the word *τριβή* which suggests friction as well as practice, prepares the way, as Taylor points out, for the metaphor of the sudden breaking out of the flame in the next sentence."

¹⁷ For this translation see Harward's note 111.—Without jealousy: where nobody is bent only upon being right himself, but where all together seek for the truth.

¹⁸ See above, note 5, Harward's translation and commentary.

which cannot be communicated by word and script with that which cannot be expressed at all. He further claims that this mystical enlightenment, in contrast to *Republic* 508 D, has "no object," because he fails to observe that the 'life together' is strictly occupied with the search for 'the thing itself,' for the Being of 'everything.'¹⁹

344 C 4: From all this he who sees another's writings—be it laws or something else—will immediately realize that these writings 'are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot he possesses' (Harward)—that is, in his soul.²⁰ Plato implies that what he himself had written is not for him 'the thing of highest worth'; it is written, as the *Phaedrus* says, *παιδιᾶς χάριν*, and for the sake of reminding himself and 'those who know' (275 D 1). Müller, however, says (p. 264, note 31) that 'the fairest spot a man possesses' is an incomprehensible phrase without *Phaedrus* 276 B, where it means the Adonis gardens which this man has planted—a wrong interpretation of the *Phaedrus* also.

Since, according to 342 D 3, what was said of the example of the circle is valid of 'everything,' among other things of the objects of moral inquiry, good, beautiful, just,²¹ the whole procedure of 'going up and down' may well be compared with Socrates' discussions in the dialogues. In the first and second books of the *Republic*, e. g., the name 'just' is given by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adimantus to that which is unjust. The 'images' or instances of love presented in the speeches of Socrates' companions in the *Symposium* are full of qualities opposite to those of love. None of the definitions, even those

¹⁹ *περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό* 341 C 7, *περὶ ἕκαστον* 344 B 7. One may ask, speaking generally and disregarding the text of the *Letter*: is there any sense in saying "I have got it" without having got "an object"?

²⁰ See Harward's note 113 with Taylor's detailed commentary.

²¹ Müller, p. 261, quoting *Politicus* 286 A, objects that it is not Platonic to speak of images of the ideas. But what the *Politicus* says is: there are no clear images of these things, one can give an exact account of them only by reasoning: *τοῖς μεγίστοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδωλον οὐδὲν . . . εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς . . . ψυχὴν ἱκανῶς πληρώσει . . . λόγῳ μόνον ἄλλω δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δέικνυται*. And reasoning, for Socrates-Plato, is 'going up and down.' See also, on the use of *paradeigmata*, *Politicus* 277 D ff.: *χαλεπὸν . . . μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων* and the following explication of the *παραδείγμα παραδείγματος*.

attained by division, can ever be regarded as final. Consequently, no cognizance based upon these three is ever fixed.

344 A 2 ff.: There are two conditions for such an inquiry: he who wants to philosophize must have, first, an inner kinship with the subject (*τὸ πρᾶγμα*), and he must, second, be quick at learning. Müller objects that these two conditions tear apart in an unbearable way morality and intellectuality (p. 258), which the genuine Plato never does. But the *Letter* states only briefly the conditions for the education of a guardian which are developed in detail in *Republic* 485 C ff. There, 519 A ff., where the malicious little soul is described which is 'wise' and sharp-sighted, it is also implied that intelligence without a morally sound mind is dangerous.

The demand to learn 'as far as possible the truth about goodness and badness' (344 A 8 f.) is also alien to Plato, according to Müller. The genuine Plato withholds the knowledge of badness from young people and allows only old men to come into contact with badness; therefore this demand must "refer to two great rivalling powers in the world," that is, to "the two kinds of soul" in the *Laws*. In the *Laws* these two souls have a place "because of the decay of the theory of ideas," but not in the *Letter* where the theory of ideas "is not yet replaced by a cosmotheology" (Müller, p. 259). What is meant in the *Letter*, however, has nothing to do with a good and a bad world-soul. It corresponds to *Republic* 402 C: 'We shall not be able to educate our guardians before we know the forms of self-control and courage, of freedom and generosity of the mind, and all that which is akin and also what is opposite to these' (C 4). The *Letter* corresponds also to the all-important address of Socrates to Glaucon at the end of the *Republic* (618 B ff.): Our greatest need is to find someone who can teach us 'in which disposition of the soul bad deeds or good deeds are done,' D 1 f. The *Letter* expresses a similar thought more generally by the words 'to learn to know the truth about goodness and badness.'

I call attention, at the end of this section, to another misinterpretation with which Müller starts his whole discussion. The *Letter* says: One may show that philosophy cannot be laid down in writing and, at the same time, one may test whether a man has a genuine zeal for philosophy. Philosophy, as we have seen, demands not only persistent study, but also a change of life.

The genuine philosophical nature, when shown what philosophy really is, will be stimulated to the highest effort. Men of a pseudophilosophical mind, however, will soon realize that such a study and such a life are too difficult for them, and that they have heard enough. 341 A 3: 'This test is a clear and infallible way of exposing those who live in luxury and are incapable of hard work; it will bring it about that such a one can never incriminate his teacher but only himself, who is unable to put forth the efforts that the task demands.' Müller translates 341 A 5 *ὡς μηδέποτε βαλεῖν ἐν αὐτίκᾳ τὸν δεικνύντα ἀλλ' αὐτὸν αὐτόν*: "They (the unphilosophical men) "seek the blame in themselves . . . and not in the teacher" (p. 253), taking that which the test is meant to achieve as a fact, while the fact implied is that the unphilosophical men do the opposite: they blame their teacher and not themselves. Müller concludes from his translation that it is a weird psychology which expects from unphilosophical men insight into their own inability (note 9). From this misinterpretation follows another, Müller, p. 253: The third alternative, that is the real reason, why Dionysius had only one conversation with Plato, was Dionysius' "insight into his own inability."

But the trend of thought in the *Letter* 345 A 7 ff. is the following. The writer asks: (1a) Does Dionysius believe that he knows, after one conversation, what Plato means by philosophy, (b) 'and does he really know enough of it,' either by having found it out himself or by having learned it, before this one conversation, from others, or (2) does he believe that what has been said is bad, or (3) does he realize that this philosophy is over his head, and that he is, in fact, unable to live the life it demands? If Dionysius believed that Plato's philosophy was bad, others would have told him the opposite. Furthermore, 'if he really thought he had learned it or found it out himself, he must have believed that it was valuable for the education of a free mind. (If however, he believed this), how could he, if he was not the strangest of men, so recklessly mistreat him who guided him to these things and mastered them?' In other words, Dionysius 'does not know enough of Plato's philosophy' (1b), because he is unable to live and act in accordance with its demands (cf. 341 A 6). The *Letter* then continues, 345 C 2 ff., to relate how Dionysius had mistreated Plato.

2.

The Personality of the Writer

With our last quotation, we have already mentioned one of the reasons for Müller's argument that the writer of *Epistle VII* has an overbearing, arrogant, and self-glorifying personality which cannot be Plato's but must be that of an admiring imitator who in his biography of Plato wants to enhance his hero. The sentence: if Dionysius had recognized the worth of these teachings, how could he have mistreated thus 'the guide to and master of them' (τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον 345 C 1 f.) is a stumbling-block for Müller; Harward, also, feels bound to excuse Plato (note 120) because he uses "this strong phrase of himself." Müller translates ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον "Führer und Meister dieser Lehre," and speaks of "the arrogant bearing of a spiritual Führer" (p. 266); he may, unconsciously, imply in ἡγεμόνα something of the German "Führergedanken." But is it really necessary to understand it thus? Novotny, pp. 235 f., quotes several passages from Plato's dialogues where ἡγεμών means teacher, and κύριος somebody who is entitled to take care of somebody or something, κύριος being a legal expression for guardian. Morrow and Bluck follow Novotny's comments.²² But even if the combination of the two words would imply a higher sense, is it arrogance on the part of a great man when he refers to himself as the guide to his own teachings and the one who masters them? And if we do not find any similar passages in the dialogues—is not a letter a different and more personal pronouncement?

Another instance for the claim that the writer cannot be Plato is 341 D 2 f. (Müller, p. 266). The trend of thought is the following: After having said that he himself has never written nor will ever write about 'these things' because they differ from other sciences (341 C 5 f., see above p. 385), the writer continues: '... If the things were written or put into words, it would be done best by me, and ... if they were written badly, I should be the person most pained' (Harward). Harward, in his note

²² One might add to the passages cited by Novotny, for ἡγεμών, *Laws* 670D: ἵνα . . . οἱοί τ' ὦσιν . . . ἄδοντες αὐτοί . . . τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἡθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται and for κύριος *Phileb.* 12 A: οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴη τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τούναντίον.

93, quotes Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 355: "It is Plato's apology . . . for giving to the public . . . only 'discourses of Socrates.' . . . If the Platonic philosophy could have been imparted to the world at large in a book, Plato was obviously neglecting his duty in not writing that book." So much for the "selfglorification" of the author of *Epistle VII*.

The author says, in the beginning of the *Letter*, 323 C 3 E.: I left home (for Syracuse), not for the reasons some people insinuate, but 'because I felt the deepest shame that I might some day appear to myself to be nothing but simply a word, and never to have tried, by my own will, to attack a deed.' These moving words are, according to Müller, on account of the opposition of word and deed (*logos* and *ergon*) absolutely alien to Plato, because they imply a depreciation of *logos*. The genuine Plato never meant to put his theories in the *Republic* or the *Laws* into *praxis*, *logos* was to him worth more than *praxis*, and the *Republic* has sense only in the sphere of the idea (Müller, p. 270). "The centuries have seen in Plato a thinker who conquered the world by his ideas; the last centuries have made him an unsuccessful man of action." But the belief of the centuries did not imply the view that Plato never aimed at the actual reform of the Greek city-state. If this belief may have sometimes overrated Plato's intellectual idealism (as does Müller) and underrated his zeal for politics, it may be due to taking into account merely Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and disregarding his *Politics*. The historians of the 19th century—first Grote, and then Eduard Meyer—have taught us to see more clearly. They have made us realize that Plato was an Athenian nobleman, and that, as such, he was born to political action. Aristotle, the citizen of a small Northern Greek community and the teacher of Alexander, felt that the glory of Athens had gone; Plato hoped and worked for its rebirth unto the end of his life.

Müller is right in arguing (against Wilamowitz) that the *Republic* was not meant as a challenge to the Athenian people to abdicate power in favor of Plato and his Academy. But he is wrong in claiming that Plato never thought of political action, and in weakening the implication of the *Republic* that this ideal state is the aim at which any real political effort has ultimately

to be directed.²³ He is wrong also in claiming that the very opposition of *logos* and *ergon* is not Platonic. It is a natural opposition which is found, explicitly, e.g. in the *Crito*, the *Meno*, the *Timaeus*.²⁴ The *Laws* seriously proclaims that real reformation could be achieved best and most quickly by a young autocrat whose helper and adviser is a thinker and lawmaker—a belief which stands behind *Letter VII*. Müller is led by this theory to re-interpret or reject anything which might indicate that there was ever a thought of political activity in Plato's mind. Therefore he wants to delete, for instance, the passage *Republic VII*, 540 D 1–541 B 5, where Plato proposes to send into the country all citizens over 10 years, in order to begin reforms with a clean slate.

3.

Müller's other arguments

Müller's other arguments can be dealt with more briefly.

Argument 3. That "Panhellenism" is absolutely alien to Plato refutes itself by its absurd consequences: the rejection of the long passage of the *Republic* (464 C 5–471 C 3) which belongs to the whole context²⁵ and has never been doubted by anybody. Müller claims that the passage is written in bad Greek, as is the whole *Menexenus* also, a dialogue "considered genuine only from the time when scholars came to believe in a political Plato" (p. 270).²⁶ Müller rejects the *Ion* also as spurious, though he gives no reason for doing so. Maybe it is on account of the statement *Ion* 531 C ff. that he who is an expert in any field must be able to judge both what is well done and badly done. This may remind Müller of the sentence in the "spurious" *Letter* that it is necessary to learn the truth about both virtue and vice.

²³ On the "Daseinsform" of the *Republic* see P. Friedländer, *Platon*, II (1930), pp. 412 ff.

²⁴ *Crito* 52 D 5, *Meno* 86 C 2, *Tim.* 51 C 5.

²⁵ On the trend of thought which leads up to the "panhellenic" demand that Greeks ought not to fight Greeks, and from there to the question how this State could be realized, see Friedländer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 381 ff.

²⁶ See Friedländer, *loc. cit.*, Chapter 16, which interprets the *Menexenus* convincingly. P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (1933), p. 186, states that the genuineness of the *Menexenus* is "beyond question."

Argument 4. A great work of the size of the *Laws* dwells in the mind of its author for a very long time; to write it down would have taken a great many years. Therefore, though *Epistle VII* must have been written earlier than part of the *Laws*, nothing prevents us from comparing the *Letter* with the *Laws*, and if we find a similar style and similar thoughts in both of them, there is not the slightest reason for the belief that the *Letter* copies the *Laws*.

Argument 5. Müller claims (p. 267) that the use of certain terms is not Platonic, but Aristotelian; therefore he assigns the *Letter* to the epoch when Theophrastus wrote his *Characters*, that is, towards the beginning of the third century B. C.

"Aristotelian terms" are e. g. *ἔξις*, *πρᾶγμα* in the pointed sense of philosophy, *ἐπιχειρήσεις*, *φύσις*. But *ἔξις* combined with soul (= state of mind), as in the *Letter*,²⁷ is to be found in the *Laws* 650 B 7²⁸ and, above all, in Socrates' address to Glaucon at the end of the *Republic*, 618 D 1. In this passage, as in the whole philosophical passage of the *Letter*, the relationship between teacher and pupil is implied. The teacher has to help the pupil to learn 'which is the state of mind' (*μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως*) 'in which a bad or a good deed is done.'²⁹ *τὸ πρᾶγμα* "in the pointed meaning of philosophy," as Socrates' occupation (*Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*), occurs e. g. in the *Crito* (53 C) where it refers back to the teaching of Socrates that virtue and justice are of higher value than customary law. It occurs e. g. in the *Euthydemus* (274 E) as 'the problem whether virtue can be learned' (*τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀρετὴν μαθητέον*). For *ἐπιχειρήσεις* see the passages adduced by Ast. *φύσις* in the phrase 344 D 4 f. 'on the highest matters and first principles of nature,' which Müller considers incriminating, may have come into the writer's mind as a reminiscence of the books 'written by other philosophers, small or great' (D 5) which sentence follows the phrase. Müller stresses (against Stenzel) that Plato never believed in any science of nature. But even if Stenzel's view of Plato's philosophical development were wrong, we know that the Academy was occupied with biological research. A fragment of the comic

²⁷ *Ep.* VII, 343 E *ἔξις τῆς ψυχῆς*, and implying *ψυχῆς* in *ἔξις* 339 A 1, 344 A 4.

²⁸ *γινῶναι τὰς φύσεις καὶ ἔξεις τῶν ψυχῶν*. . . .

²⁹ Cf. p. 391 above.

poet Epicrates caricatures a discussion in the Academy, where, under Plato's and Speusippus' direction, by the method of class division, the right place of the pumpkin in the system of botany is sought. And, furthermore, we have the fragments of Speusippus which deal with history of nature.³⁰

Argument 6. Dion, as he appears in the *Letter*, and as he is well portrayed in Harward's and Morrow's introductions and translations, is a man of a sound and somewhat stern character, and of deep moral convictions. He is no tyrant or "Machtmensch" (Müller, p. 276), but a man of goodwill, who is driven by enthusiasm for Plato's teachings to undertake a task which, under the circumstances, would have needed an iron fist, while Dion tried to apply to politics the self-control and mildness demanded by Plato. When Dionysius, after many admonishments, had denied him his rights, he had lost patience and had begun his ill-starred war, that is, 'his advice to Dionysius took the form of action' (ἐργῶ ἐνουθέτησεν, *Ep.* VII, 333 B 3, Harward). This sentence, according to Müller (pp. 275 f.) is a "strong phrase of ideological and propagandistic deception," and against such "ambiguity" Müller feels bound to defend Plato. Finally, that Plato would have said things "quite different from those reported in the *Letter* to the autocrats Dion and Dionysius" is something which Müller certainly cannot know.

It was the purpose of these pages to show that Müller's arguments, because they are based, to a great extent, on incorrect interpretations and sweeping statements, do not suffice to prove that *Letter VII* is spurious. If Müller is unable to hear in the *Seventh Letter* "the sound of divine Plato's voice," there are many other students of Plato who feel otherwise. If such personal reactions are of any value at all, I, for one, have never read this letter without feeling deeply the touch of the master.

BERTHA STENZEL.

³⁰ See P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici Scriptis* (Diss., Bonn, 1911), pp. 57 ff., and J. Stenzel's article "Speusippos" in R.-E.

THE MEANING OF THE *HISPERICA FAMINA*.

Among the more exotic developments in the history of the Latin language is the medieval *Geheimsprach* known as Hisperic Latin. The origin, purpose, and much of the meaning of this strange tongue are obscure. About all that can be said is that its vocabulary was derived from Hebrew, Greek, vulgar Latin, and unidentifiable sources, and that its influence was considerable during the sixth and seventh centuries. There are a few traces of its effect on continental letters, among them the *Epitomae* and *Epistolae* of the obscurantist grammarian, Virgilius Maro of Toulouse,¹ and the impenetrable third book of the *Bella Parisiacae urbis* by Abbo of St. Germain.² But it was in Ireland and south-west Britain that Hisperic apparently enjoyed its widest and most lasting popularity. F. J. E. Raby writes, "That it (Hisperic) was taken seriously we cannot doubt, and it exercised a fascination over the mind of Aldhelm and over generations of Irish writers."³ Here is a typical specimen of the Irish style:

Adelphus adelpha meter
alle pilus hius tegater
dedronte tonaliter,
Blebomen agialius
nicate dodrantibus
sic mundi vita huius,

which Professor Raby translates, "Brother, sister, mother, father (?), son, daughter die together; we see the shore beaten by the waves, so is the life of this world."

The most remarkable and best known of the works composed in this learned argot is the *Hisperica Famina*, or "Occidental Talkitudes," a rambling, rather bardic account of life in an early medieval center of learning.⁴ The first half is a log of events during a typical day in the scholarly community, and the second half is a collection of sketches describing common

¹ J. Huemer, *Virgilii Maronis grammatici opera* (Leipzig, 1886).

² *Mon. Germ. Hist., Poet. Lat. Aevi Car.*, IV, p. 77.

³ F. J. E. Raby, *Secular Latin Poetry* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934), I, p. 167.

⁴ For general discussions of this work, see Raby, *loc. cit.*; M. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* (Paris, Picard, 1905), chapt. VII; and R. A. S. Macalister, *The Secret Languages of Ireland* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1937), chapt. III.

school-room and domestic articles. The *Famina* are written in what appears to be an assonating, highly stylized form of Hisperic prose, or possibly, as some critics have thought, in a kind of free verse vaguely influenced by the classical hexameter. In any event, one must agree with Professor Raby that the work "is poetically conceived, whether it is to be called verse or prose." It seems most likely to have been composed in sixth century Ireland, though this cannot be called a certainty. The only complete manuscript is found in *Vat. Reg. Lat.* 81.

Cardinal Angelo Mai, the first scholar to wrestle with the text of the *Famina*, was openly incredulous. "Quis hunc Aethiopem lavet?" he inquired in his bemused commentary,⁵ and in that *quis* plainly wrote a *nemo*. John Rhys, coming upon the fragmentary version of the work in the Echternach manuscript, grew bitter and described it as "opening with a kind of rhythmic twaddle about astronomy and ending with the prophet in the lion's den."⁶ Since the days of these reluctant pioneers, the *Famina* have been the object of somewhat more informed and sympathetic study, but much in them still remains dark. And probably the darkest part is the 132 line passage which comprises the first five *capita* of the Vatican manuscript.⁷ The two best efforts to get at the sense of this forbidding piece of rhetoric have been those of F. J. H. Jenkinson⁸ and E. K. Rand.⁹

⁵ Angelo Mai, *Classici Auctores*, V, p. 479.

⁶ John Rhys, "The Glosses in the Luxemburg Fragment," *Revue Celtique*, I, p. 52.

⁷ Robinson Ellis ("On the Hisperica Famina," *Journal of Philology*, XXVIII, p. 221) claimed this distinction for the relatively innocuous passage which is headed *De taberna* in the Vatican manuscript. "It is," he wrote, "quite uncertain *what* is described." Jenkinson thought that the object described might be a bookcase. Actually the first seven lines of the passage describe a kind of knapsack in which books were carried. (This article is also mentioned in lines 71 and 507.) The following eleven lines outline the manner in which a page of parchment should be prepared.

⁸ F. J. H. Jenkinson, *The Hisperica Famina* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1908). Jenkinson followed Henry Bradshaw's suggestion that the *Famina* should be printed as verse. In the one passage I have quoted from the original Latin, I have reproduced Jenkinson's format, not because I agree with it, but simply for the convenience of the reader. All line references are based on Jenkinson's edition.

⁹ E. K. Rand, "The Irish Flavor of the Hisperica Famina," *Studien zur lateinischen Dichtung des Mittelalters* (Dresden, W. und B. v. Baensch, 1931).

Jenkinson, whose account of the work has been the basis of all subsequent discussions, regards this passage as a monologue in which the *faminator* (to use Robinson Ellis' fine word) first exalts himself and his school, then heaps ridicule on a would-be scholar, next illustrates the excellence of his own Latin with some choice similes, and finally points out some common faults of style. Rand also saw the passage as a monologue and agreed with Jenkinson's main divisions, but thought that the deprecatory remarks were the author's own conventional "confession of exceeding rusticity" rather than insults aimed at someone else. The monologue is, he added, by way of a prologue to the narrative account of the scholars' works and days which follows it.

Both these interpretations appear to be based on reasonably sound, if not always literally accurate constructions of many individual images and ideas. But they leave the passage a most tortuous and uncohesive thing, bestrewn with difficulties which would in any other text be called desperate. Let us look at a typical example of the problems which beset the views of Rand and Jenkinson. Lines 110-115 say something like this:

As far as the eastern bourne is distant from the western limit; as far as the solar disc excels in its fuller ruddiness the blazing stars; as the sonorous clangor of contending hawks surpasses the mellifluous murmur of bees and the strength of the raging bear that of the feeble sheep, so far is the power of my loquacious eloquence distinguishable from that of the others. (*Intantum nostri loquelosi tenoris segregantur altrinsecus numina.*)

Immediately after this (116-132) comes a passage which, as I have ventured to translate it, reads:

I have studied the twelve defects which lacerate the Ausonian palate. Two of these outrages in particular wound the verbal structure with their viperous touch. One, a barbarous growth, assaults the foot-path of language. It functions in two ways, confounds the four types, adds unwonted letters to traditional literature, drags established writing to death and damnation, rearranges the elements of urbane eloquence, and transmutes the stable tenor of description with its destructive venom. The other defect arose on eastern soil, and by it Hisperic eulogy is pierced with a viperous stroke which corrodes the ready wits of the initiate. Other disgraces which disfigure the pure gold of Italic diction are also in evidence, since from these (twelve defects) you have compounded your own special outrage against loquacious elo-

quence in this assertion. (*Quod ex his propriferum loquulosi tenoris in hac assertione affigis facinus.*)¹⁰

It is difficult to see how the second passage can be explained as anything but a rejoinder to the first, as a sarcastic contradiction of an inflated boast. There is nothing to which the phrase, "in hac assertione," can refer except the assertion made in lines 110-115. And "propriferum loquulosi tenoris . . . facinus" must almost certainly be taken as an ironic reference to "nostri loquulosi tenoris . . . numina." Jenkinson granted that on the basis of his general analysis, "the connection of this passage (116-132) with what precedes is not clear." Rand, however, ignored the difficulty and said simply that the speaker, having assessed his own accomplishment, now "proceeds to lay low twelve unnamed writers who have offended all the canons of unity . . ." ¹¹ Ellis, to his credit, saw the absurdity of supposing that the two remarks concerning "loquacious eloquence" are both parts of the same monologue, but rather than abandon this supposition, he proposed, unhappily, to athetize "Quod . . . facinus" as the interpolation of a *commentator irrisor*.

Every such transition between commendation and obloquy in these 132 lines (I count six of them) resists the interpretations of Rand and Jenkinson with the same vigor. If we assume with Rand that the speaker's sole theme is himself, we must reduce his discourse to this unlikely summary: (1-48) "We are the best group of rhetoricians in the world, and I am the best rhetorician among among us. I have never seen my peer in eloquence and never expect to." (49-86) "Owing to my inexperience I cut a sorry figure as an orator. You (i. e., I) really should go back to the farm instead of foolishly trying to imitate your (my) betters." (87-102) "My eloquence flows along like a mighty river, carrying all before it. The very thought of me suffices to terrify lesser talents." (103-115) "Alas, you (i. e., I) will sooner touch the sky with your (my) hand, see fish dwelling on land and men in the sea than you (I) will learn to speak properly." (116-132) "My superior learning enables me to distinguish these sundry faults in other rhetoricians." Jenkinson's

¹⁰ For a detailed and thoroughly convincing explanation of the terms used in this passage, see J. H. Stowasser, *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie*, III, p. 168.

¹¹ It is not, of course, writers, but rather styles of writing which are being attacked here.

notion that the *faminator* is alternately praising himself and denouncing another does not involve as bad a tangle as this, but it results in a confused, disconnected sequence of thought that even Jenkinson did not claim to follow. Why, to choose just one example, are lines 53-60, which are deprecatory in tone, in the first person, while lines 61-86, which continue in the same vein, are in the second person? Such confusion of thought and lack of structural cohesion are not at all typical of the rest of the work. The account of the scholars' day is, underneath its opaque and fantastic verbiage, a well-ordered, straightforward narrative. And the descriptive essays which conclude the *Famina* are, saving vocabulary, so innocent of all complexity that they have been taken for classroom exercises by more than one critic. So it seems not unreasonable to look for an explanation of the first five *capita* that will avoid the worst of these logical entanglements and produce at least a rudimentary unity.

The first point to be noted is that the passage is evidently not a monologue but a dialogue. The purely mechanical evidence for this seems plain. Lines 53, 61, and 87, each of which begins one of the transitions between praise and blame, are indented in the manuscript. And indentation, as appears from its use in two other places, is the manuscript's method of indicating a change of speaker. The first of these two places occurs in the passage describing the beginning of the scholars' day:

Sonorous tumult rouses us from our chambers. Fasten the soft vestments to your limbs . . . Start your scholarly endeavors and begin to scan your letters. That scholar wins no trophies who guards health-giving sleep in the cloister of his breast and does not, when Phoebus glows in the east, pluck the pleasures of sleep from his eyelids and fashion a studious industry.

Why do you disturb us with this thunderous clangor of speech? Why perturb the inner caverns of our ears with vocal tumor? For we have devoted the whole station of the nocturnal plow to studious watches while you indulged your limbs with sleep, and the goad of somnolence presses us.¹²

¹² Ellis took the phrase "*nocturni ligonis*" as a corruption of "*nocturnae lagenae*," and translated, "We have devoted the whole time that might be given to nocturnal revels to reading." The manuscript reading, which clearly means, "We have outwatched the Bear," seems preferable. It also furnishes a convincing (though unused) argument against those who have unaccountably thought the *Famina* of Spanish rather than Irish origin.

The second indented line is found in the section recounting the scholars' activities at noon-day:

Phoebus' disc divides the lofty center of the heavens, and mid-day approaches. Now the breast burns with consuming hunger. Visit we therefore the surrounding neighborhood that the inhabitants may provide sweet refreshment for the hungry scholars. What knowledgeable man will lead this decent band along the roadways?

I have often roamed these secret crags and have hunted out the remote resources of this borderland. I know the dear inhabitants who feed the wandering bands of scholars.

In the 225 lines comprising the account of the scholars' day, these are the only two places where we find what may be thought to be an exchange of dialogue. It can hardly be a coincidence that at these places we find the only two instances of indentation in this account. Let us make the working hypothesis that the indented lines in the first five *capita* may also indicate dialogue, and see what can be made of them on that basis.

The *Famina* begin with a general eulogy of the rhetoricians and their school. These lines should probably be thought of as an introductory soliloquy by the *faminator*, but they may conceivably have been intended as a formal address (possibly on the occasion of the opening of school):

Ample joy stirs the pectoral hollow, and I pluck mournful sadness from my breast. But I confine in the arteries of my chest a storm of gladness when I behold the glorious guardians of wisdom, who produce a noble strain of eloquence from their jaws . . . From the limits of the round earth the flower-bearing throng has bent its reins and deserted the remote cross-ways of the vast foundation.

"Then follow, it would seem," says Rand, "descriptions of a bloody fight and of an awful shipwreck . . ." But the subject has not shifted as abruptly as this. The speaker is still praising the rhetoricians and describing (rather empathetically, it is true) their mastery of the standard *suasoria* and other rhetorical exercises which formed the basis of medieval instruction:

(I rejoice) whether they discourse of treasured fables (Will deadly contention arise among rival heirs or will the sons ascend their thrones peacefully?) or whether fierce bands of warriors clash in the fatal battle-line and wet their shining limbs in rivers of blood, or whether the foaming wave of the roaring sea drives the tiring oars to shipwreck, or whether

frightful slaughter seizes whole peoples in common destruction.¹³

The eulogy closes with the question, "Quos edocetis fastos cuique adheretis rhetori?" which seems to mean, "(Professors,) what books do you teach? (Students,) what professor do you follow?"¹⁴ This query carries the implication, "Now let's see this splendid school in action," and serves to introduce what I take to be a classroom scene.

As the scene opens, we hear a rather self-assertive lecturer advertising his own abilities and challenging any of his auditors to debate. "I invite," he cries, "any debater seeking an audience to match wits with a man who has eagerly prepared an arena for learned battle." He then launches into an account of an epic encounter in which he was able to best three mighty opponents. The remarkable translation is Rand's:

¹³ This involved passage had perhaps best be cited in the original.

Ampla pectoralem suscitatur vernia cavernam;
mestum extrico pulmone tonstrum.
Sed gaudifluam pectoreis arto procellam arthereis
Cum insignes sophie speculator arcatores,
Qui egregiam urbani tenoris propinant faucibus linpham
Vipereos que litterature plasmanit syllogismos,
Cui mundano triquadre telluris artico
rhetorum florigera flectit habenas caterva,
Et qui remota vasti fundaminis deseruere competa,
Utrum fabulosas per ora depromunt gazas
(Num trucida altercaminum inter soboles pubescunt litigia
An placorea abucant proles sceptrum?)
Utrum sevis armatorum coetus
toxica corruiit certandi in acie,
Ut furis ostrei cruoris rivis
candida olivarent madiada,
Seu spumaticum bombosi tithis flustrum
inertes oppresit naufragio remiges,
An horridum communi stragi rapuit acculas loetum.

Rand's rendering of lines 10-11, "... whether they broach treasures of fable from their lips or fierce battle is rife among the sons of disputation (i.e., the rhetoricians)," cannot stand. Lines 12-19 must also be included in the series of alternatives, and on the basis of Rand's translation this cannot be done. And *num* is not likely, even in the *Famina*, to be used correlatively with *utrum*. The *soboles* of the text may very well be Polynices and Eteocles. Statius was a great medieval favorite, and the situation of his princely rivals would make an ideal *suasoria*.

¹⁴ *Cuique* is not, I think, the dative of *quisque* here, but the equivalent of *et qui*.

And I pounded the lazy galoots, and I smashed my sturdy coevals, and I downed in battle the cyclopes mightier than I. From none of my coevals did I slink away. The while their truculent darts would pluck at me, I forthwith unsheathed my crafty sword (I raised my good shillalegh), that butchers gentle statues, and I grasp in my hand my sylvan targe that folds in its protection my fleshy hambones. I flourish my fatal dagger, whose beak tears through my adversary's shield. Thus do I invite all my coevals to the fray. Here shines a splendid sprinkling of poetry (*dictaminum*); none in the mass of wise sayings is out of line.

The rhetorician concludes this immodest auto-critique with a few remarks on the general distinction of his audience, and then rather sourly takes note of an apparently distasteful intrusion:

But behold the approach of a horrid serpent who will wound the members of this splendid band with a viperous stroke unless they pray to the ruler of the vast heavens, and will throw the flower-bearing troupe into poisonous discord.

This sudden shift of attention, considered in the context which I have outlined, suggests that a student (one thinks of Abelard and William of Champeaux) has risen to meet the challenge with which the rhetorician so confidently began his harangue. And the passage which follows the rhetorician's insult seems to confirm this suggestion. The indented line with which it begins and the completely new note of modesty and apology which informs it clearly indicate the presence of another speaker, one who is not wholly at home in the rhetorician's "arena for learned battle."

In a young cycle of revolving time (i. e., while still in my youth), I have tried to grasp the Hisperic sceptre, and therefore I fashion a rude discourse and a small stream issues from my lips. But if the Ausonian chain had bound me for an ample stage of temporal length (i. e., if I were older and more practiced), a sonorous draught of speech had passed through my throat, and a great river of urbane eloquence had poured from my jaws.¹⁵

Such diffidence as this, as we know by now, is not in the best

¹⁵ Rand translates the opening phrase, "*novello temporei globaminis cyclo*," as "born late in time." This translation makes satisfactory sense only on the assumption that a contrast is intended between the Hisperic and Ausonian styles; in other words, that the speaker means, "As a child of the decadence, I speak only rude Hisperic. Had I been born in earlier times, I should speak polished Ausonian." But Stowasser (*op. cit.*) has shown that the two terms are strictly synonymous.

Hisperic tradition, and the rhetorician feelingly points this fact out. The transition from the student's effort at oratory to the teacher's sarcastic comment on it is also marked by indentation:

What trade do you practice? Are you a woodcutter? A carpenter? Blacksmith? A fiddler, perhaps, or a flute player? But I don't expect an intelligent answer.

With mock solicitude, he advises the would-be scholar to abandon the profession of letters, which is clearly beyond him, and to go back to the farm, where his absence is causing ruin. The animals are eating the crops, his mother weeps constantly, and the worst sort of domestic difficulties threaten his home. "Let all these calamities," he concludes, "spur you to retire to your natal acres."

The unhappy student does not retire, however, but boldly continues. And having learned something from experience, he resumes on a note that is less calculated to play into the hands of the rhetorician. Again we find indentation:

As a mountain torrent roars through the steep gorge and a devouring wave tears up leafy trunks, rolling along with a mighty tumult, staining the meadows with mud, sweeping boulders along in its course, with such exuberant power do I beget a flood of Ausonian speech.

Two equally muscular similes follow, but to no avail. The rhetorician's ridicule is as biting as before. Here indentation ceases, but by now the structure is clear without it.

You will touch the clear sky with your hand and the two stars of especial brightness will traverse the boreal limits of the seven-zoned heavens; you will count the sandy grains of the level shore; schools of fish will dwell on land and the inhabitants of the earth will judge the pools of the deep a fit habitation before you will ever beget in your eager throat a flood of Hisperic speech.

The unequal debate closes with the exchange on the subject of "loquacious eloquence" which was quoted earlier. In his final effort to carry the day, the student makes as hyperbolic a claim to excellence as anyone could ask for, but the rhetorician coolly turns aside his boast with a learned reference to the twelve ordinary faults of diction and the thirteenth fault invented in the course of the debate. With this the scene ends, and the *faminator* passes on to other incidents in the life of the scholarly community.

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THE EXEGETES OF ATHENS AND THE PRYTANEION DECREE.

One of the generally accepted results of Felix Jacoby's *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949)¹ is the refutation of Wilamowitz' theory² that the *Atthides* of the fourth century were derived from a pre-literary chronicle which was kept by the exegetes and published about 380 B. C. Jacoby based his discussion of this theory on a very thorough examination of the whole evidence on the admittedly most difficult problem of the exegetes.³

It so happened that soon after the appearance of Jacoby's book another study of the exegetes of Athens was published, James H. Oliver's *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore, 1950). Oliver deviates from all earlier treatments of this subject, including Jacoby's, in that he proposes that the exegetes were introduced in Athens as late as "after 403 B. C.," in connection with the revision of the laws of Solon. According to him, the idea of the official exegetes came to Athens from Southern Italy whence it had been introduced "from fifty to a hundred-and-ten years earlier at Rome than at Athens."⁴ Jacoby, on the other hand, believes that the official exegetes were a creation of Solon, and earlier scholars, in any case, had not doubted the existence of exegetes in the fifth century.⁵

As a compromise between Oliver and traditional opinion, now best represented by Jacoby, is patently impossible, a re-examination of the issue is all the more called for because neither author had an opportunity to make use of the arguments of the other and no reviewer of either book has been able or willing to perform this task.⁶

¹ Cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 293-5.

² Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893), I, pp. 280-8.

³ Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 8-51. For the earlier literature cf. *ibid.*, p. 236, n. 1.

⁴ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 31 and 121.

⁵ Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 36-41.

⁶ To M. P. Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), p. 423 Oliver's date "seems fairly probable"; M. Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 24 ff. accepted it; other reviewers of Oliver's book are non-committal. Oliver's rejoinder to some of his critics, "On the Exegetes and the Mantic or

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Leaving aside for later consideration the hotly disputed Prytaneion decree *I. G.*, I², 77 of 445/33 B. C. as a testimony for the existence of the board of exegetes in the fifth century, and foregoing altogether a discussion of the reference to Lampon οὐξηγητής in Eupolis,⁷ in order to eliminate any hypothetical or fragmentary evidence from the argument, what are the reasons for Oliver's novel theory? It is simply the fact that in his opinion the exegetes do not occur in the literature and in the inscriptions of the fifth century.

An official exegete is first mentioned in Plato's *Euthyphro*, 4 C-D, the dramatic date of which is 399 B. C. It is Oliver's belief that the exegetes of the fourth century actually took the place of the chresmologoi, discredited in the public eye by the end of the fifth century. "Before the creation of official exegetes at Athens it had been customary to call the unofficial or merely semi-official experts χρησολόγοι καὶ μάντεῖς" (Oliver, p. 105). The connection which is so evident to Oliver seems even more open to doubt than his identification of chresmologoi and manteis which has been dealt with convincingly by Nilsson.⁸ For whereas the chresmologoi, as their name and the evidence indi-

Manic Chresmologians," *A. J. P.*, LXXIII (1952), pp. 406-13, mostly concerns problems with which the present article does not deal. As it is not our purpose to discuss the question of the exegetes in its entirety, the procedure of the election of the exegetes in Plato's *Laws* has been deliberately omitted from the following discussion; cf. on this point N. G. L. Hammond, "The Exegetai in Plato's *Laws*," *C. Q.*, XLVI (1952), pp. 4-12 and Oliver, *A. J. P.*, LXXIII (1952), pp. 411-13.

⁷ Eupolis, Fr. 297 Kock. Cf. Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 239, n. 17 and his commentary on Philochorus, *F. Gr. Hist.*, 328 T 2-3 in his forthcoming *The Ancient Historians of Athens. A Commentary*; Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 24-8; 124, T 8; V. Ehrenberg, *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), p. 164.

⁸ Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 421-3; cf. Oliver, *A. J. P.*, LXXIII (1952), pp. 410-11. Nilsson's objections are proved to be correct by Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1046-8, where the servant asks, upon the approach of Hierocles: "Is it a mantis?" and Trygaeus replies: "No, by Zeus, it is Hierocles, the chresmologos from Oreos." The anonymous scholium to this passage and *schol. Aristoph.*, *Clouds*, 339 (Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 131, T 16 and 125 T 11) are of no value compared with this testimony. Also in the decree on Chalcis, in which Hierocles is mentioned, he is to offer *τεὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρησμῶν* (*I. G.*, I², 39, lines 65-6 = Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I, no. 42; cf. p. 85).

cate, were concerned with oracles,⁹ the exegetes were not. This Jacoby has conclusively proved against A. W. Persson who is responsible for the confusion of chresmologoi and exegetes and for the belief that the exegetes used to explain oracles, a view for which there exists not a shred of proof.¹⁰ Aristophanes in his two famous parodies of the chresmologos Hierocles (*Peace*, 1046-1126) and of a nameless chresmologos (*Birds*, 959-91) is perfectly clear in his characterization of these men, who constantly pour forth oracles which—and this is significant, too—need not be of Delphic origin (Bacis!).

The fourth century evidence for the Athenian exegetes (apart from the exegetes of the Eumolpidae, about whom there is no serious disagreement) consists of cases mentioned mainly, but not exclusively, by the orators, which are "inquiries of private persons in the domain of justice, particularly as concerned with homicide."¹¹ They are, without exception, *unpolitical* in character.

This strictly unpolitical activity of the exegetes, engaged as they were with purification and information about ritual, is confirmed by the pertinent passages in Plato's *Laws*, where he speaks of the duties of the exegetes in his ideal state.¹² They have nothing to do with either oracles or politics. Even Persson had to admit this.¹³ In other words: None of the activities of the

⁹ K. Latte, "Orakel," *R.-E.*, XVIII, 1 (1939), cols. 851-2; Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 421-3.

¹⁰ A. W. Persson, "Die Exegeten und Delphi," *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, N. F., Avd. 1, vol. XIV, no. 22 (1918), pp. 31, 39, 42, 71. In his list of the activities of the exegetes (p. 39) he mentions "Erklärung von Orakelsprüchen," although the passages to which he refers and which I have checked have no bearing at all on this point. Persson's view was accepted by Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I (1941), p. 603, and rejected by Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 31-2; 47; 265-6, n. 172-4, whose unfavorable opinion of certain aspects of Persson's study (p. 236, n. 1) I share.

¹¹ Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 48.

¹² Cf., e. g., Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 13-15; 248, n. 50; Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 63-4; A. H. Chase, "The Influence of Athenian Institutions upon the *Laws* of Plato," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIV (1933), p. 150, presents only a fraction of the evidence. It is impossible to list here again the striking resemblances between the functions of Plato's three exegetes and those of the actual exegetes of Athens of the fourth century known to us from the *Euthyphro*, the orators, and Theophrastus, *Char.*, 16, 6.

¹³ Persson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

chresmologoi of the fifth century can be ascribed to the exegetes of the fourth century, and conversely, none of the well-known functions of the exegetes of the fourth century is known to have been entrusted to the chresmologoi during the fifth century. As for the manteis, their co-existence beside the exegetes in Theophrastus and in Plato's *Laws*¹⁴ is proof enough that the exegetes cannot possibly be regarded as "successors" of the manteis.

It is the nature of the preserved documents of the fifth century which accounts for the absence of the exegetes in fifth century literature. Once one remembers the fundamental difference between the writings of the fifth and those of the fourth century, it becomes perfectly clear that in the entire literature of the fifth century there is no place where the exegetes ought to have been mentioned.

This applies in particular to Thucydides. "Thucydides never uses the word exegete."¹⁵ True. Why should he? He naturally mentions chresmologoi and manteis who pronounced oracles and foretold the future on the basis of oracles and signs and thus exercised considerable influence on the conduct of the war.¹⁶ Yet he had not the slightest reason to refer anywhere in his work to the exegetes if their functions in his time were what they obviously are in the fourth century.

Therefore, even if the exegetes were completely absent from fifth century inscriptions, nothing could be inferred as to their existence, for exactly the same reason, just as the fact that the word chresmologos does not figure in the epigraphical vocabulary of the fifth century cannot be used for statistical purposes.

On the other hand, no positive argument has been set forth in support of the alleged introduction of the official exegetes between 403 and 399 B. C. The whole idea that an institution of this nature, bound up as it is with obviously ancient ritual, should have been imported from Southern Italy by the Athenians as late as the end of the fifth century seems to me utterly

¹⁴ Theophrastus, *Char.*, 16, 11 (cf. 6): when the superstitious man has a dream, he hurries to the interpreters of dreams, to the manteis, to the diviners who foretell the future by the flight and the cries of birds (the exegetes, mentioned in the episode in 16, 6 do not occur here). Plato, *Laws*, VIII, 828 A-B; IX, 871 C.

¹⁵ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 25.

¹⁶ Thuc., II, 8, 2; 21, 3; VIII, 1, 1; cf. II, 54 and V, 26, 3. See Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 268, n. 188; Tod, *J. H. S.*, LXXI (1951), p. 270.

incredible, especially when combined with the notion that the Romans of the fifth or sixth century B. C. should have introduced the same type of institution from the same source long before the Athenians. This theory of a common borrowing which implies that Rome in the time of the Decemvirs was more advanced in matters of religious organization than contemporary Athens—the Athens of Pericles, Sophocles, and Phidias—stands in glaring contrast to the historical tradition and to all historical probability.¹⁷ Against such an unnecessary assumption it will be well to heed A. D. Nock's sober warning: "Much of what can be said about the religion of any one nation or culture can be said about many others: for religion is largely determined by the human situation, and in considerable measure this is a constant."¹⁸ Nor is it likely that Plato would have adopted for his ideal state a "brand-new" institution created by the democracy of 403.

Our preliminary conclusion is then that the date of the establishment of the exegetes remains, for the time being, an open question. We have no right to postulate that it must coincide, as it were, with their first appearance in literature. Who would deny the existence of the Arval Brethren in the early Republic, because they are mentioned for the first time in the second half of the first century B. C., and that in a work which has been preserved in only one manuscript, Varro's *De lingua latina*: "aetate liberae rei publicae non laudantur nisi a Varrone *ling.* 5, 85"?¹⁹ This complete lack of evidence about the Arval Brethren for so many centuries of Roman history is all the more striking because for the early history of Rome two detailed accounts have come down to us, those of Livy and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whereas for Athens the only work of comparable scope, Philochorus' *Atthis*,²⁰ has survived only in meagre fragments.

A further strong disagreement between Oliver and Jacoby exists with regard to the composition, number, and character of

¹⁷ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 120-1. For a striking example of Athenian influence on Rome about the time of the Decemvirs cf. the brilliant article by E. Sjöqvist, "Pnyx and Comitium," *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, I, pp. 400-11.

¹⁸ Nock, "Religious Attitudes of the Ancient Greeks," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LXXXV (1942), p. 479.

¹⁹ *T. L. L.*, II, p. 725.

²⁰ The comparison has been made by Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 98.

the boards of exegetes. Here a few observations of a more general nature must suffice. Oliver bases his conclusions on the epigraphical evidence which is late. As a matter of fact, there is a long gap in the tradition about the exegetes which extends from 329/8 to 129/8 B. C.²¹ In this gap also belongs Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* in which they are not mentioned, a significant indication of the decline of the institution. According to Oliver (p. 35) "the reader should not attach undue importance to the absence of epigraphical evidence before the end of the second century B. C." Why, if the alleged absence of these officials in the sources of the fifth century has been used as a proof for their non-existence in that period? Jacoby, on the contrary, inferred, correctly in my opinion, that this situation reflects a loss in importance of this office.²²

Oliver's reconstruction of the numbers of exegetes of each type (the exegetes of the Eumolpidae must again be disregarded here) from ca. 400 B. C. on rests on the Pythaiast and other inscriptions of the Roman period from 129/8 B. C. on, and especially, on *I. G.*, II², 1092 = Oliver, p. 155, I 37, an inscription which is dated in the second century after Christ. For the "exegete elected by the Demos from the Eupatridae" the epigraphical evidence extends from 106/5 B. C. to ca. 180 A. D., for the "pythochrestus exegete" from 128/7 B. C. to 312 A. D.²³ It is taken for granted that between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the period of the Gracchi no change in the organization of the exegetes occurred. The theory that the number of exegetes was larger during the classical period "can be defended only by throwing out the epigraphical evidence" (Oliver, pp. 36-7). The reliance on Roman evidence for reconstructing in detail an institution of Plato's Athens seems to me open to most serious objections,²⁴ the more so because Oliver himself suggests

²¹ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 142-3, I 6-7. N. b.: the first of the two inscriptions refers to the exegetes of the Eumolpidae.

²² The importance of Aristotle's silence has been rightly stressed by Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 22-3.

²³ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 144, I 13 and pp. 156-7, I 40-43; p. 143, I 8 and pp. 160-1, I 52. Oliver's collection of the epigraphical evidence of the Late Hellenistic and Roman periods is excellent and most useful.

²⁴ Already R. Schoell, *Hermes*, XXII (1887), p. 564, had warned

changes in the number of exegetes within the fourth century: Euthyphro's father and Isaeus' client (VIII, 39) consulted *one* exegete, in 399 and before 363 respectively, whereas the speaker in [Demosth.], XLVII, 68-71 appeals to a board of exegetes in the fifties of the fourth century. Hence, in Oliver's words (p. 44): "Sometime between the events recorded in the oration of Isaeus and the year 357/6 a board would seem to have replaced the one exegete in the official exegesis concerning such points of law." While this interpretation of the collective singular cannot be maintained in the light of the crucial passage *Euthyphro*, 9 A where the plural is used (*παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν . . . πυνθίσθαι*),²⁵ the admission as such of the possibility of such a change is valuable.

Changes of this type are common enough elsewhere. A striking example within the Roman period is preserved in a long series of documents discovered in Olympia. These lists of officials for the sacrifices offered by the Eleans in Olympia reach from 36 B. C. to 265 A. D.²⁶ Among these, a fluteplayer and an exegete (occasionally called "periegete") regularly occur up to shortly before the middle of the second century (no. 95). The next dated document (no. 102, from the end of the second century) names *two* exegetes and three fluteplayers, and this remains the number until these records cease. Obviously, sometime toward the middle or during the second half of the second century a reform took place in which the number of these officials was increased.

A further analogy, from the history of Roman religion, may be instructive. The *XV viri sacris faciundis* were one of the most important priesthoods in Rome. If we were as ill informed about the development of Roman priesthoods as we are about those of Classical Athens, we might infer from the evidence of the Empire and the conservative character of the Romans that this board was created as a board of fifteen at the end of the sixth century B. C. But in this case we know: the board started

against relying on Roman evidence for the understanding of the original character of Athenian institutions. Cf. Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 35.

²⁵ Jacoby called attention to this passage, *Atthis*, p. 243, n. 42. It confirms C. B. Welles' objections, *Traditio*, VII (1949-51), p. 473.

²⁶ *Olympia. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen*, V (Berlin, 1896), nos. 59-122.

out as *duoviri s. f.*, it was increased to a membership of ten in 367 B. C., and finally was brought up to fifteen by Sulla.²⁷ Other examples could be given, all pointing to a gradual increase of the membership of the priesthoods, for obvious reasons. Would not, conversely, a tendency toward shrinkage be something to be expected in Athens, in accordance with her decline, during the long period, full of revolutionary changes, between Demosthenes and the end of the second century B. C.?

II

So far the Prytaneion decree has been deliberately excluded from the discussion (cf. p. 408 *supra*). The author of the most recent treatment of this document²⁸ concludes his study with the hope that he has "demonstrated that the Prytaneion decree cannot be used to prove the existence of ἐξηγηταὶ πῦθόχρηστοι in the fifth century." In this he follows Oliver, although he does not accept Oliver's restorations of the pertinent portions of the inscription. While it has been our intention to show that the existence of official exegetes in Athens during the fifth century does not depend on the interpretation of the Prytaneion decree, the issue still remains whether in this inscription, in which the privilege of permanent public maintenance is conferred upon various categories of Athenians, the exegetes are included or not.

R. Schoell, in his still fundamental first publication of the text,²⁹ recognized the exegetes in lines 9-11; and this has been the established view ever since, taken for instance by Preuner, Wade-Gery, and Jacoby. W. Bannier, in the belief that the phrase κατὰ τὰ [δ]έδομ[ένα] "in itself is insufficient," suggested alternatives which did away with the exegetes, but proved to be unacceptable because they are contradicted by the stone.³⁰ However, this conjecture was used in a modified form by Hiller von

²⁷ G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1912²), pp. 534-5. On the development of this college cf. A. A. Boyce, "The Development of the Decemviri Sacris Faciundis," *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 161-87. Oliver, too, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 119-20, has referred to this priesthood.

²⁸ Martin Ostwald, "The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined," *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 24-46.

²⁹ Schoell, *Hermes*, VI (1872), pp. 30-42.

³⁰ W. Bannier, *Berl. phil. Woch.*, XXXVII (1917), pp. 1216-17; cf. Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), p. 33.

Gaertringen in his edition in *I. G.*, I², 77 to read κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδο-
 μ[ένα κατὰ τὴν παντρίαν ἡε]ν. This phrase, which was accepted by
 Oliver, is in Jacoby's words "hardly Greek," an opinion shared
 by Ostwald.³¹ The sentence resulting from Hiller's restoration
 was termed by Wade-Gery, with an understatement, as "not
 elegant,"³² whereas Jacoby called it "unintelligible."³³ It has
 been generally overlooked that Bannier himself later withdrew
 his proposal, without endorsing Hiller's alternative, and rein-
 troduced the exegete (one only!) in another restoration of the
 text,³⁴ so that up to the appearance of Oliver's book Hiller's
 reading represented everything but standard opinion. As a matter
 of fact, Wade-Gery's thorough re-examination of the inscription,
 in which he returns to and improves on Schoell's original resto-
 ration, would have seemed to lay the ghost.³⁵ Oliver's readings
 of the lines 7-11 are, as we have seen, strongly influenced by
 Hiller and the elimination of the exegetes is for him naturally a
condicio sine qua non. As Ostwald, a close adherent of Oliver's
 views about the official exegetes, has already rejected these resto-
 rations with good reasons, it will suffice to refer to his treatment.³⁶

Ostwald himself brings into the discussion a novel element:
 he maintains that the complete absence of the movable N in the
 preserved portions of the decree is "likely to indicate that it
 was carefully avoided and should caution us not to use it in
 any restorations here."³⁷ But is it really probable that such a
 simple rule, if it were actually valid, should have escaped the
 attention of so many distinguished specialists in this field? Pro-
 fessor B. D. Meritt whom I consulted about this alleged rule
 denied its existence, and Ostwald's own evidence, *I. G.*, I², 39 =
 Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I (Oxford, 1946²), no. 42
 (a. 446/5), and *I. G.*, I², 76 = Tod I, no. 74 (about a. 418),

³¹ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 139-41; Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 238, n. 5; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 33-4.

³² H. T. Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), p. 126.

³³ Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 237, n. 3.

³⁴ Bannier, *Rhein. Mus.*, LXXVII (1928), p. 283; cf. Hondius and Raubitschek, *S. E. G.*, X (1949), no. 40.

³⁵ Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), pp. 123-7. His readings and interpretation were accepted by Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 8, no. 1; 238, n. 5.

³⁶ Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 27, 33, 39.

³⁷ Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 26-7.

is not conclusive, if one considers individual sections of the two inscriptions and remembers the fragmentary character of the Prytaneion decree. How untenable Ostwald's argument is will be clear after examining for a moment the first of the two financial decrees moved by Callias in 434, *I. G.*, I², 91 = Tod I, no. 51. Here movable N is missing three times in lines 1-2, once in line 6, and twice in lines 29 and 31; it is present in lines 5, 11, 13, 20, 23; that is in twenty-six consecutive lines (e. g., 3-28) movable N is missing once, present five times, a situation completely analogous (though in reverse) to the Prytaneion decree as restored by Schoell and Wade-Gery, where in eighteen half preserved lines movable N is missing six times (but in four of the six cases in datives ending in -οῖσι; in fact, *all* six words end in -σι, a circumstance which further weakens the force of Ostwald's argument); it has been restored in only two instances, in lines 5 and 9. In the latter case Wade-Gery reads ἀνῆλ[ε]ν because he believes that "a trace of this N can be read on the stone";³⁸ Ostwald, who has purged all restorations of movable N's, has removed also this one.³⁹ Professor Sterling Dow very kindly examined his excellent squeeze of the inscription in my presence with the result, which seems convincing to me, that what remains of the disputed letter is inconsistent with a I and seems to be the lower end of the left hasta of a N (n. b., the letter must be either I or N). We therefore entirely agree with Wade-Gery's reading.

There is little to add to Ostwald's own reading of the passage in question. He virtually returns to Schoell's proposals, replacing, however, the word ἐχσεγέτας with τῶν μάντεων ἥος. His main argument is really a negative one, to wit Oliver's theory that the exegetes did not exist in the fifth century. His positive reasons⁴⁰ are so conjectural in the decisive points that I may be allowed to forego their further discussion. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence whatsoever suggesting the appointment of manteis or of a group of manteis by Apollo.

This leads us to the last question: what about the original

³⁸ *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), p. 126, n. 3.

³⁹ Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, p. 38. It should be remembered that the word in question does *not* end in -σι! Cf. also *I. G.*, I², 78, p. 417 *infra*.

⁴⁰ Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 39-45.

insertion of the exegetes by Schoell, as modified by Wade-Gery? The main argument, already set forth by Schoell and ably discussed again by Jacoby,⁴¹ is that the category dealt with in line 9 is characterized as ordained by Apollo—hòs nũ]ν ho 'Απόλλον ἀνῆλ[ε]ν—and that this is exactly the phrase used by Plato of his exegetes, *Laws*, IX, 865 D: τούτων δ'ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὓς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ. The passage gains in importance if we remember how close the connection is between Plato's exegetes and the exegetes of Athens.⁴² Oliver has not even mentioned this crucial argument in his discussion of the Prytaneion decree (pp. 139-41), and Ostwald's attempt to explain it away in three lines is ununderstandable to me.⁴³

There remains, finally, *I. G.*, I², 78, a document strangely neglected in this discussion.⁴⁴ This decree, moved by Philoxenus and to be dated, it seems, about 430 B. C., begins as follows: . . . Φιλόχσενος εἶπε· τοῖ [᾿Απόλλωνι θῦσαι, ἐπ]ειδὲ ἀνεῖλεν ἑαυτὸν ἐχσεγετὲ]ν γενόμενον ᾿Αθηναίο]ς, θρόνον τε ἐχσελεῖν ἐν τοῖ πρ[υτανείοι . . .]. Here the same phrase that appears in the Prytaneion decree and in the Plato passage is used with respect to Apollo himself (cf. the underlined words in all three quotations). Not less suggestive is the request in the same inscription that a seat be reserved for the god in the Prytaneion, obviously in his quality as exegete, and obviously because it was there that the officials ordained by him were already enjoying—in human terms—this very honor. By declaring himself exegete of the Athenians, he joins the exegetes ordained by him and partakes symbolically in their privileges.

⁴¹ Schoell, *Hermes*, VI (1872), p. 36; Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 29; 248, n. 53.

⁴² Cf. p. 409 *supra*.

⁴³ Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴⁴ Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 139, I 2, reproduces only the first portion of the motion of Philoxenus. His only comment (p. 121) "Apollo replied (*scil.* when the Athenians consulted Delphi about the establishment of official exegetes) that he himself would serve as their exegete (I 2) so that human exegetes would be unnecessary," seems in no way warranted by the text of the inscription. Cf. about this document also Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, II (Munich, 1926), p. 1106, n. 1; Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 238, n. 3; p. 273, n. 242; Raubitschek, *C. W.*, XLIV (1951), p. 136, who refers to *S. E. G.*, X (1949), no. 63.

In conclusion it may be said that the traditional interpretation of lines 9-11 of the Prytaneion decree by Schoell, Wadegery, and Jacoby has not been invalidated by Oliver and Ostwald. On the contrary, Jacoby's penetrating treatment of the problem of the exegetes has rendered it even more certain that the exegetes are the officials ordained by Apollo who are honored in the Prytaneion decree. Their existence during the fifth century is assured also without the evidence of this document.

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THE HOROSCOPE OF CEIONIUS RUFIOUS ALBINUS.

In 1894 Theodor Mommsen suggested¹ that Ceionius Rufius Albinus was the person to whom the horoscope contained in the second book of the *Mathesis* of Firmicus Maternus referred. Circumstantial evidence led Mommsen to the conclusion that it was the *praefectus urbi* of the year 336/337 A. D. whose horoscope is discussed in detail by Firmicus. Mommsen did not, however, submit his thesis to the final test: whether or not the astronomical data agree with his hypothesis. It is the purpose of the present note to fill this gap. At the same time I wish to point out how easily problems of this type can be solved without going into a great many unnecessary details which are usually invoked in the dating of horoscopes by professional astronomers who are not familiar with the techniques of ancient astronomy and astrology, techniques which by their approximative character make quite meaningless the application of modern high precision tools.

Our horoscope contains as data only the zodiacal signs in which the seven planets and the Horoscopus, the rising point, are located. As starting-point we use the positions of Saturn and Jupiter in Virgo and Pisces respectively. I know of twelve Greek horoscopes with Saturn in Virgo, three of which show Jupiter in Virgo also. Their dates, A. D. 65, 124, and 125 respectively,² are too far away from the critical years around 300

¹ *Hermes*, XXIX, pp. 468-72 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, pp. 446-50.

² These texts are Vettius Valens, II, 21; VII, 5; *P. Fouad* 6 respectively.

which alone are interesting for our problem. With *P. Harris* 53, however, we reach the year 245 A.D. but both planets are one sign farther ahead than required. The common period of Saturn and Jupiter is 59 years, thus the same situation will prevail in 304 A.D. Jupiter moves one sign per year; thus 303 will give the right sign for this planet and it can be hoped that Saturn is one sign back also. Thus 303 is our only chance before 336 A.D. Other possibilities are either 59 years earlier or later, and thus incompatible with Mommsen's hypothesis.

The first step consists in finding the approximate positions of Saturn and Jupiter in 303 A.D. We now have to consider the position of the sun in Pisces. This requires a date shortly before the vernal equinox. I choose 303 March 1 because the sun is then in the middle of Pisces (about Pisces 12). For this date one can find the mean longitudes of Saturn and Jupiter by two additions of triplets of numbers,³ and one more addition gives the required positions as Virgo 24 and Pisces 26 respectively. Thus 303 is possible. We repeat the same process for Mars and find Aquarius 5, again in agreement with the data of the text. Though the longitudes computed so far may be wrong by several degrees, March 303 is certainly a possible date.

Narrower limits are obtainable when we consider the longitude of the moon, which was located in Cancer. We again use mean motion in longitude alone and find by adding twice three numbers each⁴ that the moon was in the middle of Cancer either on February 15 or on March 14 of 303 A.D., i. e., either 13 days before or 13 days after our preliminary date, at which the sun was near Pisces 12. Because the sun moves about 1° per day the earlier date will barely lead to a position in Pisces whereas the second is still well inside this sign. Consequently we compute the longitudes of Venus and Mercury for the more plausible date, 303 March 14. We now use the tables quoted in note 3 to their full accuracy (requiring the addition of six numbers for each planet) and find for Mercury Aquarius 28, for Venus Taurus 11. The text gives Aquarius and Taurus respectively.

This result also tells us that we need not check the second

³ Denoted by a_1, a_2, a_3 in the *Genütherte Tafeln für Sonne und Planeten* by P. V. Neugebauer, *Astronomische Nachrichten*, 248 (1932), cols. 161 ff.

⁴ Denoted by L_1, L_2, L_3 in the *Tafeln zur astronomischen Chronologie*, II, by P. V. Neugebauer (Leipzig, 1914).

possibility, February 15, because one month back Venus cannot have reached Taurus. Finally, change from March 1 to March 14 can only improve on the position of Mars and will not change appreciably the longitudes of Jupiter and Saturn. Thus A. D. 303 March 14 satisfies all requirements. Because we have placed the moon only approximately in the middle of Cancer one must consider not only March 14 but also March 13 or March 15 as equivalent dates. Knowing from Firmicus that Scorpio was rising while the sun was located at the end of Pisces, we see that the hour of birth must have been about 9 p. m. Computing the longitude of the moon for this hour of March 13 or March 15 shows that the moon was entering Cancer in the first case, leaving it in the second; consequently only 303 March 14 remains as the date of the birth.

We have thus removed the only serious possible argument against Mommsen's conclusions, namely that the age of the person in question might not fit the other data. We may now from the opposite point of view as well see in the perfect agreement of all external data with the data of the horoscope an explicit confirmation of the fact that horoscopes in ancient astrological literature were not artificially made up examples but constitute a valuable source both of historical and astronomical information.

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MORE ON THE CONSULS OF A. D. 13.

In July, 1951, this Journal (LXXII, pp. 283-92) published our article entitled "Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13." Recently, quite by chance, we stumbled upon a long and difficult paper which presents essentially the same arguments in support of the same thesis, namely that A. Caecina Largus was a separate person from C. Silius and was a consul suffect for the year 13. The author of it, Luigi Grifi, who was then Cavaliere (later Comendatore) and "Segretario Generale del Ministero del Commercio, Belle Arti, Industria e Agricoltura, socio ordinario e conservatore dell'archivio e libri della Pontificia (Romana) Accademia di Archeologia," read his paper on June 12, 1861, before that Academy, and it was printed in volume XV (Rome, 1864) of their *Dissertazioni* (pp. 1-42) under the title "Sopra un tratto dei fasti consolari del tempo di Augusto" and the subtitle "In continuazione della illustrazione della epigrafe dell' auriga Scirto e in risposta ad una operetta stampata in Lipsia" (i. e. Leipzig).

In two previous papers delivered to the same group and printed in vols. XIII (1855, pp. 385-497, 3 plates) and XIV (1860, pp. 81-113) he had published the Scirtus inscription¹ (which lists the consuls ordinary for A. D. 13-25) together with remarks on the consuls of those years and on the Lesser Fasti of Antium. In the combined *Monumenti, Annali e Bullettini* of the Istituto di Corrispondenza Archeologica for 1855 (pp. 3-17) Henzen re-edited those two inscriptions, making some objections—stated quite properly—to Grifi's editing and interpretation, and including two long letters from Borghesi in support of his own position. It was to this article that Grifi replied in 1861.

The first question that must occur to anyone is why Grifi's long article is missing from the later-19th-century bibliography on the year 13 in the fasti and on the Scirtus inscription.² The

¹ Now *C. I. L.*, VI, 10051; Dessau, 5283; cf. *C. I. L.*, I¹, p. 475; I², 1, p. 73.

² Capitoline Fasti, Lesser Fasti from Antium, and Scirtus inscription: *C. I. L.*, I¹ (1863), pp. 450 f. (year 766), 475; *C. I. L.*, I², 1 (1893), pp. 39 f. (year 766), 72 f.; *C. I. L.*, VI, 2 (1882), 10051; *C. I. L.*, X, 1 (1883), 6639; fragments of the Fasti of the Arval Brethren covering A. D. 13, found in 1868 and published by Henzen, *Bull. dell'Inst. di Corr.*

answer must lie in the circumstances out of which the article grew, perhaps in the character of the protagonists of the opposed views, and surely in the tone of Grifi's article. It is polemic and impassioned, even angry, rhetorical, and often sarcastic. Grifi leaves nothing unsaid, he over-argues his case and over-buttresses it with observations sometimes irrelevant and sometimes inaccurate. He is scarcely less bristling in refuting Borghesi (as quoted by Henzen), who had died only the year before (1860), a greatly venerated scholar. Much of what Grifi says must be judged not only unwise but in poor taste. So perhaps it is no wonder that the scholarly world chose neither to accept nor to answer his paper, but simply to ignore it.³

We call attention to Grifi now with three purposes: (1) to complete the bibliography, (2) to give proper credit to one who anticipated our thesis by nearly 100 years, and (3) to offer his work as some confirmation of ours. Though the wheat and the chaff must be separated in what he has to say, he omits none of the data then known and he offers independent testimony—contemporaneous with Borghesi's and Henzen's—about the erasure in the Capitoline Fasti under the names of the consuls ordinary of A. D. 13. Here, like Degraffi 75 years later (see p. 290 of our previous article), he could find no remains of specific letters,⁴ and, as we do (pp. 290 f.), he found the erasure too long for just the name "Caecina Largus" or even "A. Caecina Largus."

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Arch., 1869, pp. 121-4 (cf. *C. I. L.*, I², 1, pp. 70 f.), which confirm the existence of at least one consul suffect for that year.

³ In the *Bull. dell' Inst. di Corr. Arch.* published July 25, 1861 (pp. 158-60) Henzen reviews Grifi's speech (three or four years before it was published). He calls attention to Grifi's unfair tactics and inaccurate scholarship, deplores his shabby treatment of Borghesi, but does not answer any positive arguments put forth by Grifi, saying only that he [Henzen] has already discussed the subject adequately.

⁴ He says (p. 7): . . . orme, che più ho guardato nella scritta cassata, meno mi è riuscito di ritrovare. . . ."

REVIEWS.

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH. *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. ix + 501; 8 plates. \$7.50.

Classical readers of Professor Duckworth's book will not long be deceived by the modest disclaimer in the preface (p. vi): "This book is not written for the specialist in Roman comedy." It may not be written for him—it is indeed an admirable and completely trustworthy synthesis for scholars in other fields—but from it the specialist can learn much. It is a massive, important, indispensable book. It summarizes succinctly, ranges widely, quotes appositely, adjudicates coolly. It categorizes without dullness and expounds without condescension. It steers a safe and sane course between the Scylla of Greek perfection and the Charybdis of Roman originality. It is in short the book we have been waiting for; there has never been anything to match it in English in its field.

Duckworth begins with an account of the influence on Plautus and Terence of pre-literary comedy: Fescennine verses, the so-called dramatic *satura*, the Atellan farce, and the Graeco-Roman mime. (Here he might have done more with the *phlyax* vases, were it not for the prohibitive cost of further illustrative plates.) Popular influences may perhaps be traced in the cantica, and in slapstick, trickery, and coarseness of many literary comedies.

The author next turns to a brief account of Greek comedy. His pages on New Comedy (pp. 25-30) are admirably concise and up-to-date; his judgment on Menander avoids both overpraise and condemnation: "Menander understood the human heart and delineated his characters with vigor and charm. It is a great loss to world literature that so little of his drama has been preserved" (p. 33). In his rejection of claims of large Euripidean influence on Menander, Duckworth very sanely follows Prescott. Perhaps he lays less stress than he should on Peripatetic influence upon Menander: a good account of this is to be found in T. B. L. Webster's *Studies in Menander* (Manchester, 1950), pp. 175-84, 195-219, which reached Duckworth too late for him to use.

In his discussion of the Golden Age of the drama at Rome, Duckworth gives (p. 52) a useful list of the authors and titles of the Greek originals of Plautus. Here he might have mentioned Webster's tentative attribution (*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXI [1948], pp. 191-8) of the *Aulularia* to Menander's *Apistos* (reprinted in *Studies*, pp. 120-7). Duckworth's chronology of Terence's plays (p. 60) is also useful. On the vexed question of the quarrel between Terence and Lanuvinus, Duckworth holds (p. 65) that "at the bottom of the whole affair was the corporate jealousy of the poets' guild," and relegates to a footnote Minar's suggestion that political opposition to Terence's noble friends and sponsors may also have played a part. On *retractatio* in Plautus he has missed or ignored A. Boutemy's suggestion (probably wrong!) in *R.E.A.*, XXXVIII

(1936), p. 29 that *Stichus* 491 (on the Ambracian ambassadors) proves revision in 187.

The chapter on presentation and staging is a most convenient summary, to be supplemented by W. Beare's *The Roman Stage* (London, 1950). We learn that the number of days devoted to dramatic festivals was four times as many under Augustus as in 200 B. C.; that the plays were sometimes presented in the Forum (perhaps, it might be added, in the Basilica Porcia or Aemilia, if we may judge by the basilica of the Latin colony of Cosa, which was remodelled, probably in the age of Nero, into a *théâtre intime*); that no curtain was in use before 133 B. C. In accordance with the Athenian convention, the wing entrance on the spectator's right led from the forum, that on the left from the harbor and foreign parts. To Duckworth, *angiportum* means not "alley" but "street." On costume, Duckworth does not refer to Pollux (IV, 118-20), a primary source; on masks, he produces adequate evidence for believing that they came into use early. Doubling of rôles was common but not restricting; act division is of course late.

In dealing with stage conventions and techniques (Chapter 5) Duckworth is at his best when he points out (p. 102) what bad method it is to lump Plautus and Terence together "as a kind of dim reflection of Greek comedy," and then use them "as a quarry for the restoration of the supposedly flawless Greek original." We learn the various uses of monologue (exposition, announcement, commentary, deliberation, characterizing, moralizing, comic, topical, or rhetorical effect); in Plautus, 44% of the monologues are by slaves; in Terence, 33% are by young men. Other conventions include eavesdropping and asides, entrance and exit announcements, limitation of the stage-setting to the out-of-doors (on this see Virginia Woolf's perceptive essay "On Not Knowing Greek" in *The Common Reader*), the elasticity of dramatic time, the violating of dramatic illusion by a sort of parabasis. Duckworth's analysis provides interesting corroboration for Harry Levin's important critical point of view, midway between the sociologists and the New Critics, in "Literature as an Institution" (*Accent*, VI [1946], pp. 159-68). In sum, Plautus follows the inherited conventions of New Comedy; Terence is in revolt against them.

The chapter on theme and treatment is one of the most valuable in the book. The emphasis is on "the importance of being mistaken": *Agnoia* is the presiding genius of Roman comedy (p. 140). The 26 extant plays are most helpfully divided into four categories: plays of character (e. g., the *Adelphoe*), of innocent mistakes (e. g., *Rudens*, *Menaechmi*), of mistaken identity and deception (e. g., *Andria*), and of guileful deception (e. g., *Miles Gloriosus*, *Mostellaria*). Here Webster's categories for Menander (*Studies*, pp. 57-8) are interesting to compare: single-character plays (*Apistos*), plays of reconciliation (*Perikieromene*), of social criticism (*Second Adelphoi*), of adventure and satire (*First Adelphoi* = *Stichus*).

In methods of composition Plautus' plays, except the *Stichus*, are unified; Terence, like Menander, prefers an intricate duality. Plautus is repetitious and digresses much; Terence is more closely-knit. Plautus, too, is full of improbabilities and contradictions, but they

do not constitute serious structural flaws. Duckworth is properly reluctant to assume *contaminatio* overmuch; on the other hand he does not go as far as Beare, who denies it in Plautus almost entirely. Webster (*Studies*, pp. 139-45) ingeniously avoids the issue for the *Stichus* by assuming that it had an alternative title in the Greek: *Philadelphoi*.

In his chapter on foreshadowing and suspense, Duckworth finds in the Plautine prologue more variety than is commonly supposed. He does not deny irony to Terence, nor to Plautus a realization of the value of dramatic tension and surprise. Among devices to arouse suspense Duckworth emphasizes the *servus currens* (he began running at least as early as *Acharnians*, 176).

In discussing characters and characterization Duckworth draws, one suspects, from his lecture room—clearly a pleasant place for a student to be—the comparison of the *adulescens* and his *servus* to Bertie Wooster and Jeeves. He collects, and condemns, from the scholarly literature a priceless collection of adjectives used to refer to the comic *adulescens*: slinking, whining, sensual, spineless, secretive, weak, timid, hysterical, self-indulgent. *Senes* are more than ancient gallants or tedious moralizers: they are parents, aged lovers, or helpful friends. Sanely as always, Duckworth withdraws assent from Dunkin's allegation that the clever slave represents the "instinctive reaction of a vigorous poor man to an oppressive capitalistic system." In general what one misses here is what Webster provides: an adequate discussion of the debt of New Comedy types to Aristotle's *Ethics* and Theophrastus' *Characters* (but see p. 392).

The thought of Roman comedy centers around wealth and poverty, love and marriage ("love is that emotion which causes a man to forget for the time being how many minas there are in a talent"), the problems of education, the relations of master and slave, religion and the gods. As for the moral tone, πάντα καθαρά τοῖς καθαροῖς: "Hough finds an average of only about four obscene allusions per play" (p. 295) in Plautus! The stage acquainted Rome with Greek philosophy before the final introduction of it to the city: we too often forget that Terence was dead before Panaetius arrived. Duckworth might have noted that part of the comic effect of Seeledrus in the *Miles*, that stalwart believer in sense-evidence, lies in the parody of epistemological discussions in the philosophers. On the whole Plautus is more steadfastly against sin than Terence. In this section Duckworth's characteristic caution, and his low view of the excesses of writers like Dunkin, perhaps lead him to dismiss too cavalierly themes of social and political significance in Roman comedy. The *Adelphoe* particularly may have political overtones; the ideal relation of master and slave in the *Captivi* has perhaps deeper social implications than Duckworth is prepared to grant; the *Miles* could be social satire of a familiar war-time personality, and reasons other than aesthetic may explain the repeated failures of that "serious play of married life" the *Hecyra*.

The comic spirit (Chapter 11) of Terence adds up to wit; of Plautus, to humor. Superiority, degradation, surprise, incongruity, irrelevance, exaggeration, all are stimuli to laughter. A character is comic in proportion to his ignorance of himself. Terence, like

Menander, carefully subordinates the ridiculous to the serious; in Plautus, quite the other way.

Much of the humor in Roman comedy depends on linguistic and stylistic devices. Plautus abounds in puns; he differentiates his characters' language far more than Terence, and two Plautine jests out of every five are put in the mouths of slaves. And they are the despair of the translator; but Professor Harry Leon's translation of *Most. 770* (*Sarsinatis ecqua est, si Umbram non habes?*) is worth quoting: "Well, if you haven't got any shade, maybe you've got a Venetian blonde." Plautus ranges wider and is more flexible; Terence, like Menander in his later plays, is more restrained and refined. Plautus has the lighter touch, Terence the greater warmth and sympathy.

In metre and song, and in festival endings, may be traced the influence of pre-literary comedy, though Plautus uses them with great sophistication to lend symmetry of structure (fascinating analysis, p. 374)—an important part of his originality—and his metres would do credit to a Gay or a Gilbert.

The penultimate and summary chapter deals with the originality of Roman comedy. Plautus, whom Duckworth prefers throughout, is an original artist whose technique developed and matured; he is more farcical than the Greek; he gradually increased the amount of song and dance until the result is musical comedy; he added Roman references, a spice of vulgarity, and elements of suspense and surprise. Terence is subtler: he represents the philosophic concepts of the Greek originals more faithfully than Plautus. In Plautus there is a variety of theme, simplicity of thought, *Romanità* of character, wider range and variety in comic devices, language and metre. For Duckworth the final originality of Roman comedy lies in its making two types out of Greek social comedy: (1) the comedy of farce and robust humor, song and dance, gay and improbable plots, amusing and grotesque characters, the whole embellished with jokes, puns and word-play; (2) the sentimental family comedy of subtlety and artistry, without coarseness or the *gros rire*, but with intricate plots, heightened suspense, and dignified characters. To have created and developed these two divergent trends is the true significance and originality of Roman comedy.

A final chapter treats the influence of Plautus and Terence on later comedy, down to Dickens and modern mass media. There is an appendix on MSS and editions, an exhaustive bibliography (pp. 447-64) and a good usable analytical index. The book is illustrated from miniatures of Terentian MSS.

Professor Chandler Post's classes in Aristophanes used in examinations to be adjured to "translate, with elucidation of jests." Elucidation of jests is likely to be a sober, though for antiquity a necessary business. When that is said, adverse criticism of *The Nature of Roman Comedy* is at an end. The book is a *vade mecum* for students of Roman comedy which will hold the field for years to come. Professor Duckworth has put us all in his debt.

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W. BEARE. *The Roman Stage: A Short History of Latin Drama in the Time of the Republic.* London, Methuen & Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 292. 25s.

This book is well described by its title. The first one hundred fifty pages are taken up with eighteen chapters, only four of which are devoted specifically to Plautus and Terence. Thus, this book differs fundamentally from the more recent work of Duckworth (*The Nature of Roman Comedy*), which is directed towards an exhaustive and very profitable analysis of the extant plays. Compared with Duckworth's work, Beare's treatment of the extant plays must seem inadequate. But Beare's treatment of the other material touched upon in both works compares more favorably. For instance, Beare's chapter on Naevius, though it does not attempt to cite or summarize recent work in the field, is spirited, and his appreciation of Naevius is probably as good as any that has been written. Besides this, there is much in Beare's work on dramatic antiquities which Duckworth treats only incidentally or not at all. This book, then, is a valuable and very welcome contribution.

Beare has a tendency to vacillate between general literary appreciation and somewhat detailed scholarly discussion. Thus, if only twenty-four pages are to be devoted to Terence, less should be given over to a discussion of the details concerning contamination, even though the author has original views here which he is naturally anxious to present. The space devoted to refuting various views concerning the law of five acts (23 pages) also seems disproportionate. The style of this book, which eschews footnotes except in the lengthy appendices, does not lend itself to detailed discussion.¹ Finally, Beare is at his best in his general accounts and his literary appreciations.

Beare expresses many judgments that are either new or at least contrary to the usually accepted views. He (p. 28) thinks it probable that all actors on the Roman stage except the mimes normally wore masks. He (p. 37) questions the authenticity of the *Asinaria* and the *Mercator*, pointing out their lack of metrical variety. (Why not include the *Miles*, then, since it resembles these plays in its metrical simplicity? Is not metrical development more plausible?) He (p. 60) points out that Graeco-Roman tragedy had at least as long a career on the Roman stage as any other form of literary drama, and thinks that its effect on the popular mind must have been far-reaching. He (p. 92) thinks that never in Latin was there a recognized method of composing plays by the fusion of two or more originals. In treating Accius, he (p. 113) keenly remarks: "But the continual straining after rhetorical effect tends to eliminate all the delicate half-tones necessary to credible character-drawing

¹ For instance, Beare (p. 150) does not give the location (*Epist.*, 108, 8) of the two-line quotation from Seneca. In citing Menander, *Epitrepontes*, he (p. 43; cf. pp. 243, 244) uses the numbering of the editions of Capps and Allinson without noting the fact. Since references are now usually made to Körte's third edition (or to Jensen's edition), in which the numbering is quite different, it would have been advisable to specify the edition cited.

and to leave us nothing but superhuman virtue and inhuman vice." (This should be noted by students of Seneca.) He (p. 224) also concludes: "There is no song in Plautus." (This seems extreme, though we may readily admit that Greek or Roman "song" was markedly different from our own.)

Various details of the book might be criticized. Beare (p. 88) refers to Donatus as an individual, "an honest if unintelligent student." Now it is true that there is some valuable and some worthless material in the Commentary, and, as Beare insists, careful distinction should be made. But it is fallacious to view all the material as coming from one hand: the Commentary is a compilation; some of the annotators were learned and keen, some ignorant and stupid. Again, Beare (p. 99) says: "Ancient drama, on the whole, does not seem to have aimed at surprise effects. . . ." He cites the famous fragment of Antiphanes (191 K); but in citing this, one should always include the somewhat contradictory statement of Aristotle (*Poet.*, 1451 b 26). In general, the ancient poets, like Shakespeare, seemed to have felt that great tragedy is more effective when it appears inevitable. Perhaps this is the main reason why they do not strive more for effects of surprise. But such effects, as Duckworth rightly insists, are far more frequent, especially in comedy, than critics usually recognize.

Beare is normally sensitive to etymological nuances. It is doubtless a mere infelicity of phrasing, therefore, that seems to suggest that he is overlooking the literal meaning of *scortum*, that is, "skin," when he (p. 138) says: "Rustics in Atellanæ referred to a *scortum* ('wench') as 'a bit of skin' (*pellicula*). . . ."

Beare (p. 152) says that the prologues of Plautus and Terence are quite different from what we know of the Greek prologues. But the lengthy papyrus fragment which refers to the "long-winded god" would seem to refer to a type of prologue similar to those of Plautus, and to be of such a type itself.²

The conclusion (pp. 182-3) that costume may have played comparatively little part in helping spectators identify a character seems extreme. In the relief which Beare (facing p. 38) reproduces, the gentlemen are dressed very differently from the slave; and it is risky to argue from the silence concerning the clothes of Tyndarus and Philocrates, since they are captives of war and would have presumably been stripped of all finery.

Beare (p. 183) refers to "the immensely thick soles which we see on the ivory statuette from Rieti." This has been a frequent interpretation of the pegs beneath the feet of this well-known statuette. Other scholars, however, view these pegs as designed to fit into a base in order to hold the statuette upright.³

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² Cf. Otto Schroeder, *Novae Comoediae Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta* . . . (Bonn, 1915), pp. 46-8.

³ Cf. James Turney Allen, *Stage Antiquities of the Greeks and Romans and Their Influence* (New York, 1927), Fig. 22, fac. p. 164.

H. MICHELL. *Sparta*. Cambridge (England), At the University Press, 1952. Pp. ix + 348. \$7.00.

The last three decades have produced quite a number of sizable books on Sparta, by U. Kahrstedt (*Griechisches Staatsrecht*, vol. I, 1922), V. Ehrenberg (*Neugründer des Staates*, 1925), F. Ollier (*Le mirage spartiate*, 1933), H. Berve (*Sparta*, 1937), P. Roussel (*Sparte*, 1939), Th. Meier, (*Das Wesen der spartanischen Staatsordnung*, 1939), P. Coleman-Norton (*Socialism at Sparta*, 1941), and K. M. T. Chrimes (*Ancient Sparta*, 1951), to mention only the most important ones, and an enormous wealth of articles on special problems concerning its history and political institutions. The most recent of the more extensive works mentioned was not yet known to the author of the present book. Yet there is but very little duplication. By far the most valuable part of the work by K. Chrimes is based on a minute study of Spartan inscriptions of the Roman period, most of which were discovered through the excavations of the temple of Artemis Orthia in the first decade of the present century. The remainder of the book by K. Chrimes, especially as far as it deals with early Spartan history and institutions, is full of sometimes interesting but mostly highly speculative conjectures, many of which replace whatever information we can find in ancient authors by rather fanciful reconstructions.

The work under review, on the contrary, mentions the inscriptions of the Roman period only incidentally and devotes only comparatively little space to the question of the origin of the Spartan constitution but concentrates mostly on the Sparta of the period from the sixth to the fourth century B. C., with a brief appendix on Hellenistic Sparta. In compensation it contains a rather full discussion of the interesting problem of the Spartan system of land tenure, of the military and naval organization of Sparta, and of the Spartan monetary system and financial organization, three subjects which are hardly touched upon in the work by K. Chrimes. Apart from the three chapters just mentioned, which are in many ways the most interesting, the work contains an introductory chapter on the origin and early history of the Spartan state and chapters on general Spartan institutions (citizenship, civil rights, marriage, burial customs, etc.), on the relations between the Spartans, the Perioeci, and the helots, on the Spartan constitution, on the Spartan discipline, on the syssitia or public meals of the Spartans, and, by way of an appendix, a very brief chapter on Agis IV, Cleomenes III, and Nabis.

The work is distinguished by the completeness with which—apart from the first and the last chapter—all the evidence from antiquity is collected and by the great care with which all relevant modern suggestions concerning the many problems which the subject presents are adduced and discussed. Since the work deals with a very great number of intricate problems which have been endlessly discussed, it is difficult to give an adequate summary of its contents, but the following interesting suggestions which the author has made or theories that he has adopted may perhaps be mentioned.

The author tries to show that the *ὄμοιοι*, i. e. the full Spartan

citizens, differed greatly in wealth, but that, apart from this, there were no differences of social or political rank among them, in other words that there was no aristocracy within the aristocracy which the Spartan citizens as such constituted in regard to the rest of the population. This is probably correct within the period for which it is claimed by the author. The author believes, however, also that the perioeci were essentially Dorians, perhaps slightly mixed with "Achaeans," but essentially Dorians, i. e. not a conquered people but the commoners among the conquerors, who perhaps to some extent had mingled with the native population. As the author himself points out, this is essentially the explanation of the origin of the perioeci given by Isocrates in his *Panathenaicus* (177 f.), in contrast to Ephorus and other ancient authors; and more or less the same explanation has also been accepted by a number of modern scholars. The main reasons given by the author are as follows. Since the perioeci were acknowledged as Lacedaemonians, though not as Spartans, and since we find them fighting loyally side by side with the Spartans in their wars, they cannot have been "inconvenient unsubdued foes," who had proved too strong for the Spartans to be turned into helots. For the same reason they cannot have been of a different race. Their non-servile status and their status as Lacedaemonians is further attested by the fact that they competed at Olympia, and that, according to the Lycurgus legend, they shared in the original distribution of the land. Finally, the author argues, the few perioec inscriptions that we have are written in the Dorian dialect though interspersed with some "Achaean" forms. All this proves that the perioeci must have been preponderantly, if not completely, Doric.

These arguments do not appear to me particularly convincing. In the first place it may be pointed out that, even according to the author's own theory, the Dorian perioeci had mingled with the Achaeans. This presupposes that not all the native inhabitants had been reduced to serfdom, i. e. to the status of helots, when the Dorians first conquered the Eurotas valley; and in fact it is quite incredible that the Dorian conquerors should have been able to reduce the whole native population to outright slavery. But if this much is granted we do have non-Dorian perioeci, whether mingled with Dorians or not. To contend that these Achaean perioeci cannot have been inconvenient unsubdued foes, and therefore cannot have existed or cannot have existed in considerable numbers, is to set up a wrong and unwarranted alternative. It is a very common occurrence in the conquest of one nation by another that, after the decisive battles are lost, a part of the population makes its peace with the conqueror on acceptable conditions while a part fights on to the bitter end and, when finally subdued, is dealt with much more harshly. The analogy of the Roman conquest of Italy is quite instructive. The Romans, to be sure, did not make helots. But they too had different kinds of citizenship, and there was a considerable period in which those Italians who had no full Roman citizenship were nevertheless greatly favored over subject populations outside of Italy. Over a long period of time Italians who had no full citizen rights fought loyally in the Roman armies; and

when the Italians finally did revolt in the so-called Social War we find again that those who, while the war was still going on, laudably submitted were the first to be granted full citizenship and that this citizenship was extended to the rest only some time later. All this is of course different from what appears to have happened after the Dorian conquest. But it shows that it is wrong to argue that the perioeci cannot have been "an inconvenient unsubdued foe" who had proved too strong to be enslaved. If the perioecs were "Achaeans" they were the descendants of those who had found it profitable to make their peace with the conquerors on advantageous terms and so enabled the latter to reduce to slavery those others who were not willing to submit in any way until compelled by force. This is also what the ancient tradition—apart from Isocrates who is certainly no historian but makes up his history to suit his purposes—suggests. The argument from the dialect does not appear very convincing either if one considers how rapidly in the same period the Ionian dialect spread all over the coast of Asia Minor.

Whether, in addition to the "Achaean" perioecs, whose existence, it seems to me, can hardly be denied, there were also Dorian perioeci who, through a victory of the aristocracy over the common people, had lost even the right to participate in the *ecclesia*, is a different question. It is impossible to discuss this question fully in a review. But before answering it in the affirmative one should consider what this implies. The analogy would be a victory of the patricians over the plebians so great as to eliminate the plebians from the *comitia*. For, that in the primitive old times of the Dorian conquest the assembly of the warriors, which at that time included all Dorians, had to be consulted on important decisions, the author does not doubt. Is it likely that in early Sparta conditions existed which made such a victory possible?

In regard to land tenure the author (pp. 205 ff.) tries to show that Plutarch's statement (*Lyc.*, 16) according to which every male child after having been found healthy at birth immediately was assigned a *κληρος* by the ephors is in all likelihood correct. He believes that this *κληρος* was inalienable but nevertheless could be mortgaged; which would explain how some Spartans could become desperately poor in spite of the fact that they could not lose their *κληρος*. He further believes that, though most of the land originally consisted of *κληροι*, which remained state property and at the death of the person to whom they had been assigned reverted to the state, the ephors could be bribed to sell such land to individuals as outright property and that this accounts for the accumulation of large estates in the hands of a few families and of rich heiresses which plagued the Spartan state from the late fifth century. Obviously this solution of the problem is open to grave objections. But the ancient tradition on land tenure and the laws of inheritance in Sparta is so contradictory and confusing that it is doubtful whether a satisfactory solution of the problems which it presents will ever be found.

In the beginning of his chapter on money and public finance (p. 298) the author contends that, at least in historic times, the Spartans used gold and silver coins just as freely as any other

nation, though the Spartans did not make any gold or silver coins of their own before 280 B. C. He explains the statement in Xenophon's *Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία* that the Spartans were forbidden to own any gold or silver coins privately as referring only to a very temporary condition after the year 404 B. C. when a law to that effect had actually been passed.

The author believes that, contrary to the belief of Pericles on which he based his grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War, the poverty of the Spartan treasury as compared to that of Athens, in the long run worked to the advantage of the Spartans. For, he argues, the Athenian treasury, however rich in the beginning of the war, was bound to be exhausted some time and the tributes imposed on the Athenian allies in order to refill it were bound to cause increasing resentment. The Spartans, on the contrary, who from the beginning had no such resources, had to wage the war on a different basis, and therefore, if they only held out long enough, were bound to win in the end.

In his last chapter the author (p. 326) points out that it was Aratus who, in 228/7, by his movements in Arcadia, provoked the counter measures of the Spartans which were later continued by Cleomenes' expeditions of conquest, though Polybius has tried to conceal this fact and has deceived most modern historians.

It is unfortunate that a work which, whether one may always agree with its conclusions or not, on the whole is so careful in the collection of the evidence and so sober in its discussion of it, should sometimes be marred by almost inexplicable inaccuracies. Thus on pp. 106-7 we find the statement that "the divine origin of the double kingship was explained by contemporaries on the ground that the two royal houses were *Tyndarids*, descended from the *Dioscouri* or great twin brothers, *Castor* and *Pollux*, sons of *Tyndareus*, king of *Lacedaemon*, who, after the death of their father, reigned as two kings of *Sparta*." As evidence the author adduces *Od.*, XI, 298; *Pausan.*, III, 1, 5; and *Herodotus*, VI, 52. In actual fact the passage in the *Odyssey* says nothing whatever except that *Castor* and *Polydeuces* were sons of *Leda* and *Tyndareus*. *Pausanias*, to be sure, says that the sons of *Tyndareus* for some time ruled over *Sparta*. He continues, however, by telling the well-known story of the return of the *Heracleidai*, who superseded the previously ruling royal house, and makes it quite clear that the kings of *Sparta* were the descendants of the twin sons of the *Heraclid* king *Aristodemus*: not a word about the two royal houses of historical *Sparta* being considered descendants of the *Dioscouri* nor any suggestion that there continued to be a double kingship immediately after the mythical rule of these demi-gods. *Herodotus*, in the chapter quoted, does not mention the *Dioscouri* at all but tells the story of the twin sons of the *Heraclid* king *Aristodemus* and of the descent of the two royal houses from them at very great length. Now it is true that the *Dioscouri* were very highly revered at *Sparta* and that they were supposed to accompany the kings in war. From this one may possibly derive the hypothesis that there existed at some time a version according to which the Spartan royal houses were descendants of the *Dioscouri* and that this version was later replaced by the *Heraclid*

legend. But simply to state that the historical kings were believed to be descendants of the Dioscuri, and to adduce as evidence passages which either say nothing of the kind or say the very opposite, is a somewhat unusual procedure. It is in fact all the more astounding since, on p. 132, the author clearly implies that the Heraclid legend was the predominating one, though in the place where he discusses the legendary origin of the double kingship he does not mention this version at all.

In his discussion of the various age-classes of Spartan boys in the sixth chapter the author points out correctly that to the Greeks the "first birthday" of a person was the day when he was born and not the day on which he became one year old. Starting from this observation the author argues that the expression $\kappa \epsilon \tau \eta \gamma \epsilon \gamma \omicron \nu \acute{\omega} \varsigma$ does not mean "twenty years old," in the sense in which we use this expression, but "after someone's twentieth birthday," i. e. after his nineteenth birthday—or when he is nineteen years old—in our sense. This interpretation of the Greek term is controversial. But there is certainly no semantic or mathematical possibility of interpreting the expression mentioned to mean "upon entering the nineteenth year of his life," as the author on p. 171 contends, which would be "when he becomes eighteen years old," in our idiom.

On p. 143 one finds the strong statement concerning Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian constitution (*Politics*, 1273 a 6): "The sense of the passage therefore is that in Carthage unanimity in the Senate is necessary before a proposal is brought up in the Ecclesia. If the vote is not unanimous then it is referred to the Ecclesia." What Aristotle actually says is that if the suffetes and the Senate agree on a proposed measure then they can, but need not, submit it to the Assembly for ratification, but if they disagree then the measure must be brought before the Ecclesia, which in this case has the final decision.

On p. 142 the author says that it was impossible in Athens to make motions from the floor of the house (i. e. the ecclesia). In support he quotes Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians*, XLV, 4. But what Aristotle actually says there is merely that it was unlawful to put a motion to the final vote before it had been discussed in the Council and then formally submitted to the assembly by the prytaneis. This is quite a different matter.

In note 2 on p. 19, V. Ehrenberg's book *Neugründer des Staates* is attributed to Kahrstedt, though in the bibliography the author is given correctly.

On p. 135 the author accepts Kahrstedt's unfortunate idea that the original form of the term $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omicron \nu \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha$ was $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omega \chi \acute{\iota} \alpha$ and that this meant not a council of elders but the assembly of the $\gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho \alpha \varsigma \acute{\epsilon} \chi \omicron \nu \tau \epsilon \varsigma$, i. e. of those who enjoyed special honors. How $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omega \chi \acute{\iota} \alpha$ could ever become $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omicron \nu \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha$ remains unexplained, quite apart from the fact that such a compound with $\acute{\epsilon} \chi \epsilon \iota \nu$ would be most unusual in so early a period. In actual fact the form $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omega \chi \acute{\iota} \alpha$, which occurs only once in a comedy of Aristophanes, is clearly a joke on the Doric dialect in which intervocalic σ had become a rough breathing: $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omicron \nu \tau \acute{\iota} \alpha > \gamma \epsilon \rho \acute{\omicron} \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha$ (spelled $\gamma \epsilon \rho \omega \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha$) $> \gamma \epsilon \rho \omega \chi \acute{\iota} \alpha$. Both because the Ionic alphabet had no means of expressing a simple rough breathing, since it used the

letter H for the long open e, and perhaps also in order to produce an exaggerated and therefore comic effect, Aristophanes expressed the rough breathing by the letter χ, thus replacing it by an aspirated κ. Likewise due to an unsufficient knowledge of the Spartan dialect appears the author's explanation (p. 100) of φυλάξαντα in the rhetra quoted by Plutarch, *Lyc.*, 5, as derived from φυλάσσειν. The aorist in ξ is regular in the Laconic dialect with verbs in -άζειν, and there is the analogy of the verb ἀπελλάζειν from ἀπέλλα to φυλάζειν from φύλα, so that there is no reason to assume that ὠβάξαντα was formed by analogy to φυλάξαντα from φυλάσσειν, which would be very strange anyway.

For the reader who is mainly interested in the history of Spartan political and social institutions all these may be points of minor importance, though this can hardly be said of the correct interpretation of the rhetra. But there are also occasionally certain, though much less glaring, inconsistencies in regard to important problems concerning the Spartan constitution. On p. 95, for instance, the author says: "We know that the powers of the *Ecclesia* were limited to a consultative capacity, but nevertheless it certainly functioned and the gravest issues of state were within its jurisdiction." It is difficult to see how an assembly whose powers are limited to a consultative capacity can have jurisdiction over anything. In actual fact the problem of the powers of the *Ecclesia* is discussed later on at considerable length, and the author sometimes (p. 126 and p. 144) seems to incline towards the view that these powers were rather considerable while at other times (p. 136) he seems to incline towards the opposite view. Perhaps one may say that the author's statement quoted above is not so contradictory as it may appear at first sight, if one distinguishes between legal and actual powers. Thus it may be pointed out that in the course of the third century B. C. the Roman Senate, for instance, acquired very far-reaching actual powers though legislation of the fourth and the early third century had reduced its legal function to that of an advisory body. It is not impossible that the development in regard to the powers of the Spartan *Ecclesia* went, during a certain period of time, in the opposite direction, i. e. that under certain conditions it became possible to disregard to some extent the legal (= traditional) rights of the *Ecclesia*. On p. 144 the author starts on an analysis of this kind. But this analysis is not carried through and thus the problem posed by the somewhat paradoxical statement on p. 95 remains unsolved.

Deficiencies like those mentioned make it impossible to use the work as a ready source of accurate information on the various aspects of the Spartan state. The reader must always be on his guard. But as pointed out in the beginning of this review the work has also very great merits and deserves to be carefully studied.

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L. A. Post. *From Homer to Menander. Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951. Pp. 333. \$3.75. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXIII.)

The first eight chapters of Professor Post's book are the lectures he delivered at the University of California in 1948 as Sather Professor of Classical Literature. He has added a ninth and final chapter in which he generalizes on his preceding analysis and discusses the theory of fiction or, in the Aristotelian sense, Poetics; and indeed the term "fiction" is understood in this, to a classical philologist perhaps the natural sense.

The purpose of the book is to "study forces in fiction and fiction as a force" (p. 3). Its method is to analyse the Homeric poems, the tragic poets and Menander, and to see their essential significance (as did Aristotle) in their fashioning and handling of plot. This method does not restrict itself, however, to problems of artistic creation and of technique, but is extended to ethical aspects of fiction. "The total impact of our authors is highly moral in intention" (p. 5).

The first chapter considers the *Odyssey* as "The Pattern of Success." It is analysed as a success story, and "a success story should be moral" (p. 14). "Penelope is represented as a creative personality who, when all men doubt and disapprove, wins a personal success and glory by gambling against odds on the hope of regaining her husband" (p. 20), and Penelope is said to be "the emotional centre of the epic" (p. 20). When one is reconciled to the exigencies of Post's method it is illuminating to see the *Odyssey* cut down to Aristotelian size. Whatever one's antipathy to success stories (did the Greeks have a word for success?), it must be conceded that the tale of Ulysses, in its essential plot, is the tale of the happy ending.¹

The plot of the *Iliad* is analysed as the prototype of tragic plot—the wrath of Achilles, the consequent death of Patroclus, and the reconciling conclusion in the encounter of Priam and Achilles. "The *Iliad* preaches glory, loyalty to a loved one, and, last of all pity; but the greatest of these is pity" (p. 55).

The tragic poets are studied only in part separately. Their plays are grouped according to the character of their plots. Aeschylus, because his plays are dominated by "social consciousness," is considered as a poet of political aims "concerned to strengthen institutions and to present examples of devotion to rational progress" (p. 87). Sophocles—in the *Ajax*, *Antigone*, *Trachiniae*, and *Oedipus Tyrannus*—is "more philosophical because his plots introduce more of the appearance of design. Unfortunately, life in this particular design seems to be cruel and unjust. This is the essence of tragedy" (p. 120). Euripides, in seven of his greatest plays, is presented as the tragedian of "desperate detachment from life" (p. 155).

The three tragic poets having been considered in what is perhaps

¹ It seems to me unnecessary to the theme to insist on "one genius called Homer" (p. 10) and hardly justifiable to state that in the eighth century "Greek cultural life was without form and void" (p. 9).

their most characteristic productions, the remaining plays of Sophocles and all but four of the other plays of Euripides are considered under the heading "Propaganda, Idealism and Romance" (Chap. VI, p. 157). A further chapter on "Vacillation, Burlesque and Variety" discusses the *Helen*, *Orestes*, *Phoenissae*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, and the *Rhesus*. A final chapter deals with the comedy of Menander.

A brief sketch of contents, such as I have given, is necessarily inadequate. But, tempting as it is to discuss at the outset Post's many provocative points of view, justice can be done to an analysis of large sweep only if one has a clear idea of the author's plan and the criteria of judgment he is applying. These are set forth in the last, appended, chapter—"Aristotle and the Philosophy of Fiction." In that chapter he makes it clear that his point of departure is Aristotle's *Poetics*.

It may not be justifiable in a reviewer to wish that Post, who has given us an excellent book on Plato's *Epistles* and who in this book amply demonstrates an understanding of Plato's view of fiction, had chosen as his point of departure Plato rather than Aristotle. Plato, despite his to us unacceptable conclusions, asks the questions we still ask—what is the relation of a work of creative imagination to the "real" world, what is its ethical and political function. Aristotle begged these questions. For once he indulged in no polemic with Plato. He brushed aside problems of aesthetics and ethics, and simply applied his scientific method to the criticism of poetry. Consequently his *Poetics* is not a treatise in aesthetics nor, in the strict sense, in literary criticism. It is a sort of writers' manual in which, in the interests of an intellectual scheme, poetry is seen in distorting generalizations; and many of them are, to us, simply not true. Post is well aware of this. "Aristotle," he says (p. 245), "is but a pedestrian guide to Greek poetry." He "followed in the *Poetics* the principles that were dear to him in biology" (p. 246). Nevertheless he chooses to follow in general the Aristotelian plan. He chooses to follow it, however, in an aspect in which it is fundamentally sound.

"The *Telos* of tragedy," Aristotle says (1450 a 10), "is the incidents and the plot." This statement is true of all fiction. It is true of a detective story writer or a Somerset Maugham who deliberately contrives a plot. It is true of the great plots like *Moby Dick*, in which a writer has evolved in his plot an adequate symbol. It is true in the case of Shakespeare or James Joyce when they borrow a plot, but a plot that appeals to them as an adequate vehicle for creation (cf. *Poetics*, 1451 b 18). Such a concept of plot, however, assigns to it a deeper meaning than does the Aristotelian concept. And Post seems to accept Aristotle's restricted meaning when he states that "drama tells us how something abnormal happens to a character, what he decides to do about it, and how this decision leads to success or failure, happiness or unhappiness" (p. 252). This limitation in the concept of plot, while it allows for consideration of ethical purpose, excludes what we call loosely "poetry." It is easily applicable to Menander (the chapter on Menander is to my mind the best in the book), as it is to the Restoration dramatists or Noel Coward. It is sometimes illuminating

when applied to Euripides. But with Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles we feel that the pith of the matter is lacking.

In judging a book, however, we must accept the restrictions of method the author has imposed on himself. Post has chosen to look back at the epos and at tragedy from the standpoint of Aristotle's *Poetics*, and to analyse them especially as to plot. He does not rigorously adhere to this plan, and it would be easier to follow if his terms had been defined.² But with this wellnigh crippling limitation of method he achieves results of analysis that are often both provocative and illuminating.

In order to see how this criterion is applied let us turn to the most difficult case, the *Iliad*. To the modern reader it is hard to see why Plato should call Homer ποιητικώτατον καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν (*Rep.*, 607A, also 595C), and in what respects the *Iliad* was for the Greeks at the source of tragic poetry. "Homer invented tragedy," Post writes (p. 30),

and, by communicating his vision of life through the medium of art, became a force in the lives of others. Tragedy is itself a triumph over despair, for it clears the mind of emotional weakness and enables it to pursue a rational goal. The more pity and terror there are in a picture of life, so long as the poet's vision is not distorted by pity or terror for himself, the greater the potential of his salutary shock.

The tragic sense of life is a sense of the tremendous power of ideals, a sense of something the worth of which transcends all defeat by circumstance. The best things in life are the flashes of joy and courage and insight that beckon and reward the individual, yet seem always to elude the attempt to imprison them in any institutionalized form of social security. Virtue and honesty and beauty are brightest in a setting of tragedy, and this is Homer's great discovery. He has consequently designed the *Iliad* in a pattern that emphasizes personality rather than a code of polite or moral behaviour that succeeds because we think it should.

Here the Aristotelian excuse for tragedy, that it purges of pity and fear, is used. Presumably, at a time when transposition of medical terminology to psychological phenomena was fashionable, and playgoing might be thought to effect a similar catharsis to a sea voyage or horseback riding, beneficial effects of purgation might be alleged. In our day this psychological approach to the effects on the spectator (lumped in one type and suffering from surfeit of ill-described emotions) is too simple to be useful or acceptable. Our psychology has acquired other dimensions.

The plot, however is not considered only under this aspect. It

² Sometimes he is admirably lucid. At other times it is difficult to understand precisely what he means by such statements as "Thus imagination is a crystal ball into which we gaze and see the truth about ourselves. Such truth is a kind of Aristotelian god, self-moving and self-contemplating, and possessing power to integrate subordinate powers and functions in subjection to itself" (p. 257).

is considered chiefly as a technical device, in which the gods are the mainspring. But

The Gods in Homer are thus in the main more than machinery. They represent to some extent the forces of nature that may aid or thwart men. They represent also forces that operate in social organization and a kind of hierarchy of classes and functions. . . . The gods also represent to some extent the forces that operate in the activity of an individual (p. 45).

and further (p. 47)

Achilles' tragedy is the loss of his illusions. He had lost his honor in surviving Patroclus. That to him was worse than death, and no reconciliation of his quarrel with his fate was now possible. . . . The tragedy of Achilles was complete in Book 18 of the Iliad when he learned of the death of Patroclus. He might have fought beside his friend, but had not done so because he was thinking of glory and honor and would not fight before Agamemnon had apologized. His pride was his downfall, and the greater blow to his pride, when his friend was lost, was his tragedy.

I find it difficult to accept the underlying presumption, into which Aristotle seems to have led the author, that, as opposed to the fiction of optimism and success, there is a fiction of failure and pessimism called tragedy; and that both attitudes could be used in fiction by the same poet to present two equally valid pictures of life.

If, however, one takes partisan exception to the scheme of Post's book, in so far as it is based on the *Poetics*, one cannot but be grateful for the acute, detailed and often novel discussions of plot in which the book mainly consists. They form a valuable survey of an aspect of Greek poetry to which sometimes, either entranced by Diction and Thought or seduced by philological interests, we pay too little heed.

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Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Vol. XX. Rome, American Academy in Rome, 1951. Pp. 166; 106 text figs.; 3 maps. \$6.00.

The new volume of the *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* contains only two articles, but both of them are important contributions to Roman art and archaeology: Frank E. Brown presents the first section of the publication of the Academy's excavations at Cosa, and Marion Lawrence gives us a most useful supplement to the corpus of Asiatic sarcophagi.

When the American Academy reorganized its activities after the long interval imposed by the war, it was happily decided to revivify its School of Classical Studies by undertaking an excavation. The site wisely chosen by Professor Brown is ancient Cosa, the medieval

Ansedonia, situated on a small promontory between two lagoons just south of Orbetello in Tuscany. Cosa was the first Roman colony on newly conquered, actual Etruscan territory and was founded in 273 B.C. Its foundation reflects the Roman naval strategy of the time: to cut off the Etruscans from access to the sea and to consolidate Rome's new naval power. Throughout its long life, the harbour of Cosa remained its principal *raison d'être*, and the fortifications of the town still bear eloquent witness of its military strength and importance.

One might have expected that the Roman Cosa superseded an earlier Etruscan settlement and that its stratigraphy would have revealed at least some of the phases of Etrusco-Roman relations in historic times, but so far the excavations of the site have yielded no evidence whatsoever of a pre-Roman Cosa. This negative result does not detract in the least from the interest of the exploration. On the contrary, Cosa gives us a unique opportunity to study the lay-out and architecture of an early Roman colony in its pure and uncontaminated shape, to get a typical view of Roman civic and military town-planning of the third century, and to trace its development through the following centuries. The author-excavator does not lose this opportunity.

What strikes the reviewer when reading Brown's treatise is above all the rare combination of a well-handled and refined field-archaeological method and a broad humanistic approach when evaluating the results. Secondly, it is particularly gratifying to see how much factual knowledge can be acquired from a careful and experienced surface survey without actually putting the spade to the soil. Many of the fundamental results already gained in Cosa are due to the excellent field survey, and they are made accessible to the reader in three remarkably fine maps and a series of beautiful photographs, some taken from the air, which may well serve as models of their kinds.

The massive city-walls of Cosa enclose an area of some 34 acres and are pierced by three main gates. The irregular area is subdivided by a strictly rectangular street net. The main streets are laid out so as to match the gates, and the positions of the gates are ultimately dependent upon the demands of fortification. The planning was functional, not ritual. Thus, the street system became the armature of the town plan, and the size of the different blocks was determined by the street net, not vice versa. It is worth quoting what the author states in this context: "They (the blocks) do not form an inflexible system of equal units of area rigorously imposed, of which the streets are merely separators, but themselves are the product of the functional dissection of the terrain by the streets." This is a clear and important principle of town-planning. It seems to have been a specific Roman solution, employed for early colonial foundations in the late fourth and third centuries B.C. One cannot help contrasting it with the old, undisciplined, and organically developed habitation quarters of Rome itself, or with Republican Ostia, as it has lately been traced by the new trial excavations. These latter reflect the gradual development of important towns where private enterprise and private interests dictated the general

lay-out and where no masterplan can be detected in the irregular labyrinth of the housing quarters. The town-plan of Cosa is, as the author rightly points out, a single act resulting in an intrinsically Roman plan. No direct influence from the gridiron plans of the Hellenistic world can be traced. The oblong blocks, the three different widths of the streets, adapted to their various functions, the absence of thoroughfares from gate to gate are all original features not met with in the Classical or Hellenistic East. The author points to the Etruscan Marzabotto as a probable archetype of the plan. The parallelism between the two plans is striking, and again brings into focus the desirability of a renewed and thorough exploration of that site. What the old excavations of the 1860's and 1880's were unable to prove was precisely the crucial problem of the date of the town. If it really dates from the 6th and the early 5th century B. C., as the author presumes, Cosa can rightly be considered as a late Roman version of the Etruscan tradition of town-planning. Until further proofs of the early date of Marzabotto are available, the reviewer prefers to leave open the question of Cosa's Etruscan ancestry as regards the principles of its town-plan.

The city-plan and the fortifications are all of the same date. The mighty city-wall with its three gates and 22 towers is the work of the first Roman colonists. To have been able to prove this beyond any doubt is one of the greatest merits of the publication. The consequences are important, and give full support to the more and more generally recognized presumption that the similar polygonal constructions at Cori, Segni, Norba, Terracina, and all the other sites in Latium are "no older than the Roman colonization of those regions." Thanks to the evidence from Cosa we can also confidently date the appearance of the *portecullis* to the early third century, and the gateways testify to a confident handling of the wide-spanning arch.

The main lay-out of the Forum is fairly well ascertained, virtually without any excavation. It is an oblong, open place, about 90 m. x 30 m., surrounded by buildings, two of which were temples, one a basilica, and one most probably an *aerarium*. A free-standing triple-arched gateway, placed in the centre of its northwest end, leads into the public place. Archway and basilica seem to date from the 2nd century B. C. while the sacral and other buildings on the Forum are more or less contemporary with the foundation of the colony. There is no consistent alignment of the facades toward the Forum, and there were no bordering colonnades flanking its sides. A building of paramount interest is the basilica of which a preliminary plan is presented. Since the publication it has been fully explored and one looks forward to its full publication in the next Cosa volume.

The excavations of the first seasons concentrated on the *arx* situated on a hillock in the southwest corner of the town and separated from the habitation quarters by a low massive wall. A broad *via sacra* leads up to the sacred area, dominated by a remarkably well preserved three-cella temple, the Capitolium of the colony. This building dates from the beginning of the 2nd century B. C. An earlier temple, not yet explored, and already destroyed in antiquity, was most probably contemporary with the foundation of the colony, while a small third temple seems to be approximately

coeval with the Capitolium. The three sanctuaries form a rather irregular lay-out which, however, becomes clearly understandable thanks to the convincing analysis of their respective building histories.

Of particular interest is the section dedicated to the building technique. The local grayish limestone is the main material, but it is treated and used in different ways. One meets it in the city-walls and in some of the temple-podia as beautifully finished polygonal masonry, laid without mortar. The bulk of the civic and domestic buildings of Cosa is constructed in what is called "random rubble-work," i. e. small unshaped blocks of limestone bonded together by a fairly hard mortar of lime and sea sand. This type of masonry can rightly be considered a forerunner of *opus concretum*, and was freely used from the very beginning of Cosa's life as a Roman colony. Everyone who has followed the discussion of the original date of *opus concretum* in Rome can appreciate the importance of this new and certain evidence from Cosa. It is particularly worth mentioning that this type of construction is contemporary with the dry polygonal masonry of the city-walls, and that it was in continuous use as long as building activities went on in Cosa, i. e. to about the middle of the 1st century B. C.

It is surprising that the time of the Empire signifies the final decline of Cosa as a town. The downward trend had actually started even earlier. The original colonists and their descendants were farmers and soldiers. The military rôle of Cosa soon became of decreasing importance and the free peasant fought an uneven struggle against the social and economic tendencies which were so marked in the agricultural structure of Italy of the late Republic. The great villas in the immediate neighbourhood of Cosa testify to the extinction of the free peasants as a class in society and to the creation of the large estates owned by the senatorial aristocracy of Rome, a feature which is still characteristic of the "Maremma."

The first report of the excavations at Cosa thus not only gives much important archaeological information on early Roman architecture and town-planning, but also yields historical material of far-reaching interest. One looks forward to the continuation of the work, and the reviewer interprets as a good omen for the future the misspelling of the term "Foreword" which constantly appears in the form of "Forward."

Miss Marion Lawrence's article carries the title "Additional Asiatic Sarcophagi" and consists of a most careful and judicious catalogue of the columnar sarcophagi which have appeared since C. R. Morey published his fundamental work on the subject in 1924. The author follows Morey's chronology in the main, and corroborates it with new arguments based on sound stylistic analysis. Morey's type B with undivided figure-frieze is omitted in the series and we are promised a separate study of it as an offshoot of the Asiatic types. Likewise, type E, with the central gable and lateral arches, is rightly considered a specific type made for the Western market. Description and diagnosis of the 45 additional pieces leave nothing to be desired and the dating of them, ranging from about A. D. 160 to the second half of the third century, is admirably precise and very well founded.

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CARL W. BLEGEN, JOHN L. CASKEY, MARION RAWSON. *Troy*. Volume II: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Settlements. Part I, Text: pp. xxii + 325; Part II, Plates: 318 figs. (including 59 plans and sections). Princeton, Princeton University Press for the University of Cincinnati, 1951. \$36.00.

Just as this volume is a continuation of the account of the Cincinnati excavations at Troy begun in the first volume, which included the general introduction and the First and Second Settlements, so the review of it must be considered as a continuation of that of Volume I which appeared in this Journal in the issue of January, 1953 (LXXIV, pp. 86-91). The scheme of presentation of the results of the excavations is identical with that followed for the first two settlements; continuity is obtained through a brief recapitulation in the Foreword and through the re-publication of seventeen plans, sections and charts, as well as Tables 22 to 28 in the Appendix. The charts and tables are designed to illustrate the general cultural continuity which the excavators ascribed to Troy for the five major phases of the Early Bronze Age, with not less than thirty architectural phases, a period of a millennium. This cultural development, best illustrated by the pottery, is said to show slow progress of the native Trojan culture, but also to show a persistent local tradition virtually unaffected by alien influences.

Yet, in the face of considerable evidence for continuity, this reviewer was impressed with the factors indicating the introduction of several new cultural traits at the beginning of Troy III and wonders if the three settlements reported in this second volume do not form a cultural unit somewhat separated from Troy I and II, just as the excavators see them almost completely separated from Troy VI and the subsequent development. Most striking is the introduction at the very beginning of Troy III, built over the burnt débris of IIg, of a completely new building technique, walls built entirely of stone and often standing to a height of two metres or more, rather than the walls of brick on stone foundations of the previous settlements. The orientation of the third settlement is different; from the scant available evidence the general plan seems to be blocks of houses separated by narrow streets and lanes. There are in Troy III to V some scant traces of heavy retaining walls which may possibly have been fortifications, but the well-established architectural scheme of Troy I and II—megaron, forecourt, fortifications with propylon opposite the megaron—disappears at the end of II, not to emerge again until the beginning of VI, after the end of the Early Bronze Age. The disappearance and re-emergence of this architectural complex is paralleled on the Greek mainland, where the identical scheme was known in late neolithic Thessaly, at Sesklo and Dimini, contemporary in part at least with Troy I. The Early Bronze Age culture known as Early Helladic, which flourished in the Peloponnese and Central Greece and touched southern Thessaly, was ignorant of the scheme, preferring instead the groups of multi-roomed houses, not unlike those of Troy III-V. But with the beginning of the Middle Helladic the megaron returned and not long after the entire complex as known earlier was again employed in

the well-known Mycenaean megaron, just as it was in contemporary Troy VI.

While this is the major rupture that shows up in the report, there is also the fact that of the forty-six pottery shapes found in Troy III, twelve are newly introduced; some of those of II no longer appear and were possibly discarded. Less tangible, but equally interesting, is the much more frequent comparison of Trojan material in settlements III-V with that from Anatolia. It is also important to note that in Troy III the deer suddenly became a common item of food and deer horn was widely used for implements and weapons. All this might indicate that the burning of Troy II and the building of the new settlement was caused by an incursion from the Anatolian hinterland, perhaps from the same region which had previously sent to Greece the founders of its Early Bronze Age, for the excavators have noted the strong similarities between the Troad and the Aegean which persisted although actual imports from the Aegean fell off. Certainly a large portion of the Trojan population must have remained to serve or be assimilated, if such a disruption did occur, for the continuity is still very considerable. To this reviewer it has always seemed likely that the Indo-Europeans credited with beginning the Middle Helladic period in Greece had brought along with them from the north, perhaps Thrace and Macedonia, those survivors of the neolithic culture who knew the megaron-fortification complex and were responsible for its reintroduction into Greece; it now appears likely that a parallel phenomenon occurred with the arrival of the equestrian settlers of Troy VI, for in its earliest phase there appear already the free-standing house and fortifications, very like those of Troy II.

For all three settlements this is the first clear picture to emerge, for the earlier excavators considered them poor villages and lumped together all the material from them. Unfortunately, the areas left for profitable excavation by the Cincinnati expedition were too small for important architectural information; just what was the area excavated is not indicated in every case and the lack of this information makes it difficult to appraise the importance of the results. However, pottery and small finds were abundant, though there was little that the excavators considered sufficiently useful to give precise information on external relations and chronology. Yet for Troy III there are clear indications of contacts with the Aegean and with Central Anatolia, and the period, which lasted perhaps a century, is placed well before the end of the third millennium. Troy IV, which witnessed a reversion to the brick and stone wall construction of Troy II, and in which the first domed ovens were used, still seems to have communicated primarily with the Aegean, but no doubt had contacts with Central Anatolia and with the Near East as well. To it the excavators ascribe a century and a half, coeval with a late, but not the last, phase of the Aegean Early Bronze Age. Schliemann dug away most of Troy V, and what he called Vc, d, and e are now shown to belong to early Troy VI. But the remaining patches indicate a town as large as Troy VI. It was a settlement of neater, more orderly, and larger houses than IV, with better internal fittings; the pottery and miscellaneous objects reflect the same improvement in taste and craftsmanship. Conne-

tions with the Aegean, though more elusive, are unquestionable; those with Anatolia seem to loom larger. After a hundred or a hundred and fifty years, at about 1900 B. C., the inhabitants of Troy V were overwhelmed by the same movement of peoples that ushered in the Middle Bronze Age in Greece, and the excavators intimate further that this incident coincided fairly closely with the arrival of the advance guard of the Hittites.

Such, in brief outline, are the main conclusions which the excavators have drawn from the mass of material so meticulously described in these volumes. But though the architecture is described in detail for each section and each level, there is no general consideration of the architectural development and the excavators have not yet touched on the problem of the disappearance of the megaron, though perhaps this will be considered with its re-emergence in Troy VI. Again the reader is made to feel the loss of valuable information in the excavators' decision to leave aside the material from earlier excavations. This is especially clear from the statement on page 118 that "many pots in the Schliemann collection might now be safely assigned on stylistic grounds to the Fourth Settlement, but we have not undertaken to reclassify them." We can but express once more the hope that this will be done as a supplementary publication.

With the appearance of Volume II, the account of Early Bronze Age Troy is finished; the two volumes describing the first five settlements together form the most monumental and complete publication of any East Mediterranean site of the period. With their copious illustrations, both photographs and drawings of the site and the finds, they offer a model description. Yet one of the finest passages (p. 226) deals not with settlements III-V, but rather with the sixth settlement; in a brief, but brilliant, summation of the characteristics of the new town which inaugurates the Middle Bronze Age, the reader is given an enticing glimpse of the fascinating material that will be published in the forthcoming Volume III.

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ANDREW ALFÖLDI. *A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire:*

The Clash between the Senate and Valentinian I. Translated by Harold Mattingly. Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 151. \$3.75.

This is the second of a series of monographs in which the distinguished author undertakes to reverse or modify the generally accepted estimate of certain emperors and their policy during the fourth century. The first, entitled *The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome*, appeared in 1948. Whether or not one agreed with all of its conclusions, it was a brilliant essay dealing with a world-historic figure, whose personality and career will always fascinate the student of history. The present volume is of more restricted appeal and will hardly interest other than specialists. Dr. Alföldi is at pains to rehabilitate Valentinian I, "the last of the

great Pannonian emperors," as well as certain of his subordinates, particularly the Praetorian Prefect of the Gauls, Maximinus. He contends that Ammianus and the other ancient sources are bitterly hostile to this emperor and his entourage, because they are all on the side of the senatorial aristocracy, whose attitude towards the Danubian *soldatesca* was a mixture of fear and contempt; and that the majority of modern writers have followed this lead in blackening the characters of Valentinian and of some of his ministers. The author's intimate familiarity with the history of the Later Empire is patent on every page and his main contention is sound, that the usual estimate of Valentinian is too severe and needs to be revised. He is also justified in saying that Valentinian, in all fairness, should be judged by the standards of his age. That the threat to the security of the empire from its "barbarian" neighbors was becoming more and more menacing, and that the resulting economic conditions, made worse by much official corruption, were deplorable, is a matter of common knowledge. Consequently, many measures which in happier times would have been harshly despotic can in the fourth century be justified on grounds of necessity, even though our final estimate may resemble the poet's bitter epigram on the regime of Sulla:

Excessit medicina modum, nimiumque secuta est,
Qua morbi duxere, manus. Periere nocentes,
Sed cum iam soli possent superesse nocentes.

There is no dispute among scholars about certain beneficial aspects of Valentinian's reign. Ancient and modern authors agree that he strove for economy against appalling odds; that he tried to lighten the fiscal burden imposed on the humbler citizens of the empire; that his religious policy was tolerant and his private life above criticism. The mass of the population in Rome, moreover, as Alföldi describes in some detail (pp. 60-5), benefited by the emperor's drastic reform of the *annona* and other improvements. Nor will one disagree with the author that the senatorial reaction in the fourth century was "of the greatest historical importance"; but it is surely a phenomenon of which scholars have long been aware.

And yet, after reading this book, one is assailed by two serious doubts. First, Alföldi's great erudition is marred by a violence of partisanship as extreme as the hatred that he attributes to Ammianus. The ancient historian, we are told, is "beside himself with rage" and "positively revels in describing the agony of death by fire of one of the judges." Words like "malice" and "malicious" are applied not only to the ancient writers but to some of their modern successors. The reader must judge for himself, in the light of the passages quoted in support, whether these violent expressions are justified. And it is easy, though the very negation of objectivity, to give a slight twist to a phrase, to heighten the effect intended. "A scrap of humanity sunk in endless filth" (p. 68) is neither a fair nor an accurate rendering of *mancipia squalore diuturno marcentia*. Seeck (p. 6) did not say that Valentinian "had no brain in his skull"; what he wrote is "sein enges Hirn, das nicht leicht mehrere Gedanken auf einmal fassen konnte." If Valentinian and Maximinus are to be judged by the standards of the age, is not the same criterion

valid for Probus, Symmachus, Ausonius, and others? Or again, when Alföldi condemns the rhetoric of the fourth century in unmeasured terms (pp. 108 ff.) and represents it as the only avenue leading to advancement in the imperial service, does he not forget that in Libanius' time (cf. *Orat.* 43, 5; 48, 22) flocks of young men were still attending the law-schools at Berytus and Rome? The second criticism may be put in the form of a question: Was it needful, in order to do belated justice to Valentinian and his problems, to compose a book of one hundred and fifty pages, in which there is much repetition and in which the same *testimonia* often appear twice (cf. p. 21, n. 1 with p. 43, n. 4; p. 27, n. 1 with p. 47, n. 2; p. 105, n. 2 with part of p. 141, n. 46). To your reviewer at least it seems that the essential points could have been stated concisely and persuasively in an article of little more than average length. Mr. Mattingly, who turned the previous volume into English, has again achieved an impeccable translation.

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DENYS L. PAGE. *Aleman: The Partheneion*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. xii + 179. \$4.25.

The *Partheneion* of Aleman has many claims on our attention. First, it is by any standards a lovely poem, and one which recreates for us a Spartan world of delicacy and beauty not yet blasted by an overriding concern with military efficiency. It is also the earliest considerable fragment of Greek choral lyric: four stanzas, of a probable ten, survive virtually intact, and there are appreciable remains of four others; enough, then, to provide a better measure of the poet's work than all the other fragments combined. Moreover, the poem comes to us, not through the distorting medium of citation, but in a carefully written papyrus, complete with scholia (mutilated but still useful), and evidently deriving from a good Alexandrian edition. Here is a text which carries considerable authority, and this fact, together with the character and extent of the poem, serves to make it a capital document, which fully deserves the elaborate edition and commentary which the new Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge University has here lovingly devoted to its mere hundred lines.

It is something of a paradox that, as Page notes, this essentially simple poem should, for us, bristle with difficulties, and it might well be that many of these difficulties would remain even if we had the poem in its entirety. Since it was first published in 1863 it has, of course, been repeatedly studied and analyzed, albeit with a disconcerting lack of agreement in the interpretations proposed. Yet not until now has there been an adequate and comprehensive study of the poem as a whole, based on a reliable text, and taking full account of the mythological, religious, and linguistic problems on which a proper understanding of the poem must depend. In dealing with these problems Page's methods are essentially conservative. Only the most certain supplements are admitted to the text. Where the

evidence is inadequate for a decision he is not afraid to conclude with a *non liquet*, and where several interpretations are admissible he is willing to indicate his preference without prejudice to the alternatives. He ascribes to the papyrus the authority it obviously deserves, and will not for example countenance suggestions of a division into semichoirs of which the papyrus (so rich in paragraphoi and other symbols) gives no hint. At the same time he is ready to correct the orthography of the papyrus where the linguistic and epigraphical evidence is conclusive: accordingly he disregards the "Doric" $\sigma = \theta$ of the papyrus, and prints *πάθον, θιῶν, παρθένος*, not *πάσον, σιῶν, παρσένος*. And elsewhere, as in the interpretation of the myth, his well-grounded conservatism leads him, in fact, to quite revolutionary conclusions. After the unfettered speculation to which the poem has so often been subjected, this approach is as refreshing as it is sound, and the results are, in the main, entirely convincing.

The text of the poem is presented twice, first in a transcript of the papyrus, based on the readings of Blass, Barrett, and Page himself (with one important new reading, *τέρει* for *τηρεῖ* in line 77, attributed to Lobel); and again as emended and reconstructed. Only the most certain supplements have been admitted to the text, and only the more plausible ones are recorded in the critical apparatus, though some others find mention in the commentary. As compared with the text as printed in Diehl's *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* (ed. 1, 1925; I have not seen the second volume, published in 1942, of ed. 2), the differences, quite apart from the presence or absence of supplements, while individually often quite slight, are so numerous that Page's claim (p. v) that he could find "no reliable text" seems only too true. As to Page's own deviations from the readings he records for the papyrus, it should be noted that the justification is to be sought, not in the critical apparatus, but in the detailed study of the Dialect which forms the third portion of the present work. The text is followed by a translation, a procedure which should be regarded as essential in all publications of new or debatable texts.

It is not possible without gross oversimplification to summarize Page's interpretation, but some few points should be noted. Aleman's whole treatment of the legendary portion of the poem shows an affectionate concern with ancient Laconian traditions. In particular, the native Dioseuri overshadow Heracles in the chief legend, which thus appears in an unfamiliar form and is not to be reconstructed simply on the basis of Pausanias' account of the feud between Heracles and the sons of Hippocoön.—As to the much debated constitution of the choir, Page readily establishes that Hagesichora, to whose praises the song constantly reverts, *is* the Leader, and Agido no more than a Second-in-Command; the full complement of the choir is ten (not eleven), the eight members of the rank and file being the girls named in vv. 70-76 (excluding Aenesimbrota), who sing the praises of their leaders while Hagesichora and Agido are engaged in ritual and prayer; the Peleïades are a rival choir. In order to assign a function to Agido it may be supposed that part or all of the *dancing* was semichoral, but attempts to divide up the singing parts by individuals or semichoirs are misguided and lead

only to confusion. The objections adduced to such a procedure are decisive, and it is to be hoped that this particular will-o'-the-wisp will not again distract the unwary.—Finally, Page is duly circumspect in regard to the religious occasion for the poem. He resolutely retains *ὀρθρίαι* as the reading of the text in v. 61, whether it be taken as nominative plural or dative singular, and rejects the variant *Ὀρθίαι* offered by the Scholion. At the same time he allows that the ancient commentators were presumably well informed on the identity of the goddess for whose festival the poem was composed, and he shows that nothing in the text is inconsistent with what is known of the cult of Ortheia. Beyond this, it is impossible to go.

The Supplementary Notes (pp. 82-101) include much detailed discussion in support and justification of the interpretation previously offered, as well as the usual line by line commentary. The final section of the work, as already noted, is a study, based on the manuscript tradition of all the fragments, of Aleman's dialect, which is found to be basically and preponderantly the Laconian vernacular, uncontaminated by any alien dialect except the Epic.

This is a sound, even a model, piece of literary criticism, carried out with sensitivity and discretion. Thanks to Page's efforts the *Partheneion* stands freed from the encumbrance of much unfounded speculation and unnecessary complication. Individual points of interpretation and judgment may be open to question. It is unlikely that Page's major conclusion will be seriously challenged.

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CHARLES ALEXANDER ROBINSON, JR. *Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian*. New York, Macmillan Company, 1951. Pp. xxiii + 738; 138 illustrations; 83 maps and diagrams. \$6.00.

This is a textbook which will no doubt be welcomed by many instructors in ancient history. Physically, the book is attractive: it is well-made, handsomely illustrated, and provided with numerous maps. As regards arrangement and content, established conventions have been followed. It should also be said that Professor Robinson writes reasonably well and shows familiarity with recent publications dealing with many phases of ancient history.

It would be exceedingly unfair to criticize this particular book for defects traditional as well as fundamental which are common to most "ancient histories." Does a textbook of this kind need to begin with a chapter on prehistory? Probably not. If, however, such a chapter is to be included, the author should be warned that eleven pages will hardly be sufficient for an adequate treatment of the subject. Prehistory involves something beyond opening a closet door for a peek at a couple of skeletons.

Far more serious, however, is the universal mishandling of ancient

Near Eastern history. In this field the average textbook writer is hopelessly lost. There is no available pattern or synthesis for him to follow, for the Near Eastern field is the happy hunting ground of specialists who seldom share their game with lesser mortals.

Ideally, the author of a textbook on ancient history should try to achieve three goals in his treatment of the Near East. In the first place, an attempt should be made at a synthesis; the usual hodge-podge only bewilders and antagonizes the reader. Secondly, the people of the ancient Near East must be brought to life, projected in three dimensions instead of two. If this can be done for the Greeks and Romans, it can be done for the Sumerians, Egyptians, and Hittites. Thirdly, Near Eastern history should be given its proper place in the larger story of ancient civilization. It is essential to explain that ancient civilization began in the Near East and was diffused to Mediterranean lands. This continuity of culture ought to be the central theme of any ancient history, and it is not enough to state on page 1 that such a continuity exists. Subsequent demonstration is required if the statement is to be meaningful.

Putting aside these general criticisms which might be made of almost any "ancient history," two specific faults of this book ought to be mentioned. It contains more than its quota of glittering generalization, and it lacks balance. Prehistory and the Near East are covered in 75 actual pages of text; 250 pages are devoted to Greece, and 207 to Rome. Quite a point is made of the fact that this book carries the story down to 565 A.D., but it is instructive to observe that the period from the death of Commodus to that of Justinian is covered in 47 pages.

TOM B. JONES.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

DAVID DIRINGER. *The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind.*

New York, Philosophical Library, 1948. Second and Revised Edition (no date). Pp. 607, with 256 cuts in the text. \$12.00.

In spite of the size and cost of this work, the sale of the first edition was so heavy that it was exhausted within a year, and the preface to the revised edition is dated only fifteen months after the preface to the first. This gives some idea of the need which the appearance of Diringer's work has filled. The reviewer noticed the first edition in *Modern Language Notes*, March, 1949, pp. 182 ff.; it is therefore not necessary to go into details again. The current revision has utilized all comments and criticisms received by the author in the first few months of publication. Needless to say, additional literature on the subject has been accumulating, and further revisions would now be necessary. Among the more important items now available should be listed J. G. Février, *Histoire de l'écriture* (Paris, 1948), G. R. Driver, *Semitic Writing from Pictograph to Alphabet* (London, 1948), I. J. Gelb, *A Study of Writing* (Chicago, 1952), Sir John Myres, *Scripta Minora*, Vol. II (Oxford, 1952). This last work, combined with E. L. Bennett's *The Pylos Tablets, a Preliminary Transcription* (Princeton, 1951), provides a

solid basis for decipherment of the Cretan system of writing, though Johannes Sundwall is quite correct in emphasizing the obstacle still furnished by the absence of adequate photographic reproductions.

In the first edition Diringer omitted any reference to the debate between Berthold Ullman and Rhys Carpenter about the date of the borrowing of the Phoenician alphabet by the Hellenes. He has now introduced an allusion to this debate and the present state of the question (p. 452), but still without a bibliography. His statements are very unsatisfactory. While it is quite true that the debate now ranges between extremes in the eleventh and the eighth centuries B. C., very few hold to the impossible date in the eleventh, and no serious scholar, so far as the reviewer knows, maintains a date in the seventh century (line 2 of p. 452). It is a mystery how a Semitic epigrapher like Diringer can maintain such an impossible theory as that of Ullman. Gelb's date in the ninth century is also that of Driver and other Semitic epigraphers (*op. cit.*, pp. 180 f.). No Greek archaeologist, however, now maintains such high dates for the Thera and Dipylon inscriptions as the early eighth, "or even the late ninth century B. C."; the most daring epigraphers limit themselves to the second half of the eighth century, and most students probably follow Rhys Carpenter in dating them in the seventh. The reviewer continues to insist strenuously on raising the date of the transition from geometric to orientalizing and "archaic" types of pottery in Cypriote and related Hellenic cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean from about 700 to nearer 750, but this does not mean that he is willing to date the borrowing of the alphabet before about 800 B. C. By far the closest analogies in form with the letters in the earliest Greek inscriptions are provided by Northwest-Semitic inscriptions from the first half of the eighth century.

W. F. ALBRIGHT.

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ATTILIO DEGRASSI. *I fasti consolari dell' impero romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo*. Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1952. Pp. xviii + 298. Lire 2500. (*Sussidi Eruditi*, 3.)

The editor of the *fasti consulares et triumphales* needs no introduction. He is, of course, the foremost student of the list of consuls. The list published by Liebenam in 1909 has long been out of date, and a completely new one by a competent scholar really fills an urgent need. The author is not only a competent scholar but a great master of Latin Epigraphy, and he has performed this long awaited work in a manner which will not disappoint justified expectations.

The new list, beautifully printed on good paper, deserves special commendation also for its disposition, compactness, and ease of reference. Well over half the book is devoted to indices. The chrono-

logical list is drawn up on two levels, on the upper part of the page those consulships which are dated with certainty, and on the lower part those consulships which belong in the general period. The names are so printed that one can both see at a glance the main elements in a long name and also tell immediately where a year's record is completely known so that there is no longer room for further names.

The book is an indispensable reference work for a classical library. New discoveries will doubtless bring new names and greater precision of date in some cases, but the author has been so careful to avoid committing himself in cases of doubt that surprises in regard to old names are not to be expected.

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